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ABSTRACTS

Social Foundations of Political Order in Interwar Europe

By G. M. LUEBBERT

Four types of regimes of historic importance appeared in Europe between the two world wars: pluralist democracy, social democracy, traditional dictatorship, and fascism. Where liberal parties had failed to establish responsible parliamentary institutions before World War I, it proved impossible to stabilize pluralist democracy afterward. Henceforth, stabilization would require corporatism in either its social democratic or its fascist form. The author attempts to explain why pluralist democracy was not possible where it had not previously been established, and to identify the conditions that led to social democratic and fascist regimes. In developing an explanation of the regimes that appeared between the wars, the author challenges a number of widely accepted interpretations of fascism that are based on social structure, economic development, leadership, polarization, and ideological conflict.

The Party and the People:

revolutionary and postrevolutionary politics in china and vietnam

By B. WOMACK

During their rural revolutions, the communist parties of China and Vietnam operated as quasi-democratic systems because their major resource against a more powerful, hostile government was mass mobilization. A quasi-democratic system is an authoritarian organizational system constrained by environmental factors to be responsive in its policies to popular interests and demands. Victory confirmed the party's self-image as a mass party, but because of the party's monopoly of power the masses lost the clout they once had. Neither bureaucratic centralism nor Mao's attempt to restage the revolutionary experience in the Cultural Revolution restored any real discretion to the masses. In the 1980s, new reforms in China and Vietnam are beginning to supply institutional supports for mass preferences.

Middlemen in Third-World Corruption:

implications of an indian case

By P. OLDENBURG

An examination of the case of a land consolidation program in India reveals a procedure that has resulted in a contradiction between a low incidence and a high reputation of widespread corruption. This contradiction can be resolved by recognizing that the middleman has an interest in spreading the belief that bribes are necessary to make officials follow the rules. Most significant corruption transactions probably involve middlemen—in fact, a chain of intermediaries—whose roles can be divided into "insiders" (inside the donor's group or inside the recipient's office) and "outsiders" brokers and touts). It is important to analyze corruption in terms of the subtransactions that occur along this chain.

How Middle Powers Can Manage Resource Weakness:

japan and energy

By D. B. BOBROW and R. T. KUDRLE

This paper develops a set of general prescriptions for the behavior of middle-level powers with modest natural resources. The authors use the case of Japanese energy policy to develop prescriptions and demonstrate their feasibility. They do not imply that Japan is an inherently typical middle power, nor do they contend that the policy guidelines they put forward provide a complete explanation of why the Japanese economy has outperformed many others. But they do believe that the Japanese energy case exemplifies what it means for middle powers to come to terms with the post-World War II world, to adapt to the difficulties and opportunities provided by the world market, and to try to shape them in a nationally beneficial manner. Atypically extreme cases can serve to make policy possibilities especially clear.

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The Single Party as an Agent of Development: Lessons from the Soviet Experience

By G. GILL

An important feature of the postwar world has been the dominance of single-party systems as a means of structuring the politics of many of the newly independent states. One of the sources of this dominance has been the perception that the tightly organized single party acts as an effective agent of central control and of bringing about rapid socioeconomic change. This perception emanates in large part from the view of the Soviet Union's development that is current in contemporary scholarship. However, analysis of the Soviet party at the time it achieved the revolutionary breakthrough shows it to have been an organization in which internal management procedures were underdeveloped and chaotic. At the lower levels, power was concentrated in local cliques that were not subject to continuous central control. It is a mistake, therefore, to associate massive socioeconomic change with a tightly organized single party.

Competing Images of the Soviet Union

By B. R. POSEN

International relations theorists have debated the relative merits of unit-level vs. systems-level explanations for state behavior in international politics. Two new histories of Soviet diplomacy in the mid-1930s provide an opportunity to revisit this theoretical dispute. The books disagree on how to interpret Soviet diplomacy, especially its role in the failure of collective security. One of them explicitly traces the failure to a deliberate scheme by the Soviet Union, driven by its totalitarian nature, to cooperate with and profit from the expansion of the model totalitarian state, Nazi Germany. The other interprets the policy as a cautious effort to form a coalition with the Western allies to prevent Nazi expansion. Evidence is introduced that supports a systems-level interpretation of the failure of collective security. This stresses the influence of the barriers to cooperation within the anarchical international system which have plagued many alliances. Of special importance in this period were widespread perceptions of defense dominance in warfare. The systems-level approach emerges as the more persuasive interpretation.

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Global Affairs

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SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL ORDER IN INTERWAR EUROPE

By GREGORY M. LUEBBERT*

FOUR types of regimes of historic importance appeared in Europe between the two world wars: pluralist democracy, social or corporatist democracy, traditional dictatorship, and fascism. The vast body of literature that has grown up around them has rarely cast these political orders as historical alternatives to each other, however. When it has done so, it has normally cast pluralist democracy as the alternative to fascism. Most commonly, this has taken the form of contrasts between Germany and Britain, and has been accompanied by the question, why was Germany not like Britain?[1] Yet, pluralist democracy such as appeared in Britain was actually the least relevant alternative between the wars, for the possibility of stabilizing it where it did not already exist had been foreclosed by World War I. Where liberal parties had failed to establish responsible parliamentary institutions before the war, it would prove impossible to stabilize a pluralist democracy afterward. Henceforth, stabilization would require corporatism—in either its fascist or social democratic variant—rather than pluralism.

The appearance of fascism, however, was not predetermined by the irrelevance of pluralist democracy. Germany did not become fascist because it could not become a pluralist democracy such as Britain. It became fascist because it could become neither a corporatist democracy such as Norway nor a traditional dictatorship such as appeared in much of eastern Europe. It was still possible to establish a stable social or corporatist

* I would like to thank Vinod Aggarwal, Gabriel Almond, Paul Buchanan, David Collier, Giuseppe Di Palma, Joseph Fizman, Ernst Haas, Andrew Janos, Daniel Verdier, and John Zysman for their thoughtful comments on the longer manuscript from which this article is taken. I am especially indebted to Daniel Verdier for his research assistance.

[1] Among the most influential of these works are those by Ralf Dahrendorf and Karl Dietrich Bracher, both of whom postulate a liberal or Anglo-Saxon theory of the state and contrast it with a German Idealist tradition. See Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (New York: Norton, 1967); Bracher, *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik* [The Dissolution of the Weimar Republic] (Stuttgart: Ring Verlag, 1955). Two influential but more sociologically grounded analyses that make use of the contrast between Britain and Germany are Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), and Alexander Gerschenkron, *Bread and Democracy in Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943).

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democracy. This could be done if socialists could form a coalition with the countryside. Even when socialists could not do this, it was still possible to avoid fascism if interwar liberals could make such a coalition. Where they could do so, the result would be a traditional dictatorship. Fascism, in other words, could only appear if pluralist democracy, social democracy, and traditional dictatorship could not. An understanding of fascism, then, requires an understanding of why these alternative regimes were not possible in some countries.

To understand why they were not, we must study the determinants of both state and labor-market institutions. The form the interwar state ultimately assumed in the crises of the 1920s and 1930s cannot be understood apart from the manner in which workers became organized in the labor market. For both state and labor market institutions took shape simultaneously as two halves of the same response to working-class mobilization.

Trade unions could be organized along corporatist or pluralist lines, or they could simply be repressed by the state. Corporatism between the wars denoted a system in which economic interests in a private economy were becoming functionally organized in groups that were centralized, comprehensive, and authoritative. In its democratic variant—social democracy—membership in these organizations was voluntary; the organizations mediated the relationship among workers, capitalists, sectors of the economy, and the state. In social democracies, corporatist labor unions have served to offset the otherwise inherent advantages of employers in collective bargaining and in the polity, and have played a critical role in the making of social policy. Corporatism has not been mainly a system of restraint and control of the working class, but of inclusion. Social democracies appeared between the wars in Norway, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser degree in Denmark.[2]

In its authoritarian variant—fascism—corporatist organizations were mainly mechanisms through which the state controlled and mobilized workers and capitalists. Here corporatism provided the institutional means to subordinate the working class; inclusion was mainly symbolic. Corporatist trade unions served as the transmission belts of the material benefits and coercion by which the controlling party attempted to buy the support or force the acquiescence of labor. Between the wars, such re-

[2] The interwar Czechoslovakian experience and its corporatist aspects can be found in Harry Klepetař, *Seit 1918 . . . Eine Geschichte der Tschechoslowakischen Republik* [Since 1918 . . . A History of the Czechoslovak Republik] (Moravska Ostrava: Verlag Julius Kittls Nachfolger, 1937), esp. 283-375.

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gimes appeared in Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and, to a lesser degree, in Franco's Spain.

In pluralist labor markets, trade unions were legally free—within some basic rules—to organize, bargain collectively, and agitate politically. In contrast to their counterparts in social democracies, unions remained comparatively weakly organized and less effective in bargaining with employers and the state. They did not exhibit the same comprehensiveness or centralization; leaders could not speak with authority for their members on a broad range of social and economic questions. There developed no legal or cultural presumption that union leaders had to be consulted and their policy demands accommodated by the state. The United States, Britain, France, Ireland, and Switzerland are examples of pluralist democracies.

The fourth variety of political order that appeared between the wars was the traditional dictatorship. It combined severe curtailments of political competition with repression in the labor market. Parliament was closed or existed only as a rump after important parties had been outlawed. Trade unions were either greatly restricted or outlawed altogether, but they were not, as in fascist regimes, replaced by state-sponsored organizations of control. Such regimes offered no solution to the problem of working-class integration; rather, they attempted to ignore it. To that extent, they were inherently unstable. Such traditional dictatorships appeared in Finland, Austria, Hungary, and much of eastern Europe.

The four regimes are, to be sure, ideal types. No society acquired institutions that corresponded perfectly to the idealized models, and some institutions were a mixture, especially of the pluralist and social democratic models. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark, for instance, fell between the pluralist and corporatist models, with the first two more closely approximating the pluralist model, and Denmark more closely approximating the social democratic model. The intermediate position of these countries reflects and can be explained by the mixed character of their developmental experience, which combined aspects of both the pluralist and corporatist experiences.

The four regimes were the interwar byproducts of four routes from preindustrial politics to the crises of the 1920s and 1930s. Each route was delineated by a historical legacy and by the urban-rural coalition that formed in response to the interwar crises. The historical legacy was provided by the dominance, or lack thereof, of liberal parties before the First World War. Nowhere before the war were liberals in unambiguous po-

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litical control. Rather, they exercised more or less influence, sometimes in an alliance with, and sometimes in competition with, rural interests. Whether they were the senior or junior partner (or antagonist), however, was of decisive importance. Where they were dominant—as in Britain (where the Liberal Party and the liberalized Conservative Party alternated in power until the war), Switzerland (where the Radicals controlled every government from 1848 to 1919), and France (where Republicans were dominant after 1877)—workers entered politics before World War I; they did so gradually and in groups, rather than suddenly and as a cohesive class. As a result, these societies, all of which acquired democratic polities, also acquired pluralist labor markets.

The situation was dramatically different in countries in which liberals were not dominant. Here, the war was a turning point in the transition to mass politics. Its trauma and the example of the Bolshevik Revolution served to radicalize workers and polarize politics in all societies. Workers and peasants were now politically active everywhere. The explosion of political participation was vastly more difficult to accommodate where workers had not been brought into politics gradually under liberal tutelage. Where they had not been, they had come to be organized in politics and in the labor market in a more explicitly class-based manner. Yet, the political and economic citizenship of this more cohesively organized class remained incomplete. In effect, modern political orders had yet to be created. Ultimately, corporatism in either its social democratic or fascist variant, rather than pluralism, would be required to stabilize class politics in these societies.

The form of the political order was determined by the coalition of urban and rural interests that emerged in response to the crises. In the making of these coalitions, the allegiance of the family peasantry proved decisive: when it sided with an urban socialist party, the outcome was a social democratic regime; when it sided with the party or parties of traditional liberals, the outcome was invariably a traditional dictatorship. In this essay, I will attempt to identify the conditions that produced each of these coalitions. To set the stage, we must first consider the importance of liberal dominance in the creation of pluralist democracies, and why it was that the political economies established after World War I could not become pluralist democracies.

Pluralist Democracies

The model of the pluralist path, as exemplified by the British transition, has long fixed attention on the essential feature that distinguished

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early democratizers.[3] In these societies, the bourgeoisie gained a dominant position, through the vehicle of liberal parties, before workers mobilized autonomously. In societies that were becoming pluralist, working class unions and parties gained access to the state through collaboration with the liberal community. Liberals gradually accommodated themselves to demands for an enlarged suffrage, the secret ballot, the elimination of unequal electoral districts, the legalization of trade unions, collective bargaining, the right to strike, and so forth. In large measure, these long-term reforms came about because they served the short-term electoral needs of liberal parties. For example, because French Republicans needed the support of workers in their struggle against Conservatives, they met the three most important demands of French worker movements after 1877: the establishment of universal, free secular public education; the pardoning of the Communards; and the legalization of trade unions, collective bargaining, and the right to strike.[4]

Because workers in these societies gained the right to vote early on and because parliamentary institutions had substantial legitimacy among workers, liberal parties never found themselves confronted by the working class as a whole. Instead, they were confronted by scattered groups of gradually mobilized workers, usually organized on a local basis. In control of the state, the liberals could define the terms on which working-class parties were given access to politics; they controlled how votes were counted, constituencies defined, parties registered, campaigns financed, and legislators paid. The liberal parties could extend participation without actually changing the balance of class power very much. Indeed, the Lib-Lab alliances that were so characteristic of this pattern of mobilization actually served to reinforce the balance of class power. To the extent that the Lib-Lab strategy actually benefited workers (or merely appeared to benefit them), the liberal ideology was made more plausible, and the launching of an autonomous working-class movement was made more difficult.

Liberalism—with its emphasis on class harmony, individualism, competition, achievement, and merit—was an ideology that legitimated the pluralist order. Its extended pre-eminence meant that it, rather than the

[3] Early democratizers are defined as societies that acquired responsible parliamentary institutions, manhood suffrage, reasonably equitable electoral laws, and trade union rights before World War I. The countries that met all four of the criteria were Britain, Ireland (as a colony), France, Switzerland, and the United States. All others failed on at least one count. The classical statement of the pluralist path is found in T. H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship and Social Development* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), chap. 4.

[4] Val Lorwin, *The French Labor Movement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 18.

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landed interests or working-class movements, defined the parameters of legitimate political institutions and debate. Working-class parties thus found themselves in the difficult position of arguing against an ideology and parliamentary institutions that appeared legitimate to a large part of the working class. In 1920, Fernand Loriot, a leader of the new Communist Party, lamented the hold of the liberal ideology on French workers' attitudes:

> Whatever we do, we cannot avoid the fact that in France, over 50 years of bourgeois democracy has created within the masses amongst whom we work ... an entirely distinctive mentality. ... People here are still convinced that we have a patrimony of liberties to defend. The whole of our mental formation is based on a revolutionary [i.e., Jacobin] tradition, skillfully manipulated by our bourgeois democracy.[5]

Ironically, one indicator of the success of liberals in integrating the working class is that in some respects they actually had to do less for the material interests of workers than did the leaders of authoritarian states. Peter Flora and Jens Alber have shown that social welfare measures were most highly developed before 1914 in those European societies that lacked parliamentary institutions and political rights for workers. Flora and Alber argue that authoritarian regimes turned to these measures as a substitute for parliamentarism and the granting of political rights to workers. The greater legitimacy bestowed by a parliamentary order and liberal ideology actually militated against the early introduction of social welfare initiatives that were of value to workers.[6]

Much the same process of accommodation under liberal dominance occurred in the labor market. In France, the Republicans legislated the right to form trade unions, to bargain collectively, and to strike in 1884. This law and the manner of its enforcement illustrate the impact of liberal dominance: unions were obliged to register their constitutions and bylaws and the names of their officers. Registered *bourses du travail* were

[5] Quoted in Roger Magraw, *France, 1815-1914: The Bourgeois Century* (New York: Oxford University Press), 373.

[6] Flora and Alber use a less restrictive definition of democratic regime (see fn. 3 for the definition employed here). Their "constitutional-dualist monarchies" are Sweden, Germany, Denmark, and Austria. Their parliamentary regimes are Britain, Switzerland, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Italy, and Norway. Under the more restricted definition employed here, The Netherlands and Belgium almost fit the requirements of early democracies, falling short only on the extent of the suffrage. Norway (electoral laws) and Italy (franchise, electoral laws, trade union rights) clearly do not. Despite the definitional differences, the association between liberalism and late social welfare initiatives remains. Indeed, Flora and Alber's data show that it is strengthened if Italy is properly classified as undemocratic. See "Modernization, Democratization, and the Development of Welfare States in Western Europe," in Peter Flora and Arnold Heidenheimer, eds., *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981), 37-80.

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then eligible to receive state subsidies and rent-free office space. Registration allowed municipalities to keep track of radicals. The government used subsidies to discourage radicalism and, for a time, the creation of labor organizations that stretched across different trades.

The law of 1884 meant that the *state* recognized the existence of unions. It did not mean that employers were required to recognize them. Indeed, for two generations many French employers continued, often brutally, to resist recognition. The reluctance of many employers in France and the United States to recognize unions until compelled to do so in the 1930s was itself a manifestation of the weight of the liberal ideology. The telling effects of the 1884 law, however, were to encourage decentralized unions, to enhance the legitimacy of the Republic, and to redefine substantially the battle as one between workers and employers rather than between workers and the state.[7] The infrequency of political strikes was indicative of the success of French Republicans and their liberal counterparts elsewhere. While political strikes by French, British, and American workers were exceptions, they were common in other countries. In Belgium, for instance, there were four general strikes in the years before 1914. Elsewhere, too, political strikes were a regular feature of labor movements, even where—as in Spain, Germany, and Italy—the political restraints on labor protest were much more repressive.[8]

Because in liberal-dominated societies workers were allowed to organize more or less as they sought to, trade unions became incorporated into the labor market as individual interest groups. They were often organized locally and along craft lines, and developed traditions of local or plant bargaining. By the time national working-class parties and trade-union movements started to form, these locally organized unions had a generation or more of leaders and members whose vested interests in the established organizations had to be overcome in order to create more comprehensive structures.[9]

Among the pluralist democracies, France appears somewhat exceptional because of the eventual emergence of a radical working-class movement in the form of the Communist Party. In the terms used above, the explanation seems straightforward enough, however: liberals had less

[7] The early history of the French labor movement is discussed in Lorwin (fn. 4), chap. 2.

[8] The absence of political strikes by French workers—and the feebleness of syndicalism in the French labor movement generally—has been carefully documented in Peter Stearns, *Revolutionary Syndicalism and French Labor: A Cause Without Rebels* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971), esp. chap. 2.

[9] For a discussion of the obstacles presented by early decentralization for subsequent unification of French labor, see Lorwin (fn. 4), chap. 2. For a parallel discussion of the Swiss experience, see Eduard Weckerle, *The Trade Unions in Switzerland* (Bern: Swiss Federation of Trade Unions, 1947), 16-33.

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of a need to solicit the workers' support because of the combined electoral weight of the middle class and the peasantry and because the centrality of clerical-anticlerical conflict left French workers with no alternative to the Radical Republicans until the appearance of the unified Socialist Party in 1905. The inconsistency of the late formation of the Socialist Party and the eventual appearance of the Communist Party points to another decisive feature of the French experience: France was distinguished not only by the apparently lower level of worker integration before the war, but by its uniquely traumatic experience in the First World War. As a result, the working-class movement was, by the standards of pluralist democracies, comparatively radicalized.

Social Democracy and Fascism

Societies that became social democracies, traditional dictatorships, or fascist dictatorships after World War I differed from pluralist democracies in the comparative weakness of their liberal parties before the war. There were several reasons for this weakness. Most obviously, these societies began to industrialize at a later date—in all cases after 1850, and in many cases not until the beginning of the 20th century. The amount of time in which the subtending class, the bourgeoisie, could assert itself before the war, before the ensuing disruptions, and before the example of the Bolshevik Revolution, was briefer.[10] Also, because late industrialization sometimes brought about a greater role for the state, it often resulted in a correspondingly greater dependence of the bourgeoisie on the state and a less plausible case for the liberal ideology.

Late democratizers entered the First World War with more highly mobilized working classes than early democratizers. The war had uprooted, alienated, disoriented and, therefore, made more susceptible to radical appeals upon their return home (from factories or the front), millions of young men who had previously been beyond the reach of radical organizers. The impact of the war was hardly milder in neutralist countries, traumatized as they were by the economic boom-and-bust cycle of war and peace. In short, a significant difference between societies like these and those that became pluralist democracies was not simply that liberalism was weaker, but that workers became class-conscious over a much briefer period of time. One indication of this is provided by Table 1, which reports the percentage of the vote for the left in the last election

[10] An important study of the impact of the war on political mobilization is provided in Charles S. Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), esp. 3-15.

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TABLE 1
LEFT VOTING AND LEVEL OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

	Prewar Left Vote[a]	*Postwar Left Vote*[a]	*Labor in Non-primary Sectors*[b]
France	16.8	23.0	56.9
Switzerland	20.1	23.5	80.0
Britain	6.4	29.7	91.5
Netherlands	22.9	25.0	77.0
Denmark	29.6	28.7	63.3
Belgium	30.3	36.6	68.0
Norway	26.3	31.6	57.9
Sweden	30.1	38.9[c]	56.3
Finland	43.1	38.0	37.0
Germany	34.8	45.5	69.3
Austria[d]	23.0	40.8	68.1
Italy	22.8	34.3	43.8

[a] Last election before the war and first election after the war. For both elections, the left vote is defined as the social democratic, labor, or socialist party, and all parties to the left of it. Data for both elections are from Peter Flora, ed., *State, Economy and Society in Western Europe, 1815-1975. A Data Handbook. Vol. 1: The Growth of Mass Democracies* (Chicago: St. James Press, 1983), 89-153.

[b] The percentage of the active labor force employed outside the primary sector in about 1920. Source: B. R. Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics*, 2d. rev. ed. (New York: Facts on File, 1980), 151-66.

[c] This election took place in 1917.

[d] Prewar figure is an average for several elections. Source: Walter Korpi, *The Democratic Class Struggle* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), 38.

before the war and in the first election after the war, and the level of industrialization in twelve European countries. The table demonstrates that the societies that had not become democratic had had conspicuously higher levels of support for working-class parties even before the war. Moreover, in almost all cases the level of industrialization was lower, and therefore the size of the working class was smaller in these societies. In effect, working-class parties were having distinctly more success under distinctly less favorable conditions. The war raised the left vote everywhere, but did not close the gap. In none of the early democratizers is the left vote over 30 percent in the first postwar election. It was greater than 30 percent in all but two of the nine late democratizers.

In some societies, foremost among them Italy, Norway, and Sweden, another generation of peace might have resulted in pluralist democratic regimes. In Italy, the Giolittian coalition sought to bring together reform-

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ist parts of the bourgeoisie and what amounted to the Italian equivalent of the "aristocracy of labor" in a reform movement that bore a remarkable resemblance to the early Lib-Lab coalition in Britain. In Norway and Sweden, reform coalitions between parts of the bourgeoisie and leading sectors of the still fairly small industrial working-class movement had come into being during the years immediately before the war. Even in Germany—probably among the countries least likely to become a stable pluralist democracy because of the high level of class-consciousness—halting attempts to create a reformist coalition of liberals and labor had appeared in 1912.

Late industrialization and the war were the most proximate destabilizing factors. It was of more fundamental importance that in societies that were to become social democracies, traditional dictatorships, or fascist, the liberal community was deeply divided. Norway and Czechoslovakia, with sociological fault lines that divided bourgeois political movements into linguistic, regional, cultural and religious blocs, illustrate this well. In Norway, liberals were never able on their own to sponsor successful reform movements before World War I. As a result, rural interests dominated the Storting, the dominant values of the party system were agrarian rather than industrial, and economic liberalization was long delayed. The shift to parliamentary sovereignty itself was mainly brought about by rural representatives, and was aimed at controlling the big spending of urban bureaucrats.[11] In Czechoslovakia, liberal movements were similarly constrained by their divisions and by subordination to rural interests. Czech liberalism was also constrained by the peripheral position of Bohemia and Moravia in the Habsburg Empire.[12]

These divisions within the liberal community generally reflected the incompleteness of nation-state formation before industrialization. The basic questions of territorial identity, national language, and religion remained unresolved. These "preindustrial cleavages," to borrow Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan's phrase, continued to divide the liberal community; as a result, the latter was never able to obtain the pre-eminent position that its counterparts acquired in countries like Switzerland and Britain.[13] Switzerland's experience indicates that the decisive point is

[11] On the weakness of liberalism in Scandinavia, see Francis Castles, *The Social Democratic Image of Society* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).

[12] On Czechoslovakia, see Victor Mamatey, "The Establishment of the Republic," in Victor Mamatey and Radomír Luža, eds., *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 3-39.

[13] Sweden and Denmark are partial exceptions. The Swedish liberal community was divided into separate parties by the high church–low church conflict and by the temperance issue. This is in contrast to France, for instance, where religious conflict solidified rather than divided the liberal community. The Danish liberal community was divided by constitutional,

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not that such cleavages exist in a party system, but that they prevent liberals from acquiring a position of dominance. Swiss Radicals and Catholic Conservatives were constantly in conflict over clerical questions, but because the former outnumbered the latter by about four to one in the legislature, the political dominance of the Radicals was never challenged. Taking a longer view of causality, then, we can say that societies in which preindustrial cleavages were sufficient to undermine the dominance of liberals at the onset of worker mobilization could only be stabilized by corporatist institutions in the 1920s and 1930s, whether democratic or fascist, because of the debilitating effect of these cleavages on the political claims of the liberal community.

Liberal interests in these societies were attacked simultaneously by traditional urban and rural oligarchs, peasants, and workers. Paradoxically, the same divisions that inhibited liberal parties from establishing their pre-eminence also prevented them from expanding their support outside the bourgeoisie. The vulnerability of the bourgeoisie apparently made it more difficult to persuade bourgeois voters and activists to accept concessions to workers' interests in exchange for their support. Thus, in countries like Italy, Sweden, and Germany, liberal parties appear never to have succeeded in gaining the percentage of the working-class vote that their counterparts received in Britain, Switzerland, and France.[14]

This inability to create successful reformist alliances of the bourgeoisie and workers in the early period of worker mobilization had momentous implications. Above all, it meant that workers were more likely to be mobilized as a class than as a series of locally organized interest groups and trade unions. In the face of limited opportunities to gain influence through alliances with bourgeois interests, arguments for class-based worker organizations were made more compelling. Liberalism was empirically refuted by the political and labor-market experiences of workers.

The outcome was a high level of class-consciousness, radicalization, and polarization. Under the circumstances, the conflict between the two urban classes became so intense that their representatives could not jointly found a stable political economy. It was not for lack of effort: the

military, and foreign policy conflicts as well as by the usual social reform questions. The classic analysis of cleavage development is Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Lipset and Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967), 1-64.

[14] There is no direct evidence that liberal parties in these societies received fewer working-class votes, but—given the less frequent and less successful appearance of Lib-Lab alliances—it seems impossible to infer otherwise. Such alliances are discussed in Seymour Martin Lipset, "Radicalism or Reformism: The Sources of Working-Class Politics," *American Political Science Review* 77 (January 1983), 1-19.

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usual democratic coalition of the 1920s was a coalition of the reforming bourgeoisie and labor. Yet, in every case this coalition either could not be formed at all at the governmental level (as in Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Czechoslovakia) or soon failed under the weight of its internal contradictions (Weimar Germany and Spain). In all of these countries, the coalition was eventually formed between representatives of one of the urban classes and the middle peasants.

The Coalition with the Countryside

The coalition had to be with middle peasants because, within the agrarian population, only middle peasants combined a mass base, a fairly high and stable rate of political participation, a distinct political agenda, *and* the ability to destabilize the polity if this agenda was not realized. By contrast, landed elites almost everywhere were a spent political force in the 1920s and 1930s; they were no longer in control of the middle peasantry and the rural proletariat. Although the rural proletariat had its own agenda and, in some countries, the potential to provide a mass base, it was, by itself, the postwar equivalent of Marx's "sack of potatoes." Incapable of leading itself or creating its own organizations, it could be organized as a durable force only by groups that were not actually of it: socialists, reform-minded liberals, and christian democrats. Hence, it could be ignored if the sources of external leadership were neutralized.

Middle peasants, by contrast, usually had autonomous interest groups or a powerful voice in larger agrarian groups. In Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, they had their own agrarian parties. In Catholic Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Spain, and parts of northern Italy, they had a decisive position in less homogeneous parties. In Protestant Germany and other parts of northern Italy, they had the ability to abandon swiftly traditional representatives whom they judged to have served them poorly.

A socialist movement that sought to mobilize the rural proletariat (landless laborers and smallholders dependent on the labor market) contained the seeds of its own failure, because it would become entrapped in rural class conflict and thereby alienate middle peasants. A coalition with middle peasants required that socialists address three kinds of conflict: rural class conflict, consumer-producer conflict, and, sometimes, clerical-anticlerical and regional conflict. My contention is that defusing the second set of conflicts was essential to the creation of a worker-peasant coalition, but that these conflicts could not be defused if the socialist party found itself in confrontation with middle peasants on rural class-struc-

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ture issues. If the consumer-producer issues could be defused, the less important clerical-anticlerical and regional issues could also be defused.

Class conflict was as central to the political lives of peasants as it was to the political lives of urban workers and the bourgeoisie. Where socialist parties sought to mobilize the rural proletariat, they became enmeshed in this conflict and threatened middle peasants in several ways. The greatest threat arose from campaigns for land reform. Redistribution was a central issue of rural politics in Spain, Italy, Finland, Denmark, and Czechoslovakia. The fact that redistribution would have occurred at the expense of large landowners seems not to have reduced the threat felt by the middle peasants, especially in areas such as northern Italy, where there was a substantial rural proletariat and little surplus land to redistribute. When the assertion that their land was secure came from parties born of a collectivist ambition, it appeared especially incredible. For peasants, the security of the asset around which their entire existence revolved had to be beyond question. Hence, the Spanish Socialists' campaign for land reform in the south of Spain antagonized peasants even in the north.[15]

Socialist mobilization of agrarian workers also threatened the middle peasants' productive process. Middle peasants, who, by definition, did not rely heavily on hired labor, nonetheless had an employer's perspective. For, to the extent that they did hire a worker or two, socialist efforts to unionize agrarian workers, to establish centralized hiring halls, to fix wages, and to extend social welfare benefits to agrarian workers all impinged on the peasants' costs of production and their freedom to manage their land.

The cumulative effect was to threaten middle peasants in a third way. At stake, ultimately, was their social status. In this context, it is easy to understand why socialists' protestations that they were committed to the interests of both agrarian workers and middle peasants sounded as implausible to middle peasants as the reformist liberals' claims that they were committed to the interests of both workers and the bourgeoisie did to urban workers. And just as the socialists' efforts on behalf of urban workers aroused intense resentment among the petite bourgeoisie, even when it was not directly and materially threatened, their efforts on behalf of agrarian workers were bound to generate intense resentment among middle peasants. Indeed, resentment and a sense of neglect were the common features of all antisocialist peasant movements.

When Socialist parties did succeed in founding regimes, it was not be-

[15] See Edward Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: Origins of the Civil War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 219 and passim.

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cause they had a superior grasp of the strategic requirements of the moment, but because they did not attempt to organize the rural proletariat. The level of industrialization or the class structure of the countryside had little bearing on this, as can be seen by examining first the size of the primary labor force in comparison to the total labor force, and then the size of the proletarian labor force in comparison to the total agrarian labor force. These data, for the early 1920s, appear in Table 2. Of the three least agrarian countries, one became fascist, one became a traditional dictatorship (Austria, under the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime), and one became a social democracy. Of the three most agrarian countries, two became fascist, and the third (Finland) became semi-authoritarian.

TABLE 2
RURAL POPULATION AND REGIME OUTCOME

	Primary Labor Force (as a percentage of total labor force)[a]	*Agrarian Proletariat (as a percentage of total primary labor force)*[a]	*Regime Outcome*
Germany	30.7	26	Fascism
Austria	31.9	26	Dictatorship
Denmark	37.7	43	Social democracy
Czechoslovakia	40.3	35	Social democracy
Norway	42.1	15	Social democracy
Sweden	43.7	26	Social democracy
Spain	56.0	35-40	Fascism
Italy	56.2	35-40	Fascism
Finland	63.0	30	Dictatorship

[a] Data in the first two columns are from about 1920. The agrarian proletariat is defined as landless workers or smallholders dependent on the agrarian labor market for some part of their income.

Sources: For the first column, Mitchell (Table 1, fn. b), 151-66. For the second column, the figures are estimates based on data reported in Frieda Wunderlich, *Farm Labor in Germany, 1810-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 15 (Germany); *Statistisches Handbuch für den Bundesstaat Österreich*, vol. 26 (Vienna: Statistical Office, 1936), 43 (Austria); *Danmarks Statistik. Statistiske Meddelelser. Landbrugets Arbejdeskraft. 1904 og 1935*, series 4, vol. 102, no. 3 (Copenhagen: Statistical Department, 1937), 15 (Denmark); *Manuel Statistique, 1931*, vol. 3 (Prague: Statistical Bureau of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1931), 300 (Czechoslovakia); Kare Lunden, "The Growth of Co-operatives Among the Norwegian Dairy Farmers During the Period 1856-1905," *Cahiers Internationaux d'Histoire Economique et Sociale*, vol. 6 (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1973), 342 (Norway); *Statistisk Årsbok för Sverige: 1932* (Stockholm: Statistical Bureau, 1932), 24-25 (Sweden); *Statistisk Årsbok för Finland: 1931* new series (Helsinki: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1931), 50-52 (Finland); Edward Malefakis, "Peasants, Politics and Civil War in Spain, 1931-1939," in Robert Bezucha, ed., *Modern European Social History* (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1972), 196, passim (Spain); J. C. Adams, "Italy," in Walter Galenson, ed., *Comparative Labor Movements* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1968), 413-14 (Italy).

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The size of the agrarian proletariat is also unrelated to the regime outcome. Spain and Italy, both of which became fascist, had huge agrarian proletariats. Germany and Austria, one of which became fascist and one of which became a traditional dictatorship, had comparatively small agrarian proletariats. We have fascist outcomes, then, with both large and small agricultural proletariats. The lack of a pattern continues: Denmark, with a large proletariat, produced a democratic outcome. Sweden, with an agrarian proletariat similar to that of Germany and Austria, produced a democratic outcome. Norway, with a very small proletariat, and Czechoslovakia, with a rather large agrarian proletariat, also produced democratic outcomes.

The outcomes were determined by politics rather than by rural class structure. Socialists succeeded in making a coalition with middle peasants wherever the agrarian proletariat had been mobilized by others before socialists had an opportunity to do so. So pre-empted, the latter could freely negotiate the issues that divided rural producers and urban workers. By contrast, where the rural proletariat was available—as in Spain, Italy, Finland, and Germany—it presented socialists with a reservoir of potential support too appealing to ignore. In these cases, the logic of democratic competition and the lure of immediate power undermined the socialists' ability to acquire long-term power because the acquisition of a constituency among the rural proletariat invariably required commitments that alienated the middle peasants.

Where socialist parties were able to avoid this alienation, it was possible for them to find a way out of the regime crises of the early 1930s by making a bargain with middle peasants. The typical agreement involved some combination of price supports, interest-rate reductions, debt restructuring, protective tariffs, and tax relief in exchange for increased public works, deficit spending, and expanded unemployment benefits. Agreements of this sort were negotiated in Denmark, Sweden, and Czechoslovakia in 1933, and in Norway in 1935.[16]

By entering a coalition that satisfied the interests of middle peasants and made the latter dependent on the social democratic state, social democrats attained several objectives. Above all, they created a stable power base.[17] On this they could build the corporatist institutions that consoli-

[16] On Czechoslovakia, see Klepetař (fn. 2), 283-375; on Scandinavia, see Sven Nilsson et al., eds., *Kriser och krispolitik i Norden under mellankrigstiden* [Crises and crisis politics in the interwar Nordic countries] (Uppsala: Nordic History Association, 1974).

[17] For fascism, too, the coalition with rural interests provided the social foundations for the stabilization of a new order. Once in power, fascists could obviously rely on coercion (rather than inducement) to a vastly greater degree than could social democrats. Yet, fascists by no means entirely ignored the material needs of their constituents; a plausible case can be made

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dated their hold on the state and the working class.[18] From this position of dominance, they could, in turn, induce the collaboration of the business community.[19] And they could carry through the social reforms that the interests of their working-class constituents required. In Denmark, for example, in the years immediately following the Kanslergade Agreement, the Social Democratic government succeeded in gaining passage of legislation establishing or improving workers' compensation, invalid, unemployment, and health insurance, a pension plan, and public assistance.[20]

Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Czechoslovakia

The critical distinction between cases of socialist success and failure is to be found in the marginal number of agrarian workers in successful movements. Because there are no standardized data that allow us to make easy crossnational comparisons on this score, I have relied on data on trade-union enrollments, collective agreements, intergenerational voter surveys, and election and census reports. Taken together, these figures are revealing in spite of their lack of strict comparability.

We will begin with Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, three countries in which socialists successfully aligned themselves with middle peasants. Norway provides the simplest case. Because of earlier land reforms and the exodus of much of the rural proletariat to North America, the rural social structure had become remarkably egalitarian by the interwar years. As early as 1900, 97 percent of farmers owned their land and employed little or no hired labor.[21] According to an inter-generational survey made by the late Stein Rokkan, agrarian voters (middle peasants, smallholders, *and* day laborers) did not account for more than 13 to 15 percent of the total Labor Party vote in the 1920s and 1930s.[22] Even if we assume that

that their regimes, too, acquired widespread legitimacy. See A. James Gregor, *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), chaps. 5-9.

[18] The close association between social democratic power, democratic corporatism, and the worker-peasant alliance in Scandinavia has been extensively discussed. See Gøsta Esping-Andersen, *Politics Against Markets* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), chap. 5; Walter Korpi, *The Democratic Class Struggle* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), chap. 1; Philippe C. Schmitter, "Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal Change in Western Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 10 (October 1978), 1-20.

[19] See Korpi (fn. 18), 48 and passim.

[20] Harry Haue et al., *Det ny Danmark, 1890-1978, Udviklingslinier og tendens* [The new Denmark, 1890-1978, lines of development and tendencies] (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1980), 168.

[21] Kare Lunden, "The Growth of Co-operatives Among the Norwegian Dairy Farmers During the Period 1856-1905," *Cahiers Internationaux d'Histoire Economique et Sociale* 6 (Geneva: Librarie Droz, 1973), 342.

[22] Stein Rokkan, "Geography, Religion and Social Class: Crosscutting Cleavages in Norwegian Politics," in Lipset and Rokkan (fn. 13), Table 26, 429.

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two-thirds of these voters were at least partly dependent on the agrarian labor market for some income, we find that at most 10 percent of the party's constituency could have consisted of agrarian workers. Finally, it appears that within the Norwegian trade union movement, agrarian workers accounted for no more than 5 percent of the membership.[23]

Sweden, with a considerably less equal distribution of land, provides a more demanding test of the hypothesis. In the early 1930s, 26 percent of the agrarian work force—about 250,000 men and women—were day laborers (see Table 2). Since almost all of these were adult males, we may assume that, including wives and other adult dependents, at least 400,000 votes were contained in this labor force. To put this in perspective, recall that the Socialist electorate averaged about 750,000, and the total electorate about 2,200,000, during these years.[24]

Yet, the Socialist Party and the unions almost entirely ignored this potential constituency. As Sven Anders Söderpalm has noted:

> The Swedish agricultural workers' movement was weak and divided for a long time. . . . In the middle of the twenties, not even 5 percent of a total of 250,000 agricultural workers were organized, and only in the large estate areas on Skåne, Östergötland and the Mälar provinces was there any great support for the movement. The decline in part resulted from the advantage the agricultural crisis gave to employers, but it was also connected to the lack of interest which for a long time had distinguished the labor movement's attitude toward the rural proletarians' efforts.[25]

The Social Democrats did not seriously debate appealing to agrarian workers until 1930; by then, these workers had already been mobilized by the Liberal and Agrarian Parties. Liberals and Agrarians had in fact, succeeded in mobilizing these workers *against* the Social Democrats. "In most of the election districts," Söderpalm reports, "the majority of farm workers voted for the bourgeois parties."[26]

Although we cannot estimate accurately the actual amount of support the Social Democratic Party received from agrarian laborers and their dependents, we can estimate rather precisely the maximum amount of support it could have received under the most favorable circumstances. As-

[23] Two sources indicate that within the Norwegian trade union movement (LO) agricultural and forestry workers together constituted only 10% of the membership in 1931, and that forestry workers were a majority. See Hans Fredrik Dahl, *Norge mellom krigene. Det norske samfunnet i krise og konflikt* [Norway between the wars. The Norwegian society in crisis and conflict] (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 1971), 91, and Berge Furre, *Norsk historie, 1905-1940* [Norwegian history, 1905-1940] (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 1971), 200.

[24] Election data for Sweden are from Stig Hadenius et al., *Sverige efter 1900* [Sweden after 1900] (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1978), Table I.C., 306-7.

[25] Söderpalm, "The Crisis Agreement and the Swedish Social Democratic Road to Power," in Steven Koblik, ed., *Sweden's Development from Poverty to Affluence, 1750-1970* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), 263-64.

[26] *Ibid.*, 264.

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suming that the rate of participation was slightly less for agrarian workers than for the population as a whole (50 percent as against 60 percent), we have an electorate of about 200,000.[27] We know that three parties competed for these votes: the Social Democrats, the Liberals, and the Agrarians. If we assume that in the early 1930s one-half of these votes went to the Social Democrats—an assumption favorable to the latter—this constituency could not have represented more than 13 or 14 percent of the total Social Democratic vote.

Denmark, with the largest day-labor population of the three Scandinavian countries, provides an even more demanding test. Of the total agrarian adult labor force of 481,000 in 1934, 210,000 (43 percent) were hired laborers (see Table 2). Because, again, they were overwhelmingly male, we may suppose that, including wives and other adult dependents (parents, grandparents), they represent a voting population of about 400,000. To put this in perspective, we should note that in 1932 the Social Democratic electorate was just over 660,000 and the total electorate was just over 1.6 million. In principle, this day-labor population should have presented the Social Democrats with an extraordinarily tempting target.

In fact, it did not because this population had already been heavily mobilized by another party. The Radical Liberals had come into existence in 1906 after breaking away from the Liberal Party. The Liberals were quintessentially the party of the middle peasants, and the Radicals came into existence to mobilize agrarian workers *against* the Liberals. From 1906 until the introduction of proportional representation in 1918, the Social Democrats agreed not to compete against the Radicals (a party led by bourgeois reformers) in rural Jutland. In exchange, the Radicals promised not to challenge the Social Democrats in a number of urban constituencies. This gave the Radicals an open field in the districts in which agrarian laborers were concentrated. As a result, by the time proportional representation was introduced, the Radicals had captured this constituency.

If we assume that the rate of participation for this potential electorate of 400,000 was slightly less than for the entire population (60 percent as against 70 percent in the early 1930s), we have an actual electorate of 240,000.[28] We will further assume that the party that had historically organized this electorate received half of its vote—or 120,000 votes—which

[27] The rate of participation equals the share of the valid vote cast as a percentage of the population over twenty years of age. See Peter Flora, ed., *State, Economy and Society in Western Europe, 1815-1975. A Data Handbook*. Vol. 1: *The Growth of Mass Democracies* (Chicago: St. James Press, 1983), 141-44.

[28] The rate of participation equals the share of the valid vote cast as a percentage of the population over 20 years of age. *Ibid.*, 105-6.

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in fact approximates what the Radicals received in rural districts in 1935. We will also assumed that the remainder was distributed among the Social Democrats and all other parties at a ratio of four to one. Under the foregoing generous assumptions, 90,000 of these votes went to the Social Democrats.[29] With a total Social Democratic vote of 760,000 in 1935, this represents about 13 percent of the Social Democratic electorate. Finally, we should note that the participation of agrarian workers in Socialist trade unions during these years was virtually nil.

In sum, in Norway and especially in Sweden and Denmark, the mobilization of agrarian workers by other parties was decisive. The objection can be made that the real distinction between these countries and the countries that became fascist—especially Italy and Spain—is that, in the former, agrarian workers were mobilized by other parties because the transition to mass politics was more gradual. With a more sudden transition, this population would not have been captured, and socialists would have stepped in. In this connection, the case of Czechoslovakia, in which the transition was extremely abrupt, becomes significant.

In Czechoslovakia, the working-class movement was divided ethnically, regionally, and ideologically. The German Social Democrats, because of their ethnic base, organized almost exclusively industrial workers. The [National] Socialists, limited to Bohemia and Moravia, were also exclusively urban. Bohemian and Moravian agricultural workers—there were not many of them—were in fact initially organized by the Social Democratic Party during the first few years of the Republic. But, because these were heavily industrialized areas, agricultural workers were in a less dependent position. They routinely moved back and forth between industrial and agricultural employment. In 1921, only 28.4 percent of the labor force of Bohemia was in agriculture. The percentages for the other provinces were: Moravia and Silesia, 33.8; Slovakia, 58.7; and Ruthenia, 62.4.[30] The great majority of agrarian workers were thus located in Slovakia and Ruthenia. A conservative estimate would be that, in Slovakia, 40 percent of the agrarian labor force consisted of proletarians; in Ruthenia it was probably close to half. In these provinces there was almost no industry, and large surplus rural populations were dependent on the agrarian labor market.

The Social Democratic Party never had an opportunity to organize these workers. In the schism between social democracy and communism, the Communists captured the party organization in Slovakia and Ruthe-

[29] For election data for Denmark, see *ibid.*

[30] Vaclav L. Beneš, "Czechoslovak Democracy and Its Problems, 1918-1920," in Mamatey and Luža (fn. 12), Table 2, p. 41.

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nia, while Social Democrats prevailed in the industrial areas of Bohemia and Moravia. The result was that the Social Democratic Party became mainly a Bohemian and Moravian party and mainly one of industrial workers. Thus, in the first post-schism election, in 1925, the Social Democratic Party was wiped out in Slovakia and Ruthenia, receiving 4.3 percent and less than 2 percent of the vote, respectively. In contrast, the Communist Party received 13 percent of the Slovakian vote; with 30.8 percent of the Ruthenian vote, it became the largest party in Ruthenia.[31]

The Communist Party captured the social democratic organization in these regions, but it did not succeed in mobilizing agrarian workers.[32] These workers were mainly organized by the regional Catholic Populist parties and the secular Agrarian parties. The agrarians, who were mainly parties of middle peasants, were especially successful in capturing this constituency because of their leading role in the land reform program. They could unite middle peasants and day laborers because land reform, which consolidated mainly the position of the former, was aimed specifically at Magyar and German landowners; it consequently exploited ethnic cleavages in the countryside.[33] The net effect of the schism and the land reform was that the Social Democrats never developed a significant involvement in rural class conflict. The democratic working-class movement (Social Democrats, [National] Socialists, and German Social Democrats) remained urban and industrial in its orientation, and free to collaborate with the representatives of the middle peasants (the secular Agrarian parties and the Catholic Populist parties).

The case of Czechoslovakia also demonstrates that the many overlapping cleavages were not sufficient to prevent a stable democratic coalition; neither was the absence of a coherent peasant party. In this, the Czech example stands as a useful corrective to the proposition drawn from the Spanish, Italian, and German cases: that the absence of coherent peasant representation and the multiplicity of cleavages in those countries enfeebled democracy.

It was still possible for the Socialists to make a coalition with middle peasants—to overcome their consumer-producer, religious, and regional conflicts—even when peasants were themselves divided by these cleavages. The socialists were divided among themselves by ethnicity and region (autonomist German Social Democrats versus centralizing Bohe-

[31] Victor S. Mamatey, "The Development of Czechoslovak Democracy, 1920-1938," in Mamatey and Luža (fn. 12), 129.

[32] The rural communist vote came mainly from ethnic minorities. See Richard V. Burkes, *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 42 and passim.

[33] Czech land reform is discussed in Klepetař (fn. 2).

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mian-Moravian Social Democrats versus centralizing Slovakian Social Democrats). The peasant parties were divided from the Social Democrats by region (centralizing Social Democrats versus autonomist Slovakian Populists) and by religion (secular Social Democrats versus Catholic Bohemian-Moravian Populists versus Catholic Slovakian Populists). And the peasant parties were themselves divided by religion and region (secular, centralizing Bohemian-Moravian Agrarians versus Catholic, centralizing Bohemian-Moravian Populists versus secular, centralizing Slovakian Agrarians versus Catholic autonomist Slovakian Populists). These cleavages provoked conflicts bitter enough to be defining features of the party system; but so long as the coalition served the other interests of the participants, they were willing to avoid a showdown on these issues.

Spain, Italy, and Germany

The position of agrarian laborers in the socialist movement looks quite different when we turn our attention to Spain, Italy, and Germany. Although it is difficult to estimate the voting preferences of agrarian workers, data on the composition of trade unions make it clear that these workers exercised enormous leverage in the socialist movements of Italy and Spain; in Germany their influence was less, but still substantial. In these countries agrarian labor had remained largely unmobilized by other political groups; therefore, it presented socialist parties and trade unions with a vast reservoir of potential support.

The decisive class conflict in the Italian countryside occurred in the north and center; it pitted day laborers (*braccianti*) against a mixed group of sharecroppers, tenants, and small and large owners. The two most important points of contention were the local monopoly over hiring, which the sharecroppers, as periodic employers, resented no less than tenants and peasant owners, and the ownership of harvesting equipment, the sharecroppers caring little for the socialist vision of collective ownership.[34]

The socialist cause was pressed in the countryside by the Syndicalists (USI) and Federterra. The latter was the agrarian section of the normally reformist, socialist Confederazione Generale del Lavoro (CGL); it provided 33 percent of the CGL's membership in 1920.[35] Federterra sought to bridge the conflict between laborers and sharecroppers, but its massive postwar mobilization of laborers and its collectivist ambitions made this impossible. As its membership rose from about 93,000 in 1918 to over

[34] C. Seton-Watson, *Italy from Liberalism to Fascism* (London: Methuen, 1967), 303-4.
[35] Daniel L. Horowitz, *The Italian Labor Movement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 124.

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300,000 in 1919, Federterra leaders lost control of their members and felt compelled to act more militantly than their past experience would otherwise have recommended.[36]

The strategy of jointly organizing sharecroppers and laborers became untenable as well, because the end of the war saw a dramatic increase in the size of the middle peasantry as laborers became sharecroppers and landowners: the percentage of owners rose from 18.3 of the males engaged in agriculture in 1911 to 32.4 in 1921.[37] Federterra leaders feared that their constituency would shift its political loyalty as its class position changed.

As a solution to this, Federterra advocated collective ownership of equipment among sharecroppers. This was an attempt to bind sharecroppers to the Federterra organization. Instead, this new emphasis drove sharecroppers into the arms of local Catholic unions (CIL), thus transforming Federterra: by 1920, agrarian laborers provided virtually all of Federterra's membership, but they accounted for only 10 percent of the agrarian membership of the CIL. The remainder consisted of sharecroppers, tenants (78.4 percent), and small owners (10 percent).[38]

Attention to the Federterra alone provides an incomplete picture. The CGL, or at least its urban, industrial wing, had always followed a reformist course, and this did not change substantially after the war. But the CGL was not the only important socialist organizer of day laborers. In 1920, the three syndicalist unions (USI, UIL and the independent railwaymen's union) organized about one-third of the socialist labor force.[39] The agrarian component—overwhelmingly laborers, mainly in Emilia—probably accounted for about half of the syndicalist membership.[40] The effect of the syndicalist unions was to further increase the dependence of the socialist movement on day laborers: once these workers had been politically mobilized by a part of the left, it became imperative that the Socialist Party solicit their support.

The role of the day laborers, however, did not stop even there, because of the special place they occupied in bolstering the position of the intransigents in the Socialist Party. Intransigents were dominant in the party

[36] Maurice Neufeld, *Italy: School for Awakening Countries: The Italian Labor Movement in Its Political, Social and Economic Setting from 1800 to 1960* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University School for Industrial and Labor Relations, 1961), 367.

[37] Maier (fn. 10), 311.

[38] Horowitz (fn. 35), 124.

[39] See Neufeld (fn. 36), 347. Also see Michael F. Hembree, "The Politics of Intransigence: Costantino Lazzari and the Italian Socialist Left, 1882-1919," Ph.D. diss. (Florida State University, 1981), 232.

[40] The agrarian membership is an estimate. For the USI, it was assumed to be equal to the membership taken away from the CGL: 80,000. See Horowitz (fn. 35), 75.

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leadership and in the syndicalist unions. Accommodationists were dominant in the parliamentary party and in the CGL. Since the intransigents could not rely on the support of the CGL, they were inclined to accentuate the claims of the syndicalist unions and, therefore, of the agrarians. So much so, it turned out, that even when the fascist threat had convinced the leaders of the CGL of the need to reach an accommodation with the Catholic unions in organizing the sharecroppers and small landowners, the Socialist Party leadership resisted.[41]

The lines of class conflict in the Spanish countryside differed from those in Italy. In Spain, class conflict pitted day laborers, tenants, and marginal owners (all of whom were dependent on the labor market) against middle and large owners; some of the latter were directly involved in cultivation and some were members of the urban bourgeoisie. Two unions had traditionally mobilized farm labor: the anarchists (in the CNT, Confederación Nacional del Trabajo) and the socialists (in the UGT, Unión General de Trabajadores). Until Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, the CNT had been by far the more important organizer of agrarian workers. By the 1930s, however, the CNT was a spent force in the countryside, mainly because of the heavy hand of the dictatorship. The UGT, by contrast, had been favored by the dictatorship and, with its well-established presence among industrial voters, was ready to move forcefully in the agricultural areas. The Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Tierra (FNTT), the agrarian wing of the UGT, increased its membership from a mere 36,639 in 1930 to 451,337 in 1933, thereby accounting for about 40 percent of the total UGT membership.[42] The proportion of the FNTT membership that was dependent mainly on the labor market for its income was very high, probably in excess of 80 percent.

One indication of this is, according to Edward Malefakis, the close relationship between the Socialist Party (PSOE) vote and the size of the laboring population. Malefakis observed the disparity in the pattern of land tenure between the north (small family owners), the center and littoral (small and intermediate properties), and the southwest (large estates worked by day laborers). He demonstrated that this distribution translated into a steady voting pattern: rightist deputies were elected almost entirely by the small peasant proprietors of Old Castile and Navarre; the Socialists were the largest party in southwestern Spain; and the political center was elected in the geographic center.[43]

The PSOE left no doubt about the kind of reform it wanted; land had

[41] Seton-Watson (fn. 34), 599.
[42] Malefakis (fn. 15), 292.
[43] *Ibid.*, 206.

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to be redistributed to the poorer rural workers, especially the landless day laborers. The party bore primary responsibility for the 1932 legislation that threatened the land titles not only of large landowners in the southwest, but also of small owners who leased out their land in Old Castile and Navarre. In 1931, the PSOE and the other San Sebastian parties enacted a series of emergency decrees that forbade expulsion of small tenants; forbade owners from withdrawing their land from cultivation; established rules that favored collectives in the renting of large properties; established an eight-hour day and a *de facto* wage increase; established what amounted to a closed shop in the labor market, thereby vastly increasing the power of the FNTT; and established arbitration boards that generally reinforced the leading position of the FNTT.

Emboldened or driven by its growing support among the agrarian proletariat, the FNTT was the socialist organization that initiated the turn toward radicalization. This radicalization alienated the PSOE and UGT from the Catholic middle peasants of the north and center. Indeed, this radicalization began with an agricultural issue. In June 1934, the FNTT called a nationwide strike in response to the repeal of the 1931 Municipal Labor Act, the act that had created the arbitration boards on which so much of the FNTT's influence depended. The strike received only lukewarm support from the urban wing of the UGT and eventually failed, causing the loss of tens of thousands of union members. In its aftermath, and especially in the wake of the failed October Revolution, the gulf between the two wings of the socialist movement, and between the movement and the middle peasants, became even greater. The polarization came to a head in February 1936, when middle peasants in the center and north voted overwhelmingly for the Catholic Confederación de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA) and agrarian laborers in the center and southwest voted overwhelmingly for the socialists.[44] This electoral outcome mirrored the alignments that formed on behalf of fascism and the Republic a few months later.[45]

Although Germany presents a more complicated picture, the conclusion is the same. Notwithstanding their conventional images as quintessentially urban and working-class, the Social Democratic Party and the free trade unions (ADGB) were both dependent on the agrarian proletariat. Let us note, to begin with, that in 1928 purely rural districts gave no less than 25 percent of their vote to the socialist parties (SPD and KPD) and 21.5 percent of their vote to the SPD alone.[46] These data be-

[44] *Ibid.*, 214. [45] *Ibid.*, 219.

[46] Derek Urwin and Frank Aarebrot, "Socio-geographic Correlates of Left Voting in Weimar Germany, 1924-1932," in Per Torsvik, ed., *Mobilization, Center-Periphery Structures and*

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come more telling when we consider the strength of the ADGB-affiliated agrarian workers' union, Deutscher Landarbeiterverband (DLV).

Until 1918, Germany's agrarian workers—about 3,000,000 in all—had remained politically unorganized. Agrarian trade unions were illegal until the collapse of the empire. This segment of the proletariat must have seemed an especially tempting target for the Social Democrats and the free trade unions. Indeed, in the SPD's vision of the political and economic development of the country, these workers were assigned a vital role. Politically, it was necessary to weaken the position of the Junkers. Land reform was not a plausible solution because in early 1919, when the SPD might have had the political power to introduce it, there were severe food shortages. Moreover, it was unsatisfactory because it conflicted with the SPD's axiom that the "economic development of the country depended on large-scale production in both industry and agriculture."[47] Land reform would have increased the number of allegedly inefficient small farms as well as the size of a middle peasantry that "showed no inclination toward a socialism that considered them fated to lose their holdings."[48] Like their Spanish and Italian counterparts, the German Social Democrats faced the dilemma of mobilizing agrarian workers while not raising them out of the proletariat.

The German solution was to apply an industrial model to agriculture. Agricultural workers would be collectively organized and would share in all of the labor market and social policy rights that applied to industrial workers. This solution addressed all of the concerns of the Social Democrats. Increases in wages and taxes would weaken the Junkers, preserve large units of production, prevent food shortages, and would not create more middle peasants. At the same time, workers, "at least a considerable number of them, could be won for the Social Democratic Party and unionized. . . ."[49]

At the end of 1918, there were only 20,000 unionized agricultural workers in all of Germany. By 1920, their number had risen to about one million. Membership then declined and stabilized at about 200,000 for the remaining period of the Republic. This is in contrast to about 9.5 million industrial workers in the ADGB in 1923, and a stabilized industrial membership of about 4.9 million thereafter. It would appear that socialist unions in the countryside had no more than a residual role. At the peak of unionization, about one in ten ADGB members was an agrarian

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Nation-Building (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1981), 259-60.

[47] Frieda Wunderlich, *Farm Labor in Germany, 1810-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 35.

[48] *Ibid.*

[49] *Ibid.*, 35-36.

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worker; during the last half of the Republic, only about one in twenty-five was.[50]

These figures severely understate the impact of the agrarian unions, however. This becomes clear when we examine data on the industrial and agrarian workers who were covered by collective contracts. The number of industrial workers covered by collective agreements—union members or not—was 13,135,000 in 1924, 12,276,000 in 1929, and 11,950,000 in 1931.[51] The equivalent figures for agrarian workers were 2,371,719 in 1924, 2,749,398 in 1926, and 2,123,110 in 1928.[52] Since the total population of agricultural laborers was only about 3,000,000, this means that two-thirds of them or more were covered by collective agreements. Twenty percent of the total labor force covered by ADGB agreements were in agriculture. We now begin to see the potential importance of this constituency to the SPD and the ADGB. It seems likely that a large part of the 25 percent of the rural vote that went to the SPD and KPD came from this constituency.

We can see even more clearly the manner in which this powerful union presence—and the larger political and economic strategy of which it was a part—was bound to antagonize the middle peasants. For the corollary of that strategy was that the SPD and the ADGB took a strong interest in the living standards of agrarian laborers. Indeed, in the first years of the Republic, the SPD succeeded in winning passage of legislation that extended all of the social policy rights of industrial workers to agrarian workers, guaranteed them the right to unionize, and extended to agriculture the same system of compulsory arbitration that was used in industrial wage disputes. All agrarian workers became covered by compulsory health, pension, unemployment, and disability insurance schemes. The costs of these programs were covered in the same manner as those for industrial workers: by joint employee and employer contributions.[53] German agricultural workers were surely the most comprehensively protected in Europe in the 1920s.

These benefits were being extended to agrarian workers during years when the middle peasants' income was collapsing. The net share of national income going to agriculture fell from 13.0 percent in 1913 to 7.2 percent in 1929.[54] Several studies provide plausible evidence that the in-

[50] Gerhard Bry, *Wages in Germany, 1871-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 32.
[51] *Ibid.*, 42.
[52] Wunderlich (fn. 47), 84, n. 14.
[53] *Ibid.*, 126-59.
[54] Paul Jostock, "The Long-Term Growth of National Income in Germany," in Simon Kuznets, ed., *Income and Wealth*, Vol. V (London: Bowes and Bowes, 1955), 109.

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come of a peasant actually fell below that of a worker in the late 1920s.[55] In this context, the peasants' almost hysterical attacks on *Sozialpolitik*, and their antipathy to the SPD, become comprehensible.

On balance, then, it appears that the German Social Democrats—through their efforts on behalf of the social rights of agrarian workers, legislation that improved the market position of these workers, and the generalization of collective agreements—also became entangled in rural class conflict.

The Traditional Dictatorships

One question remains: Why, in the countries discussed so far, did liberals not enter into a coalition with middle peasants? The fact is that traditional liberals were involved in such coalitions in Finland, Austria, Hungary, and much of eastern Europe. In these countries, the outcome was a rather traditional authoritarian regime that was distinguished, above all, by its lack of institutional innovation.

Finland experienced a semi-competitive parliamentary order that was premised on the harassment and outlawing of the Communist Party, the disabling of trade unions, and the enfeeblement of the Social Democratic Party. With participation and dissent thus constrained, it was possible to preserve a circumscribed parliamentarism. The Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime in Austria was a more fully formed dictatorship; it lasted from the brief civil war in 1934 until the Anschluss in 1938. Under the dictatorship, the parliament was closed, the Communist and Social Democratic parties and trade unions were outlawed, and democratic freedoms were circumscribed. Even so, the interests included in the ruling coalition were given rather broad latitude for dissent, and the working-class organizations that were formally suppressed were allowed to carry on underground. In Hungary, political competition was also severely circumscribed, and the Social Democratic Party and trade unions were able to operate only under very restricted conditions. These regimes were thus typical of traditional authoritarianism in two ways: in their tolerance of limited dissent and in their disinterest in creating substitutes for the working-class institutions they suppressed.[56]

[55] Adolph Münzinger, "Eine bäuerliche Betriebserhebung in Württemberg" [A survey of peasant production in Württemberg]; *Der Arbeitsertrag der bäuerlichen Familienwirtschaft*, Vol. II (Berlin 1929), 873; Constantin von Dietze, "Die Lage der deutschen Landwirtschaft" [The position of German agriculture], *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik* (Jena: 1929), Vol. 130, p. 3; Vol. 75, pp. 659-60.

[56] See Risto Alapuro and Erik Allardt, "The Lapua Movement: The Threat of a Rightist Takeover in Finland, 1930-32," and Walter Simon, "Democracy in the Shadow of Imposed

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They were certainly not fascist. That much is made clear not only by the absence of fascist institutions, but by the fact that in Finland and Austria the regimes came about in part as a *reaction* to growing fascist movements—the Lapua Movement in Finland and the Nazi Party in Austria. Indeed, the Austrian government put down an attempted Nazi coup in 1934 and, then, in the face of the impending Anschluss in 1938, called a referendum on Austrian independence and invited Social Democrats to participate in a cabinet of national unity.

What distinguished these traditional liberals and allowed them to install these dictatorships with the aid of agrarians? The answer appears to be that in these countries liberals were more cohesive. In Finland, the bourgeoisie was divided into a Swedish Liberal Party, a Finnish Liberal Party, and a Conservative Party. These divisions remained in the party system, but were largely overshadowed by the experience of the civil war, which forced the bourgeoisie to unite or perish, and by the constant threat posed by the existence of a Bolshevik regime in neighboring Russia. In Austria, the bourgeoisie was less divided. A substantial part of it was already organized by the clerical Christian Social Party, which itself was a coalition of bourgeois and middle peasant interests. Along with some anticlerical German nationals, the Christian Social Party provided the core of the authoritarian Vaterland Front. What is striking about Finland, Austria, and Hungary is that all three experienced civil wars that were fought on explicitly class lines and that required the bourgeoisie to overcome its historical divisions in order to survive.[57]

Finland and Austria were also distinguished by the exceptional cohesiveness of the middle peasantry. In each of these countries, the peasants were organized in one party—the Agrarian in Finland and Christian Social in Austria. Because these were the largest nonsocialist parties in each country and because the bourgeoisie was less cohesive, it was possible for them to dominate any coalition. In Hungary the peasants were not as cohesively organized, but they nonetheless provided a mainstay of the Horthy regime.

Elsewhere, traditional liberals failed; the liberal community was di-

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Sovereignty: The First Republic of Austria," both in Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). On Hungary, see Andrew Janos, *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary, 1825-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), chaps. 4-6.

[57] Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia provide textbook cases of coalitions between liberals and middle peasants leading to traditional dictatorships between the wars. In each case, a brief class-based civil war followed immediately on World War I, and in each case, socialists were active in organizing agrarian labor in the period before the instauration of the dictatorship. See Georg von Rauch, *Die Geschichte der baltischen Staaten* [The history of the Baltic states] (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1970).

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vided into a multiplicity of parties, none of which was large enough to claim plausibly to speak for the bourgeoisie. The result, on the one hand, was that none of them could offer middle peasants a valuable ally and, on the other hand, that none of them, individually, had an incentive to become such an ally. In these cases, a bargain was struck with middle peasants by either socialists (in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Czechoslovakia) or by entirely new fascist movements (in Germany, Italy, Spain), which suffered neither the historical cleavages that divided and paralyzed liberal parties nor the involvement in rural class struggle that handicapped socialist parties. In short, the preconditions of fascist success were a divided liberal community and a working-class movement engaged in a defense of the rural proletariat.

Conclusions

In developing this proposition, we have seen that explanations of interwar politics couched in terms of a multiplicity of overlapping cleavages or the absence of a single coherent peasant party fail to account for the regime outcomes.[58] The foregoing discussion has also placed in a new light several common interpretations of fascism and democratic instability between the wars. Barrington Moore and Alexander Gerschenkron have argued that a fascist outcome was caused by the existence of a landed elite which added the support or acquiescence of a subordinated rural mass to a coalition with the bourgeoisie.[59] In this view, what distinguished societies was the presence of a landed elite in control of the rural masses: England and France became liberal democracies because they lacked a politically decisive landed elite; Germany became fascist because it preserved one.

When applied to the interwar years, Moore's and Gerschenkron's argument is questionable for several reasons. First, as we have observed, there is no correlation between the rural social structure (in particular the size of the dependent labor force), and the regime outcome. Second, even if a landed elite exercised economic control of a rural mass, it did not necessarily control the latter's political behavior. In Spain, for example, southern day laborers voted overwhelmingly for the Socialist Party throughout the life of the Republic. Third, an authoritarian outcome did not require that a landed elite have political control of a rural mass. When an independent peasantry sided with the bourgeoisie, an authoritarian outcome ensued even in the absence of an important landed elite. Fin-

[58] See the discussion of the Czechoslovak case.
[59] Moore (fn. 1); Gerschenkron (fn. 1).

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land's small and medium peasants, never noted for their subordination, aligned with the bourgeoisie, first to win the civil war and then to maintain an authoritarian regime. In Spain, the critical support for a fascist solution came not from southern landed elites, who had always been authoritarian but unable to control their workers, but from middle peasants in the north and center.

A final explanation for the weakness of interwar democracy points to a lack of cooperation among democrats, engendered by acute polarization.[60] However, polarization did not so much cause specific outcomes as reflect the inability to find any stable solution. Some countries that adopted authoritarian regimes—Spain and Austria in particular—were in fact conspicuously depolarized in 1931-1933 and 1919-1923 respectively.[61] Some countries that became democratic—particularly Norway and Sweden—were in fact among the most polarized in the 1920s and had some of the most radicalized labor parties in Europe.[62] Where democrats failed, it was not because their societies had become polarized; rather, the societies became polarized because democrats had failed.

In fact, it mattered little in the end whether socialist leaders were committed to radicalism or reformism.[63] The unqualified commitment to the reformist, electoral road to power, which was pursued by the German and, initially, the Spanish socialists, could be as self-defeating as the more radical posture taken by their Italian counterparts. Indeed, the Spanish experience suggests that such a strategy was the cause of radicalization. Moderation and democratic stability required that socialists ignore a substantial part of the working class, and no socialist leaders consciously decided to do so. Where they did, it was because they had no choice. And where they had no choice—whether they were initially radical after the war, as in Norway and Sweden, or reformist, as in Denmark and Czechoslovakia—the outcome was stable democracy.

[60] This is the central theme of the essays in the volume edited by Linz and Stepan (fn. 56).

[61] See Juan Linz, "From Great Hopes to Civil War: The Breakdown of Democracy in Spain," and Walter Simon, "Democracy in the Shadow of Imposed Sovereignty: The First Republic of Austria," in Linz and Stepan (fn. 56).

[62] The levels of Norway's and Sweden's strike activities were among the highest in Europe during the 1920s. See Walter Korpi and Michael Shalev, "Strikes, Power and Politics in Western Nations, 1900-1976," *Political Power and Social Theory* 1 (1980), 301-34; Douglas Hibbs, "On the Political Economy of Long-Run Trends in Strike Activity," *British Journal of Political Science* 2 (April 1978), 26-43.

[63] Among the most important efforts to account for the origins of radicalism and reformism in labor movements is Lipset (fn. 14), esp. pp. 14-16. Lipset contends that radicalism and reformism were one among several important variables in accounting for regime outcomes between the wars.

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THE PARTY AND THE PEOPLE: Revolutionary and Postrevolutionary Politics in China and Vietnam

By BRANTLY WOMACK*

> The earlier fish-water relationship of cadres and masses was formed in the war years when they depended on each other for their lives. Revolutionary cadres sacrificed their lives to liberate the masses, while the masses supported and protected the revolutionary cadres while they waged their struggles. The role played by the masses under such circumstances was direct and clear-cut. If the cadres separated themselves from the masses they found it difficult to accomplish anything. Their very safety and livelihood were jeopardized. Things changed after the founding of New China. Our party became the ruling party and the cadres became leading personnel in the government at all levels. In this new context, it became possible for them to entertain the illusion that they had become government "officials" while the masses were the "common people" under their jurisdiction.
>
> —*"Do Not Forget the Fish-Water Relationship," Special Commentator, Renmin Ribao, August 19, 1978*

THIS essay starts from two premises: that, as far as the articulation and mobilization of popular interest in the countryside are concerned, the "best teams won" in the Chinese and the Vietnamese revolutions; but that, after the success of the revolution, the popularity and responsiveness of the regimes to the people became more problematic. Together, these premises imply a shift in the relationship of party to people between the revolutionary and postrevolutionary stages. That such a shift occurred in China and Vietnam is not obvious; there were significant continuities of personnel, policies, and ideology across the revolutionary divide. I shall argue that, despite the continuities, the rational basis of party-mass relations was deeply affected by victory. Indeed, the very continuities helped mask a structural flaw in the new regimes that has induced current political and economic reforms.

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The cases of China and Vietnam are considered together in order to focus attention on the underlying logic of political change rather than on the historical peculiarities of a single country. Despite their common East Asian heritage, the political cultures of China and Vietnam are quite different. Their communist parties, however, had comparable problems of waging a protracted, village-based revolutionary war, and evolved broadly similar ways of successfully coping with the situation. After victory, their parallel revolutionary experiences and shared Marxist-Leninist ideology led to postrevolutionary regimes with comparable capabilities and problems. It is surely not a case of Vietnam simply copying Chinese policies or vice versa, although each of the parties has been aware of what the other is doing.[1] Proof that policy similarities are due primarily to independent responses to similar situations is provided by the astonishing convergence of Chinese and Vietnamese reform programs in the 1980s despite the active hostility between the two countries. In short, for the purposes of this essay, China and Vietnam constitute independent, "best case" instances. The analysis of these two cases should be useful, though perhaps somewhat less salient, for other rural revolutionary situations.

The general thesis of this paper is that the politically and militarily competitive environment of the revolutionary period in China and Vietnam constrained the communist parties to be "mass-regarding" in policy and behavior despite their authoritarian internal structures.[2] I call the revolutionary parties "quasi-democratic systems" because of the role of the competitive environment in determining their democratic politics. Victory confirmed the policies, political style, and leadership of the revolutionary period and set the identity of the party. But it also inevitably established a monopoly of state power that changed the context of the party-mass relationship. Programmatically, the interests of the masses still provided policy goals, but in effect the masses lost the clout with the

[1] The question of Chinese influence in Vietnam is an interesting and disputed one. The Vietnamese had extensive personal experience with Mao's revolutionary methods. However, they also drew lessons from their own experience with failed peasant uprisings in 1930. For differing views, see the following in William Turley, ed., *Vietnamese Communism in Comparative Perspective* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980): William Turley, "Introduction," 1-10; William Duiker, "Vietnamese Revolutionary Doctrine in Comparative Perspective," 45-73; and Georges Boudarel, "Influences and Idiosyncracies in the Line and Practice of the Vietnam Communist Party," 137-70. The delicate complexities of the interrelationship are illustrated by the fact that Ho Chi Minh taught guerrilla warfare in China in the late 1930s—before the organization of the Viet Minh.

[2] I use the term "mass-regarding" to refer to an attentiveness by the party leadership to the concrete situation of the population under their control, to the masses' perceptions of their own interests, and to the actual reception and popularity of the policies. "Mass-oriented" would be too broad a term, because it could include policies that were programmatically assumed to be in the interests of the masses. I want to suggest a more active and responsive political style.

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party as a whole and with the individual cadres that they had had during the revolution.

The postrevolutionary degeneration of mass-regarding politics was neither an outcome desired by the regime nor an irremediable end situation for a successful revolution. It did, however, create a fundamental structural flaw, in that the victory of a popular revolution undermined the rationale of popular politics. Threats of sanctions against erring cadres, exhortation to revolutionary virtue, and increased ideological education are limited measures that do not address the root of the problem. If the masses are to be attended to, they must again be able to make decisions in some area that is vital to the regime and its cadres. To a certain extent they do have this control in their aggregate effect on the economy; the economic reforms adopted by China and Vietnam in the 1980s reflect an institutional adjustment that has significant political implications.

The methodological fulcrum of this study is an analytical model of the rural revolutionary party and its cadres as rational actors seeking to maximize their chances of survival and success. The general intellectual debt of the approach is broad; it is based on a number of recent studies of peasant revolution.[3] The American frustration in Vietnam stimulated a finer understanding of the rationality of peasant unrest, whether the peasant cup is viewed as half-empty (in moral economy, risk-minimizing approaches) or as half-full (in political economy, advantage-maximizing approaches).[4] This better understanding of the motivation for peasant participation has led, in turn, to a closer view of the linkage between party policy and mass mobilization.[5] I will explore the organizational logic and environmental prerequisites of the revolutionary party in a world of reasonable peasants. Analysis of organizational rationality builds on peasant and policy rationality and permits a broader interpretation not only of the revolutionary situation, but also of the continuities and discontinuities of party-mass relations after victory.

The import of this interpretation will be clearer when it is compared with two common approaches to the shift in postrevolutionary regime politics. The first, which I will call the "organizational weapon model," underlies the totalitarian interpretation of communist politics (or at least

[3] For the sake of brevity, I will not digress on the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of this model. The works of Brian Barry, Mancur Olson, Anthony Downs, Sam Popkin, James C. Scott, Russell Hardin, and Jon Elster provided my primary inspiration.

[4] The two most important studies are James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), and Samuel Popkin, *The Rational Peasant* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

[5] The best analysis of the linkage in Vietnam is Jeffrey Race, "Toward an Exchange Theory of Revolution," in John Lewis, ed., *Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1974), 169-204.

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the older versions of this interpretation).[6] The communist party is viewed as a disciplined, flexible organization totally dedicated to revolutionary success by means of mobilization and manipulation. Since there is only a tactical commitment to policies designed to win over the masses, it is to be expected that the policies will change after victory, and the party will pursue its aims more directly and more coercively. In the organizational weapon model, a change of context with victory explains the change in party-mass relations, but the party is seen as consciously (and thankfully) shedding earlier tactical constraints. The change in context does not of itself produce a change in the party-mass relationship; rather, it permits the party leadership to change its policy toward the masses.

There are many problems with the model, not the least of which is the diabolism still characteristic of American political and media stereotypes of communism. The major problem in applying the model to China and Vietnam is that it is contradicted by the paradigmatic role that the revolutionary experience continues to have after victory.[7] The affirmation and even sanctification of the earlier party-mass relationship does not make sense because it implies that the party's identity is set as much by the revolutionary process as by the revolutionary goal.

The organizational weapon model falls apart completely when viewed as a micro explanation of revolution in China and Vietnam. Its triad of infinitely clever and manipulative leaders, infinitely submissive and dedicated cadres, and infinitely gullible and deployable masses makes heroic (or subhuman) assumptions concerning motivation and behavior. In China and Vietnam, where the revolutionary party was responsible for government in areas under its control, the strength of the party's organizational muscle depended on the congruity of the personal interests of masses and cadres. The organizational weapon model begins with the unquestioned assumption that the party is an alien manipulator of the masses; it is a political virus whose success is explained by organization. A protracted rural revolution in which the primary resource of the party is continued and increasing mass support might be explained by adding fresh epicycles to the paradigm of party manipulativeness, but a simpler explanation might be to entertain the notion of party-mass symbiosis and of the party's leadership of a popular revolution.

A second approach to the shift in postrevolutionary politics might be

[6] The best book in this tradition is Philip Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960; first published by Rand in 1952).

[7] It should be noted that Selznick is primarily concerned with the Soviet experience. The subtitle of his book is "A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics," and it fits Lenin's theory and practice better than it does China and Vietnam. However, the theory is advanced as a generic explanation of communist politics.

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called the oligarchic bureaucratization approach. Its intellectual grandfathers are Max Weber and Robert Michels, and it is currently the most popular approach to the study of communist politics. In contrast to the diabolism of the organizational weapon approach, the bureaucratization approach assumes that communist regimes are "all too human," and therefore susceptible to the same social and organizational aging processes as noncommunist societies. Bureaucratic rationalization and institutionalization are to be expected after the revolutionary period, when the flux and accessibility of revolutionary leadership mature into an oligarchy based on seniority and position. Although the Cultural Revolution was taken by some to be Mao's challenge to Weber, Chinese institutionalization since 1978 is seen as the ultimate vindication of Weber. Bureaucratization is administrative rationality. The process can be slowed, but the only alternative is adminstrative irrationality.

Revolutionary victory is an important milestone from the bureaucratization perspective, but it is not a basic change of context.[8] Since administrative rationality naturally gravitates toward bureaucratization, the main variables in the process are time and size, not political context. The continuity of bureaucratization is especially salient in China and Vietnam because of the importance of revolutionary administration in the base areas. Victory simply presents new vistas for bureaucratization, it does not present a constitutional choice.

The appeal of the bureaucratization model is strong because it predicts what in fact happened (namely, continuity plus bureaucratization), and predicts it on the basis of normal human and organizational behavior. Some phenomena, such as administrative growth in the base areas, are better explained by this model than by the quasi-democratic system model. Nevertheless, the model has some important flaws. First, its very universality limits its specific appropriateness for popular revolutionary regimes. What it explains best are the least characteristic aspects of Chinese and Vietnamese politics. While it is predictable that administrative growth would occur in the base areas, that fact is less interesting than the actual patterns of political control and decision making. Just as the common characteristics of the Prussian army and a guerrilla army do not provide an understanding of guerrilla warfare, so the commonalities of their civilian counterparts do not add up to an understanding of revolutionary politics.

[8] One could argue that victory marks a contextual change from charismatic to bureaucratic leadership, but—at least as Weber presents it—charismatic leadership is very much a question of the person and personality of the leader; the replacement of the leader by bureaucratic followers would proceed whether the leader died before victory (Ho Chi Minh) or after (Mao Zedong).

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Second, there was a non-Weberian political-administrative rationality in the base areas that opened every aspect of bureaucratic rationalization to question. Professional isolation from the people was a cardinal sin, delineated functions were ignored during campaigns, orders could be ignored if the situation warranted it, lines of authority were intentionally ambiguous, and so forth. Weberian rationality posits administrative autonomy; it optimizes the execution of a given task. In the primitive and risky situation of rural revolution, the current general situation took precedence over assigned tasks and made political effectiveness in mobilization more important than professional efficiency.

Third, the apolitical inevitability of the bureaucratization model suppresses the perception of political alternatives. There is much to be said for the objective reality of bureaucratization. Nevertheless, politics defines the context of bureaucracy. If serious attention had been given to the institutional guarantee of mass voice in China after 1949 and in Vietnam after 1975 in order to preserve and establish the democratic aspect of revolutionary politics, popular influence would have been greater in politics and administration.

In sum, the interpretation I present takes a position in between the voluntarism of the organizational weapon model and the determinism of the bureaucratization model. The party is shaped by the populist ideology and the policies that it adopts as well as by objective situational constraints; still, it is not pursuing an inevitable course of development, but one co-determined by its political decisions. I stress the connection between the macro and the micro explanations of revolutionary success because I take the interaction of context and policy seriously. The resulting quasi-democratic systems model pinpoints the significance of victory for party-mass relations and thus poses the question of the constitutional prerequisites of postrevolutionary, mass-regarding politics.

Quasi-Democratic Systems

In the short term, a revolutionary elite and its mass base need only agree on action against the established government. Behind this momentary common purpose there may be two wholly different sets of interests:[9] a "great" revolutionary pattern of national revolutionary goals for the elite, and a more parochial, less articulated "little" revolutionary pattern for the masses. If, however, a revolutionary elite must build and maintain mass loyalty for a long period, in a variety of localities, and through un-

[9] This situation is described by James C. Scott, "Revolution in the Revolution: Peasants and Commissars," *Theory and Society* 4 (January-March 1979), 99-134.

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foreseeable situational changes, then the revolutionary organization must incorporate a responsiveness to mass interests into its normal operation. Ideological commitment and internal sanctions are essential to the revolutionary party, but the level of its popular support is based on the decisions of countless persons who are not part of the revolutionary group. By and large, the personal interests of these people will determine their attitude of support, apathy, or opposition toward the revolutionary party. Of course, a Marxist party always professes to represent the interests of the people; but the ideological commitment is a very abstract one, in which the popular interest is derived from the course of history and the interests of the proletariat. The personal interests to which I refer are concrete; they may be difficult to aggregate, and at times they may even contradict the ideological idealization of mass interests. It is these interests that determine whether there are more rather than fewer army volunteers, whether more rather than less grain is grown in liberated areas, and whether there are fewer rather than more spies, deserters, and informants. Revolutionary success—large and small, strategic and tactical—depends on the masses' identification with the party, and in the long term that depends on the party's identification with the masses. No one expressed this relationship more eloquently than Mao Zedong, and no one symbolized it more poetically than Ho Chi Minh.

Definition

A quasi-democratic system (QDS) is an authoritarian organizational system whose policies are constrained by the revolutionary environment to be responsive to popular interests and demands. It is a "system" because it predicts a pattern of rational behavior on the basis of fairly general premises. It is more than a heuristic model because it purports to describe a "real" pattern to the extent that reality fits its premises and follows a framework of rational self-interest.

The QDS logic has a peculiar relationship to the self-consciousness of the revolutionary party. On the one hand, the importance of responsiveness to the masses for party survival and success is understood and emphasized.[10] On the other hand, it is assumed, in line with Marxism-Leninism, that the long-term interests of the party and the masses coincide. Hence, party leadership is alert to promote mass-regarding policies and a political style of service to the people, but it perceives this behavior as merely the duty of a good party member. Although the revolutionary party recognizes and responds to its competitive environment, it does not

[10] The best example is Mao's 1934 speech, "Be Concerned with the Well-Being of the Masses," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, I (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 147-52.

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realize how important the environment is for the democratic character of its politics.

A QDS is "democratic" in the general sense of encouraging an interactive popular influence on policy. Democracy involves more than just a propaganda appeal to general mass preferences. The party-mass relationship in China and Vietnam had to go beyond propaganda populism because the parties controlled territory and had to provide concrete political leadership. It is the interactive quality of the leadership of populations under party control that I call "democratic." However, in areas under revolutionary party control, effective procedural democracy did not exist. Electoral procedures, legal systems, and united front organizations existed, but they did not control policy. Nevertheless—and this is the essence of a quasi-democratic system—the content of party policy was systematically influenced by perceptions of mass interests; if these perceptions turned out to be mistaken, policy tended to change. If the masses appeared to be more cautious than party policy, it was in the party's interest to moderate its program; if mass behavior was more radical than currently condoned by the party, the latter had to reconsider its policies. If mass opinion in a particular locality made a certain general policy inappropriate, it was up to the local cadres to adjust the implementation of the policy.[11] This type of politics can be called "mass-regarding" because it is responsive to the concrete interests and preferences of the masses without being organizationally accountable to them.

A QDS is "quasi" because the influence of the concrete interests of the masses on policy depends to a great extent on the revolutionary environment. Without mass support, the party loses and is destroyed, and individual cadres lose and are killed. Mass support is therefore vital. That may be a perfectly adequate motivation for mass-regarding politics, but it depends on the environment rather than on the system itself. Because victory eliminates competition, a QDS *cannot* last beyond victory. Upon victory, the environmental imperative for mass-regarding politics is lost, and the authoritarian internal structure of the party will tend to assert itself. The QDS is therefore a temporary, conditional political system, even though it may last for decades in a protracted rural revolution.

It should be noted that the QDS is proposed only as a rational substructure for revolutionary party behavior, not as the explanation for every action taken or for every cadre's behavior. There are innumerable instances of mass-*dis*regarding behavior, many of them ideologically inspired. The

[11] Concrete cases of each of these problems are cited by Zhao Ziyang, "How Were the Masses in Hua County Mobilized," trans. in *Issues and Studies* 19 (June-July 1983), 76-100, 101-114.

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party's preference for proletarians led to some rather awkward policies in Chinese rural areas, and the overly harsh definition of class struggle in North Vietnamese land reform in the 1950s required major corrections. Although the situation of the party and of most cadres may be conducive to mass-regarding behavior, individual party leaders and local cadres may choose to act differently. For example, in the early 1930s the commander of a major Chinese base area supported his base by looting the gentry of surrounding areas. This action irritated even the poor peasants of those areas and created a hostile ring around the base, which led to its destruction.[12]

Complaints about bureaucratism, laziness, and aloofness among local cadres are almost as old as rural revolution itself; Mao's first critique of bureaucratism dates from 1928.[13] According to the QDS model, policies that alienate the masses reduce the chances of survival of the revolutionary party; they will therefore tend to be improved, avoided, or punished. Nevertheless, deviations caused by inexperience, dogmatism, or venality will occur.

The Logic of Enticement

The basic rationale of enticement is implicit in the definition of a QDS. Mass-regarding behavior is required because mass support is necessary for the party's survival and growth in the competitive revolutionary environment. The leadership will, of course, have its own ideological and group interests, and not all mass interests can be co-opted into revolutionary policy. (For instance, the masses might benefit from a government school, but the party would not.) But in general, the major resource of the revolutionary party is its capacity to mobilize mass support, and this support must be elicited before it can be led.

The logic of eliciting mass support can best be described by Albert O. Hirschman's seminal theory of loyalty.[14] The concrete preferences of the masses are important to the party because the masses have the opportunity for "exit," if we use the term in a very broad sense to cover behavior ranging from apathy to counterrevolutionary activities. The political

[12] Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise of the CCP, 1928-1938: Volume Two of the Autobiography of Chang Kuo-t'ao* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1972), 197-99; 290.

[13] See Mao (fn. 10), "Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains," 90-92.

[14] Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970). Hirschman's scheme is not totally satisfactory for our purposes because the concepts of exit and voice are rather vague, there is no discussion of apathy, and there is no treatment of the dimension of personnel choice (elections). All of these problems derive from Hirschman's focus on the firm and its customers. A more general theory of loyalty would have to be much more complex.

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clout of the masses depends on the opportunity for exit, not on procedural guarantees. As Hirschman puts it,

> That even the most loyal member can exit is often an important part of his bargaining power vis-à-vis the organization. The chances for voice to function effectively as a recuperation mechanism [for the organization] are appreciably strengthened if voice is backed up by the *threat of exit*, whether it is made openly or whether the possibility of exit is merely well understood to be an element in the situation by all concerned.[15]

This logic is directly applicable to the situation of revolutionary parties in China and Vietnam because the survival of the party and its cadres required resources that the masses could minimize or deny. If compliance is coerced from the masses by the party, the cost of policing will greatly reduce the benefit of mobilization. Even policies favorable to the masses are more expensive to implement if the masses remain passive. If the masses become hostile, the problem is much more serious because the individuals or territory involved become scorched earth to the party. In either case, the party's chances of victory over a better-supplied government in power are reduced. Not only does the threat of exit give the masses clout vis-à-vis the party as a whole, but, because of the dispersed nature of guerrilla war, regional and even local cadres might become the victims of mass exist on a small scale. Therefore, as the epigraph of this essay suggests, the logic of enticement works as a rationale for mass-regarding behavior not only for the party as a whole, but also *for the individual cadre*.

Such homogeneity of group and personal interests is an unusual and favorable situation for an organization. It reduces the need for organizational discipline in its broadest sense: sanctions, rewards, reports, commands. It avoids the entire domain of problems addressed by Mancur Olson: in this case, the common goal of survival and success does not diverge from the accumulated individual goals of survival and success, and there is thus little opportunity for free riders.[16] Because the individual's and the group's involvement coincide in the logic of enticement, the revolutionary party acts like a small group of indefinite size rather than like an organization with differentiated interests.

The term "exit" may create an unrealistic image of the revolutionary situation. Generally speaking, a peasant is not faced with a choice of loyalties. He or she lives in an area that is under the control of either the

[15] *Ibid.*, 82; emphasis in original. I use the term "clout" for concrete policy influence that is not based on formal democratic guarantees; I reserve the word "voice" for democratic influence within institutional guarantees. Hirschman does not make this distinction, and his usage of "voice" is broader.

[16] Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (New York: Schocken, 1965).

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government or the revolutionaries; except for unusually committed persons, that fact determines on whose side participation occurs. Most of the peasants can be mobilized only after the balance of power in the village favors the party. After the establishment of control, there are punishments for noncompliance and preemptive security measures against suspect groups such as landlords. The activists in a village, and to some extent the village as a whole, have a strong collective interest in preventing defections. The masses hear only the propaganda of the side in control, and affirmation of allegiance is required. In brief, the revolution may involve political competition, but there is no marketplace of regimes.

Nevertheless, the logic of enticement holds because there is a constantly shifting margin of control and because the effectiveness of mass mobilization within liberated areas depends upon it. Consolidation of new territory depends in part on the popular appeal of party policies, and the extent of damage to the revolutionary cause in lost territory depends on the lingering hold of the party. Moreover, many guerrilla tactics depend on "luring the enemy in deep" into liberated territory, thus exposing the peasants momentarily to a choice between regimes. What is just as important is that the effectiveness of mass mobilization depends on mass-regarding politics. If the party pushes rather than leads, it will exhaust its meager organized resources and leave undeveloped its unorganized resource of mass support. But, in order to lead, the party must begin with the masses' interests. Thus, the clout of the masses derives in part from a continuing discretion concerning willingness to be mobilized and in part from the great fluidity and uncertainty of rural revolution which is accentuated by the "home court" character of guerrilla tactics.

At the same time, the logical strength of the leadership's self-interest as an explanation of democratic behavior is a weakness for the realism of the model because, in fact, mass-regarding politics entails important ideological and organizational commitments. The organizational commitments involve maximizing contact with the masses, hierarchical flexibility, and promotion of mass-regarding subordinates.[17] The ideological commitments include commitments to revolution of the masses, by the masses, and for the masses, and to a disciplined but popularly oriented party structure with recruitment primarily from the masses. It is especially clear in the case of China that Mao would not have attempted rural revolution if he had not been convinced of the necessity and legitimacy of a mass-mobilizing, peasant-based revolution. Mao's commitment to mass revolution was clear in 1926 (if not in 1919), but his strategy of rural rev-

[17] See Jeffrey Race (fn. 5), 178-92, for a detailed analysis of organizational policy in Vietnam in the 1960s.

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olution took shape only in 1928-1930.[18] Only a totally unitary, omniscient organization that remained unchanged over time could use the QDS simply as a tactical device, without a preexisting mass orientation and without causing the practice of mass-regarding politics to affect the goals and structure of the party. The organizational weapon model presumes something of this sort, but the realities of the Chinese and Vietnamese parties were certainly quite different.

It might appear that the land hunger of the poor peasants and their inevitable grievances against the established elite would provide a ready motivation, but in fact village mobilization is usually a slow process requiring great sensitivity and adaptability. The village world is one of personal relationships rather than media messages, and therefore the party cadres must first be accepted into the village network. The paradoxical process of being accepted by the villagers by becoming dependent on them is well described by Frances Fitzgerald as "the politics of the earth."[19] It requires, above all, a political style of closeness to the masses, a realization that the cadre and the revolution will survive only through mass support. In addition, the individual circumstances of each village require a constant concretization and adjustment of basic policies.[20] This, in turn, requires flexibility and discretion on the part of the lower-level leadership and continuing investigation of grass-roots conditions by higher cadres. A criticism by Zhao Ziyang (now Premier of China, but in 1944 an intermediate-level cadre) illustrates this point:

> In the Sixth District, individual cadres created some improperly radical forms of struggle. The masses disliked holding joint [multi-village] rallies. They were afraid that the people from other villages would share the fruits of their struggle and that the joint rallies would kill the diehards. But we neglected their wishes and continued to launch a joint struggle. Consequently, the masses who had originally wanted a struggle against the diehards changed their minds and asked leniency for them. They shouted out things contradicting the slogans that were uttered in the rallies; hence contradiction arose between the masses of one village and the masses of the other villages.[21]

In this case, local cadres ignored the personal interests of the villagers in

[18] See Brantly Womack, *Foundations of Mao Zedong's Political Thought* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1982).

[19] Fitzgerald, *Fire in the Lake* (New York: Vintage, 1972).

[20] Differences in party policy in the three regions of Vietnam during the war against the French are well described in Popkin (fn. 4), 223-42. The importance of personal investigations by cadres was constantly emphasized and exemplified by Mao. See *Mao Zedong Nongcun Diaocha Wenji* [Collected rural investigations of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1982), passim.

[21] Zhao Ziyang (fn. 11), 113-14.

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redistribution and did not trust the village to organize its own land reform. The result—land reform imposed on a "backward" village by surrounding villages—could *appear* to be successful. In fact, however, mobilizational potential was lost. Without investigation, the actual village situation remained opaque to higher cadres; without discretion, the local cadres could not adjust policy application to village conditions.

Besides the complexities of knowing the real needs of the masses, there was the difficult and sometimes shifting question of who the masses were—or, as Mao put it, "who are our friends and who are our enemies." The problem faced by the party was not simply one of securing majority support, but of building, literally, an "overwhelming majority." The realm of potential allies, the united front, had to be defined as broadly as possible; but, in order to maximize the alliance, the interests of the potential partners must not be harmed. In effect, then, the interests of the most marginal partner in the alliance determines policy. For instance, if there were a lot of Catholic opposition to the Viet Minh but the Viet Minh would still like to attract Catholics into their alliance, then Church property and freedom of religion had to be protected:

> Help the religious to maintain their principles, repair pagodas, temples, and churches. Enable the people to carry on their prayers, attend mass and religious ceremonies. Absolutely do not use pagodas, temples and churches for meetings and do not post slogans, slips or banners inside or out of them.[22]

If the alliance is to include patriotic rich peasants and landlords, then land policy will be limited to reduction of rents and interest—regardless of the preferences of the large number of poor peasants. By this principle, mass-regarding policy is not majoritarian; it is determined by the interests of the marginal minority of the alliance. At the same time, the revolutionary coalition must be built up from the societal bottom; while party policy reaches for the marginal partner, it must take care not to alienate its base support.

Balancing these two principles was a serious policy problem. If the party had merely been a group of radical propagandists, it could have afforded to be contradictory; but it was in charge of policy in liberated areas, and the interests of various groups were in conflict. Peasants were irritated by the postponement or even rollback of land distribution, and marginal groups suspected that the commitments to them were temporary. Front organizations tended to have massive and well-distributed

[22] 1962 NLF document quoted in Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), 202.

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memberships, with a token representative from every major group serving on the executive committee. But the party was in charge, and when conditions were ripe, policy would be radicalized. The revolution must be successful, but it must remain a revolution.

One last, politically ironic observation to be made about the QDS model is that it is a logical cousin to that cornerstone of capitalism, the competitive enterprise. To the extent that customers can exit and their purchases can determine the success or failure of the firm, it is rational for the firm to be customer-regarding in its decisions despite the nondemocratic structure of the firm or its level of commitment to the public good. Even though the public has no "right" to influence the firm, the importance of its business makes customer preferences a vital concern. If the firm achieves a monopoly and customers have no alternative, customer-regarding behavior loses its rationale. Recourse must go to a larger system in which the public has citizen rights: state regulation.

The Environmental Prerequisites of a QDS

A quasi-democratic system requires a revolutionary party that is in policy-making control of a portion of the population and is directing its appeal to the overwhelming majority in a struggle against the established government. A QDS, in order to be a policy-making party rather than simply a propaganda party, must be in political and military control of a population. In order for it to appeal to the masses, there must be a considerable disaffection between the masses and the government. Finally, if the environment is to be competitive, the government must be hostile to the revolutionary forces.

The first and most restrictive environmental prerequisite for a QDS is that it must have policy control of a population: the state's control over its territory and population must have broken down well before the revolution is successful. For such revolutions, Theda Skocpol's emphasis on the disintegration of the old regime is undoubtedly well placed, although the disintegration should not be mistaken for the cause of revolutionary success.[23] A QDS is a small counter-state within a state. It is a symptom of and a contributor to the further decline of a weak state.

In China, the central state had collapsed with the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. The politics of Republican China until 1927 consisted of shifting alliances and feuds between warlords whose strength depended on their army and the territory they controlled with it. The victory of the Guomindang (Kuomintang, KMT, Nationalist Party) in 1927 resulted in

[23] Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

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a stabilized government at the national level, but warlord power at the provincial and local levels was only gradually replaced with central administrative control. In any case, beginning in 1931, Japanese incursions increasingly challenged the effectiveness and credibility of the regime. The Chinese heartland was quickly conquered by the Japanese after war was declared in 1937, and the hostile counterpart regime to most communist base areas was the Japanese occupation force and its puppet Chinese government. By the end of World War II, the communists controlled territories with populations totaling a hundred million and were in a position to wage a civil war on the Guomindang regime.

The situation was far more complex in Vietnam. Before World War II, the French colonial regime may not have been strong enough to prevent revolutionary organizing and protests, but it was effective enough to forestall the long-term survival of a revolutionary base. During the war, however, French control over Vietnam was fundamentally weakened, first by Japan's suzerainty from 1941 and later by Japan's seizure of power from the French in early 1945. Just as important, Vietnam was bled dry by the French and the Japanese in order to support the war effort; the resulting massive famine in the northern part of Vietnam in 1944-1945 cost as many as two million lives.[24] These problems weakened colonial rule sufficiently for the Vietnamese communists to begin operating base areas. The real opportunity, however, emerged with the defeat of Japan and the weakness and confusion of the colonial forces after the war. The Viet Minh (Viet Nam Lap Dong Minh Hoi, Vietnamese Independence League, the united front organization of the Indochinese Communist Party, founded in 1941) gained great prestige by declaring the independence of Vietnam in September 1945, and then led nine years of rural guerrilla warfare with the returning French.

The weakening of French colonial control and the emergence of the Viet Minh was made possible by the international disruptions caused by World War II. By contrast, the weakening of the South Vietnamese state and the emergence of the National Liberation Front in the early 1960s was due more to the domestic political mistakes of the Diem regime, especially the pro-landlord land reform and the overly zealous security sweeps of the 1950s.[25] These actions created a political vacuum at the village level which the NLF, building on the experience of the Viet Minh, was able to fill. In addition, there was a significant international dimension. Even while the United States pressured the Saigon regime for pop-

[24] The famine is very poignantly described in Ngo Vinh Long, *Before the Revolution* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1973).

[25] See Jeffrey Race, *War Comes to Long An* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

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ular reforms, American aid freed South Vietnam from dependence on indigenous political and economic resources, thus allowing it to become more distant from local concerns. Moreover, the obvious dependence of the government on the United States substantiated the NLF's assertions that Saigon was a puppet government, and that the banner of national liberation should be raised once more. Ironically, the result of the international connection in this case was that aid intended to strengthen the regime had the ultimate effect of undermining it.

Between 1965 and 1975, the situation in South Vietnam departed so substantially from the "normal" rural revolutionary situation that the applicability of a QDS model might be questioned. It was no longer simply a contest between a weakened government and a rural revolutionary force in an agrarian country. The massive American presence had a variety of effects on the structure and morale of the Saigon government, and greatly increased the destructiveness of the war. Meanwhile, military personnel sent from North Vietnam played an increasingly important and eventually preponderant role in antigovernment military actions, and the efforts of the North were backed up by large amounts of Soviet and Chinese aid. The indigenous military strength of the NLF was dealt two severe blows in the late 1960s—first by the loss of many of their best fighting units in the Tet offensive of 1968, and second by Operation Phoenix, an American attempt to root out their rural infrastructure. Finally, through the combined effects of the war, American aid, and rural depopulation programs, South Vietnam ceased to be a predominantly agrarian society. The rural population dropped from 85 percent in 1960 to 35 percent in 1975,[26] and the South changed from a major rice exporter (1,500,000 tons annually in the late 1930s) to a major rice importer (950,000 tons in 1967).[27]

If the NLF had been victorious in 1964, the postrevolutionary situation would probably have been similar to that of China in 1949 or of the North in 1954. Reunification would have had to respect the contribution of the South to the revolutionary struggle, and the much greater development potential of the South might have given it a leading role in economic policies. However, with the introduction of massive external influences and enormous levels of physical, economic, and social destruction, the South temporarily lost control of its destiny. The rural support structure of the NLF remained an essential ingredient of victory, but in many places it

[26] Nguyen Khac Vien, *Contemporary Vietnam* (Hanoi: Red River Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1981), 255.

[27] Charles Fisher, "Physical and Economic Resources of Indochina," *Prospects for the Development of the Indochina Peninsula* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1975), 56.

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supported a Northern military force.[28] The final campaign of 1975 appeared to result in a conventional military victory of the Northern forces over those of Saigon, and the immediate political effect of reunification was to replace the Saigon leadership with a revolutionary leadership composed primarily of cadres from the North.

Despite such major distortions, the QDS heritage of the NLF and the Viet Minh remains a major influence on post-1975 Vietnamese politics for a number of reasons. First, the North and South have the common political heritage of a rural revolutionary tradition. There is a great congruence between the experience of the North in 1941-1954 and that of the South in 1941-1965. Second, the increase in external pressures and destruction between 1965 and 1975 did not lead to the replacement of the QDS with a different revolutionary model, but to the weakening of village-based revolution in a situation of general societal chaos. The QDS remained the primary political form in the South, and it was essential to the logistical support of Northern troops. Third, the pressures put on the North during the last decade of the war moved the party closer to a QDS situation in the North. The war required a maximum effective effort from the masses in the North, and the party's dependence on mass performance caused it to retreat from some of its more unpopular policies.[29] Between 1976 and 1979, the party returned to its leftist policies, leading to near-famine conditions by 1979. Subsequently the party began to adopt wide-ranging economic reforms.

The second environmental prerequisite is a profound alienation between the overwhelming majority of peasants and the government. This condition may be implicit in the first prerequisite, but it deserves separate treatment because it has distinctive implications for the QDS. In both China and Vietnam, the governments were compromised by foreign ties and pro-landlord policies, which provided the revolutionary parties with the potent rallying cries of national defense/liberation and anti-landlordism. In Vietnam national liberation was the chief emphasis, while in China class struggle was the principal means of popular mobilization; but both factors were important in each case.

The obvious significance of alienation between the peasants and the government is that it creates grounds for popular support of antigovernment activities. Almost as important is that the distance between the government and the peasantry enables the revolutionary party to hide among

[28] It should be noted that in some areas, for instance the Plain of Reeds, the topography was unsuited for concentrations of Northern soldiers, and the struggle remained a Southern guerrilla affair until 1975.

[29] William Turley, "Political Participation in Vietnam," in Turley (fn. 1), 171-98.

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the peasants, forcing the security policies of the government to be either too lax or too harsh. During the crucial early period when it is most vulnerable, the party is allowed to develop because the government is unaware of its activities. When the party consolidates its power and begins antigovernment activities, the government's sanctions are often dealt out on a blanket, territorial basis. All residents are treated as if they were the enemy. The perverse effect of territorial sanctions is that they increase group pressure for support of the QDS and provide no grounds for individual exit. The scope of governmental sanctions will affect (though not control) the incidence of antigovernment activities, but any sanctions short of annihilation can be expected to have a counterproductive political effect. The distance between the government and the people leaves the government with no alternative. If it cannot tell the difference between a peasant rebel and an ordinary peasant, it must treat both as the enemy in areas of hostility. The government is thereby caught in a vicious circle, in which the partial success of the revolutionaries leads to antigovernment actions which evoke blanket sanctions that confirm the territorial control of the party. The risk of governmental sanctions is undesirable to the peasants, but it is related to symptoms of aggregate political change rather than to individual decisions of political support. There is no such thing as a politically smart bomb.

The third environmental prerequisite is the presence of active and threatening governmental hostility. Hostility is such a natural reaction to a revolutionary group that to speculate on its specific effects is largely hypothetical. In the QDS model, governmental hostility and the consequent fear and need for survival keeps the party's nose to the populist grindstone. If the government had in effect ceded control of some territory to the party, the QDS would be free to behave like a postrevolutionary state. Policy would be determined more by party goals than by the party's evaluation of mass interests, and the political structure would become more authoritarian. Party leadership might compete as a territorial elite within established national politics, or it might use the territory ceded to it as a base area for guerrilla operations in disputed territory. As a case in point, let us consider Mexico. After the defeat of the national ambitions of the Zapatistas, the state of Morelos was left under their control. Without the threat of governmental hostility, there was no need to sustain peasant mobilization, and the Zapatista government evolved into a somewhat more progressive version of normal Mexican politics.[30]

[30] See John Womack, *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (New York: Vintage, 1968); see Scott (fn. 9), 114-15, for other examples.

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Environmental Transformation and the QDS

Even if the QDS had initially been adopted as a tactical ploy by the party, the effect of its operation over the long term would be to reorient party values, style, and personnel toward mass-regarding behavior. This happened in the case of China, where the Rectification Campaign of 1942-1944 was essentially a political and ideological retooling of the CCP to be a rural, mass revolutionary party. The sincerity of the leadership's commitment to QDS values can be seen in the many postrevolutionary attempts to preserve and revive them.

The logic of the QDS implies, however, that the system will be transformed by success. A strong state will have been created, and the party and its cadres are no longer bound to mass-regarding behavior by their interest in personal survival. In view of the postrevolutionary party's monopoly of authority, the masses can be noncooperative only at their own risk, not at the party's risk. Moreover, postrevolutionary policy goals are inevitably different and more complex than prerevolutionary ones. Although these transformations certainly did not escape the attention of the successful parties, the focus was not on the change in the political mechanism. Three aspects of environmental transformation deserve special attention: the confirmatory effect of victory, the replacement of the logic of enticement by the logic of authority, and the effect of new policy goals. The confirmatory effect of victory should be considered first because it is most often overlooked and because it impedes the other factors.

Since the QDS was the mechanism of victory, the confirmatory (and even sanctifying) effect of victory necessarily tended to preserve its influence. Concerning Vietnam, William Turley observes:

> The principal legacy of the resistance for political participation in the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] was a vivid memory of when ideals seemed to work, of when Party, people, and state formed a monolithic unity based on common cause, cooperation, and zeal. This memory provided Party leaders their touchstone for judging the quite different realities faced during the construction of socialism.[31]

Mass-regarding leaders, policies, and political traditions have a place of honor in the new regime. It is possible that the old leaders may be incompetent for the tasks of socialist construction, the old policies may not reflect the current needs of the masses, and the old political traditions may not function effectively in their new context. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to interpret the political changes in the postrevolutionary regime

[31] Turley (fn. 29), 183.

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as a cynical casting away of the ladder of mass-regarding politics. The organizational weapon model simply does not fit the self-consciousness of the postrevolutionary leadership in China and Vietnam, and, since it is an intentional model rather than a latent function model, it is therefore invalidated.

But there are basic structural changes in the postrevolutionary situation regardless of the respect paid to the revolutionary tradition. Most importantly, the environment of competitive state authorities has been replaced by a monopoly of state power in the hands of the party. Because the party and its cadres are no longer vulnerable to defeat, the masses are more vulnerable to party sanctions. Mass compliance or noncompliance is of course still very important for party policies, in part because human resources remain the chief strength of the regime. Although the prestige, authority, and power of the party can on occasion push the masses to the verge of the humanly possible, the limits of policy are still set by what the masses will do. The residual clout of the masses as producers, consumers, and even resisters cannot be eliminated.[32] If the masses produce more under one policy than under another, stand in line for some goods but ignore others, collude to hide production, or complain about particular policies or officials, they create a presumption in favor of their preferences. The problem of opposition becomes marginal, however, and that of apathy is responsive to threats and rewards as well as to the popularity of policy. Basically, victory allows the party to pursue a program that it *assumes* to be popular rather than a program that *must* be popular.

For the masses, victory means a change from an environment of chaos and unstable, conflicting authority to one of clear and unquestionable authority in society, politics, and economics. The postrevolutionary society is necessarily "authoritarian" because the only hierarchy left intact is in the service of the revolution, and its core is the party. The polyarchal clutter of traditional society—landlords, lineages, religion, secret societies, and so forth—is replaced by a unified, active hierarchy that directly links the life of the village with that of the state. There is no legitimate opposition; there is hardly any legitimate interest articulation. It is a society in which disagreement is usually measured in subtle shades of compliance. The masses must rely on the party and its cadres, but the party and its cadres are no longer in a position of direct, reciprocal dependence and vulnerability. The remaining clout of the masses is reduced to their dis-

[32] The forms and importance of such behavior are detailed in James C. Scott, *The Weapons of the Weak* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

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cretion as producers, consumers, and risk-taking resisters. The masses have become the fish, and the party controls the water.

Perhaps the most basic situational shift affects the local and intermediate cadres, despite the continuity of personal and party standards. The most obvious change is from the risky and vulnerable position of revolutionary cadre to the low-risk and powerful one of state cadre. Far more than a change of title is involved. In the QDS, the cadre was responsible for generating the popular support that he or she directed. The cadre was thus more dependent on the masses and less dependent on the party hierarchy. After the revolution, the cadre's prestige, power, and responsibilities derive from his position in the hierarchy. This change encourages alterations in cadre behavior and personnel composition that are seen as a deterioration of revolutionary virtue.[33] Since the party has become the only status game in town, and a very secure and powerful one to boot, it attracts opportunists. Even among revolutionary cadres, the role of administering state authority encourages bureaucratism. Moreover, the situation of relatively unchecked power allows corruption. Although all these problems certainly existed before victory, the general conditions for their development are more favorable afterwards.

Despite the effort put into fighting opportunism, bureaucratism, and corruption, the party does not usually face the fundamental problem. Victory has introduced a split between moral cadre behavior and self-interested cadre behavior. As a recent Vietnamese editorial put it,

> Each stage of the revolution has its specific trials and requirements regarding the ethics and qualities of party cadres and members. In the current stage of the revolution, the most important trial for all party members and cadres is whether they can uphold revolutionary qualities and adopt a revolutionary lifestyle in the struggle between the two roads and the struggle between ourselves and the enemy.[34]

Temptations to which it would have been imprudent to yield before victory are now merely immoral, and the scope of possible temptations has broadened considerably. Of course, there are models for venal, elitist behavior in the old regime, and these provide much of the content and color for enjoying the fruits of victory. But it would be hopelessly idealistic (in the Marxist sense) to consider "feudal" influences to be the cause of the problem. The actual cause is that now the communist cadre, like his feu-

[33] See, for example, Ho Chi Minh, *Selected Works* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1977), 143.

[34] *Nhan Dan*, January 9, 1985, trans. in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Asia and Pacific* [*FBIS APA*], January 18, 1985, pp. K 7-9.

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dal predecessor, is no longer subject to the control of popular influence. If he is a good cadre, it is because he is either moral or disciplined. Before victory, it was heroic to be a cadre; after victory, it is heroic to be a good cadre.

The problem of the good cadre is further complicated by the third major environmental transformation—namely, the new policy goals of the victorious party. Although the confirmatory effect of victory tends to preserve the revolutionary heritage, the revolution is not viewed as an end in itself but as the opportunity to move the nation more rapidly from bourgeois revolution to socialism and eventually to communism. The party's role as the vanguard of the proletariat is precisely formulated by Marx in the *Communist Manifesto*: "They have over the masses of the proletariat the advantage of insight into the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement."[35] The party is dedicated to the interests of the masses, but not to their preferences. As adapted by Lenin and Stalin to the postrevolutionary situation of less developed countries, the party's tasks are to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and to lead socialist construction.

Neither political consolidation nor centralized economic construction have the close, mass-regarding dimension that characterized revolutionary policy. Programmatically, policy is still debated and justified in terms of mass interests, but the perception of mass interests is heavily influenced by the Leninist paradigm, and policy-shaping interaction with the masses now takes place on much more unequal terms. In any case, postrevolutionary policy would not evoke mass solidarity in the same manner as base-area policies. Policy is no longer characterized by measures against urgent, common threats. An increase in steel production may be for the common good, but it has less of an immediate mass appeal than defense against air attacks. The remoteness and complexity of new policies require a heavier reliance on specific recompense and sanction, as well as on expertise. In turn, these create a new policy establishment that is functional for regime goals but separated from the masses. The new official circles are urban-based and structured in a centralized hierarchy. The tasks and resources of the cadre are defined by his or her authoritative position rather than by command of mass support.

These new conditions tend to transform the operative value system of the party. In the QDS model, a good cadre was one who was effective

[35] Karl Marx, *Manifest der kommunistischen Partei* (1848), Section II, "Proletarier und Kommunisten" (author's translation).

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because he was close to the masses. In the environment of postrevolutionary authoritarianism, the practical meaning of a "good cadre" is one who fulfills his tasks. The situation is well described by the author of the "Fish-Water Relationship":

> In handing down a task, some organs fail to make clear to the lower levels the bounds of a given policy and the work methods and work style required. They do not understand the situation at lower levels and do not concern themselves with the well-being of the masses. They demand that the task be accomplished "at all costs." Whoever accomplishes the task, no matter what methods they use, are considered "capable." They are commended and promoted.[36]

The same point is made in the Vietnamese press.[37] As the standards of cadre behavior shift away from mass mobilization and toward the fulfillment of assigned tasks, the definition of the good cadre becomes little different from that of the good bureaucrat. Not only is the postrevolutionary cadre free from personal dependence on the masses, but the organizational rules of the game direct his attention upward toward his superiors.

The slide of the revolutionary party into bureaucratic-authoritarian behavior is not simply human nature, nor is it a Weberian routinization of charisma. It is a gradual, cumulative response to a shift in organizational context. To some extent, greater differentiation and institutionalization is inevitable in the more complex postrevolutionary situation. The drastic reduction in the political clout of the masses is inevitable if we assume that no constitutional measures are taken by the new regime to transform mass clout into institutionally guaranteed mass voice. The party sees its new powers as tools on behalf of the masses and overlooks the change that they introduce in the party-mass relationship. Emerging bureaucratic tendencies are viewed either as individual deviations or as a new bourgeois threat. The old revolutionaries find them deeply repugnant and a danger to the historic significance of their accomplishment, but they tend to ignore the importance of the change in context and to insist on a continuity or revivification of revolutionary behavior. The unacknowledged structural watershed—in which the masses have lost the power given to them by the exit option and it has not been replaced by new rights—shifts the basis of each individual decision by separating rationality and mass-regarding behavior.

[36] Special Commentator, "Do Not Forget the Fish-Water Relationship," *Renmin Ribao*, August 19, 1978. Translated in *Chinese Law and Government* (Fall-Winter 1982-1983), 46-47.
[37] *Nhan Dan*, January 3, 1985, trans. in *FBIS APA*, January 15, 1985, pp. K 11-13.

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Conclusion: Democratic Institutionalization in China and Vietnam

Although within the confines of this paper it is impossible to analyze the policy histories of China and Vietnam in detail, I would suggest that the very strength of the victorious party-state in these countries led to a crisis in its effectiveness. In turn, the crisis has induced economic and political reforms that go beyond the Leninist paradigm and allow some institutionalization of mass voice. Inevitably, China and Vietnam remain one-party states, but with policy and institutional precommitments that acknowledge and to some extent institutionalize mass discretion.

The combination of popular mobilization and Marxist-Leninist ideology gave a unique strength to the post-QDS states. On the one hand, they came to power with an experienced and extensive leadership structure well-integrated into vast areas of society. (By contrast, the Bolsheviks in 1917 were a tiny minority with no practical political experience, and the native cadres of East European communist parties in the late 1940s were persecuted by leaders returning from exile in Moscow.) China and Vietnam were therefore able to implement difficult policies relatively quickly and effectively.[38] On the other hand, Marxism-Leninism freed the victorious regimes from continuing concerns about their popular legitimacy. The ideology assumed the correctness of the party, played down the importance of political institutions, interpreted opposition as class struggle, and instituted state economic policy that pushed decision making up and towards the center. All of these factors worked against a significant voice for the masses in either politics or economics, and encouraged unlimited party penetration and control of society, overly ambitious programs, neglect of individual interests, and centralization and bureaucratization of the economy.

In China, the combination of a deeply rooted political structure and an ideology with no hesitations about using public power produced policy disasters of gigantic proportions. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were remarkable for the extent of self-destructive power of the state that they exhibited. The state required society to attempt the impossible and then led in picking up the pieces. In Vietnam, the bureaucratic leftism of Truong Chinh led to rations below subsistence level by 1979, a situation complicated by the invasion and occupation of Kampuchea and by the exodus of Vietnam's largest ethnic minority, the Chinese.

[38] Contrast, for instance, the progress of rural restructuring in China as reported by Vivienne Shue, *Peasant China in Transition* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), and in Europe as analyzed by Karl-Eugen Wadekin, *Agrarian Policies in Communist Europe* (Totowa, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun, 1982).

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As a Vietnamese cabinet minister said in 1980, "In another country, the government would have changed."[39]

The leftism of Mao Zedong was intended to democratize the Chinese political economy by returning to the political style of the revolutionary bases, irrespective of its destructive effect on the concrete interests of the masses. The Great Leap Forward was a popular mobilization that decreased bureaucratic central control while it communalized the countryside. The Cultural Revolution was supposed to be the exposure of the party to mass criticism similar to the process of "passing the gate" in land reform.[40] But revolutionary politics turned out to be Procrustian measures for postrevolutionary policy. The recommitment of the party-state to revolutionary goals and to maximum mobilization produced destructive and terrifying results.

Vietnamese leftism has been less destructive and more bureaucratic than Mao's dramatic interventions into Chinese politics. "Uncle Ho" gave a less ideological, less threatening, and more inclusive air to Vietnamese politics, and the collegiality of the top leadership has been stronger than in China. Class labels, a major poison of Chinese politics until 1979, were dropped in Vietnam in the late 1950s. On the other hand, bureaucratic tendencies had been encouraged in the North by decades of free supplies from China and the Soviet Union. Bureaucratic habits of centrally controlled, inefficient production were inadequate to the task of transforming and integrating the war-ravaged, subsidy-dependent economies of both North and South after 1975. In late 1979, emergency policies were adopted that allowed peasants greater discretion in production and the right to sell above-quota produce on the free market. These proved to be popular and effective remedies, which were supplemented with experiments in the decontrol of industrial management and incentives in the South. The general direction of economic reform was confirmed by Le Duan's speech of 1984 emphasizing collective mastery of the state by the people.[41] More importantly, these policies have been successful in raising agricultural and industrial production and in improving

[39] Quoted in Nayan Chanda, "Vietnam's Economy: Its Domestic and International Dimensions," in William Turley, *Confrontation or Coexistence: The Future of ASEAN-Vietnam Relations* (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Institute of Security and International Studies, 1985), 109.

[40] See William Hinton, *Fanshen* (New York: Vintage, 1966) for land reform politics. For the very different situation of the critique of basic-level cadres in the 1960s, see Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger, *Chen Village* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). For an administrative critique of the Great Leap Forward, see Harry Harding, *Organizing China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1981), 153-94.

[41] Le Duan, "Speech at the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam," *FBIS APA*, August 17, 20, 21, 1984.

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material conditions in Vietnam. Although there has not been a general public critique of leftism in Vietnam, the forces for market-oriented, incentive-based reform have grown stronger since 1979.[42]

Because the government changed in China with the death of Mao Zedong and the fall of the Gang of Four, the critique of leftist policies is more explicit there than it is in Vietnam.[43] The increasingly bold economic reforms that have been adopted since Deng Xiaoping's access to power at the end of 1978 are credited with awe-inspiring increases in production and personal income.[44] Moreover, the open critique of leftism has induced major political reforms intended to promote democratic and legal institutionalization. The People's Congress and legal systems have been greatly strengthened, electoral procedures are now generally based on more candidates than positions, and the liberties of individual citizens have been expanded.[45] In mid-1986, the call for reform in the political structure (*zhengzhi tizhi gaige*) corresponding to the 1984 reforms in the economic structure suggested a new wave of democratic activity. In Vietnam, the National Assembly and mass organizations have also become more lively, with the former bitterly criticizing state and party leadership for having bungled currency reform in 1985.[46] It is possible that the major leadership changes faced by both the Chinese and the Vietnamese in 1987 will be accompanied by institutional reforms of comparable long-term significance.

The fundamental problem of post-QDS leftism has not been the vol-

[42] See Vo Van Kiet, "Transformation of Private Industry and Trade in the South," *Vietnam Social Sciences* 2 (September 1985), 47-63, and Christine White, "Recent Debates in Vietnamese Development Policy," in G. White, R. Murray, and C. White, *Revolutionary Socialist Development in the Third World* (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf, 1983), 234-65.

[43] Vietnam's alliance with the Soviet Union and its hostility to China are factors inhibiting the articulation of reform. Moreover, the VCP is more Europeanized than the CCP, and probably less inclined to leap about ideologically.

[44] For Chinese rural reforms, see William Parish, ed., *China's Rural Development* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1985), and Marc Blecher, "The Structure and Contradictions of Productive Relations in Socialist Agrarian 'Reform,'" *Journal of Development Studies* 22 (October 1985), 104-26; for Vietnam, see Murray Hiebert, "Contracts in Vietnam: More Rice, New Problems," *Indochina Issues*, No. 48 (July 1984), 1-7.

[45] Brantly Womack, "Modernization and Democratic Reform in China," *Journal of Asian Studies* 43 (May 1984), 417-40. The most challenging statement of official Chinese thinking on political reform is Liao Gailong, "Lishi di jingyan he women di fashan daolu" [Historical experience and our developmental path], a speech given on October 25, 1980, to the Conference on Party Historiography, and reprinted in the Taiwanese journal *Zhonggong Yanjiu* 15 (September 15, 1981), 108-77.

[46] Nayan Chanda, "The New Revolution," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 10, 1986, pp. 24-28. See also Murray Hiebert, "Vietnam Begins Leadership Transition," *Indochina Issues*, No. 67 (July 1986), 1-5. My impression from talks with assembly officials in both countries is that, while political reforms in China have been more striking, political opinions are expressed more freely in Vietnam—possibly because Vietnam has never had an Anti-Rightist Campaign or a Cultural Revolution.

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untarism and one-man dictatorship associated with Mao, but rather a deeper failure that can be traced to Lenin. Lenin postulated that the party-state was democratic. Therefore no private interest should stand against the party's manifestation of the public interest, and mass institutions were to amplify party decisions. The view of socialist democracy as a fact rather than a problem may serve simply as a convenient ideology of the political class where the party has come to power without a mass revolution, but it poses a contradiction in China and Vietnam. On the one hand, both have seen that the Leninist paradigm of an authoritarian democratic party worked during the revolution. On the other hand, because they have seen it work then, it is obvious that something went wrong after victory. Mao tried to return the party to mass revolutionary virtue and enthusiasm, but he remained within the assumption that there was no institutional problem. The target was "party persons in power going the capitalist road." Essentially, the "struggle between two lines" in China in the 1960s was between two leftist, Leninist lines. One threatened society with the breakdown of order; the other, similar to Truong Chinh's in Vietnam, enervated it through bureaucratic control.

The current reforms in China and Vietnam depart from the Leninist paradigm in that they tend to control the excessive reach of the state in economics and to strengthen mass input into policy. Of course, they are presented as Leninist, and the example of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) is often cited. At the time, however, the NEP was viewed as a tactical retreat in the face of a severe crisis on the economic front, and the leadership tightened political control while making economic concessions.[47] When China and Vietnam undertook structural reforms, they had had longer experience with and better control of the discarded policies, and the reforms have been expanded as they have proved successful. Moreover, the reforms guarantee private incentive and discretion within a structure of collective ownership, so the contradiction between private production and public accumulation that led to Stalinist collectivization is not likely to occur. The combination of political and economic reform strengthens both states and distinguishes China and Vietnam from Lenin's political consolidation and from the Hungarian model of depoliticized economic reform. Parties with a QDS heritage seem more willing and more able to take the lead in structural reform.[48]

[47] Alec Nove, *Economic History of the USSR* (New York: Penguin, 1982), 75-86. For the political impact of the NEP, see Roy Medvedev, *Leninism and Western Socialism* (London: Verso, 1981), 57-69.

[48] For contrast, see Andrew Arato, "Democratization in East Central Europe," *Journal of International Affairs* 38 (Winter 1985), 321-35.

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For the purposes of this essay, the most important consequence of economic reform is the acknowledgement of a legitimate scope for decentralized discretion. At the individual level, the private sphere of activity is increased and guaranteed—surely a major factor in the quality of political and social life. The retrenchment of state control in production and consumption relieves many of the daily frustrations of mass impotence vis-à-vis the state. At the local level, the balance of political and economic power has been improved, leading to a greater diversity of policy influences. At the leadership level, the question of determining the will of the party is now complicated by precommitments to nonauthoritarian means (market forces, incentives, etc.) and by the increasingly important role played by nonbureaucratic forces. Although decentralizing reforms do not limit the economic power of the party-state in an effective legal sense, they do put its practical decision making in an environment that highlights and amplifies the negative consequences of simple authoritarianism. In the context of party-mass relations in China and Vietnam, such reforms condition the party's control over uncertainty and increase the masses' capacity to pursue preferences, thus enlarging popular power in public affairs.

The directly political reforms that were adopted at the party's initiative do not establish effective parliamentary control over the party-state, but they are important contributions to democratic institutionalization. First, the strengthening of the constitutional and legal systems is democratic. Legal institutionalization strengthens state organs vis-à-vis the party, and rules hamper the arbitrary behavior of officials. Rules operate to the advantage of weaker players. Second, the strengthening of mass organizations is an important increase in mass political clout, if not in mass political voice. Although such institutions cannot normally act as interest groups in a Western sense and do not provide open arenas for policy debate, they are significant as organized access to party leadership.[49] At its best, the situation of mass organizations approximates that of the masses before the revolution. The party's recognition of their importance insulates them from oppression, and they represent societal interests whose satisfaction is important to the effectiveness of the regime. Third, an increase in the importance of popular representative systems creates a potential constituency for further parliamentarizing reforms. Formal sov-

[49] The considerable literature on the question of interest groups in communist countries is summarized in H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics Revisited," *World Politics* 36 (October 1983), 1-27. In my opinion, the best article on the subject is Robert Furtak, "Interessenpluralismus in den politischen Systemen Osteuropas," *Osteuropa* 24 (November-December 1974), 779-92.

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ereignty in both countries rests with the national assembly, and there has been some progress in expanding the assembly's legal control over policy. Although China and Vietnam are still far from being citizen-based parliamentary states, the mass base of their party-states has made significant progress.

In the long view, current reforms in the political economics of China and Vietnam are a movement in the direction of coping with and correcting a structural flaw in the postrevolutionary party-state. They are a delayed response—made possible by the popular identity of the party—to residual mass clout. The structural response gives greater recognition to the power of producers and consumers, and increases the potential for mass initiative in other areas, including politics. The reforms are truly innovative; unlike Mao's disastrous policies in the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, they are in no respect a nostalgic return to the revolutionary period. These clearly postrevolutionary policies, by providing institutional protection and recognition of mass interests, have introduced a more mass-regarding political climate in which the party-mass relationship can begin to approximate the fish-water relationship of earlier times.

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MIDDLEMEN IN THIRD-WORLD CORRUPTION:
Implications of an Indian Case

By PHILIP OLDENBURG*

VIRGO: All round improvement but not without strings, which you must be able to recognize and accept. . . . If paying a bribe to anyone, see that the job is done.
—*Astrology column*,
Hindustan Times *(New Delhi), October 13, 1985.*

CORRUPTION—like the weather—is a phenomenon people in the third world talk about a great deal, and, it would seem, *do* little about. Scholars of political change in the third world share this interest, but—although they are usually not expected to deal with corruption itself—they should move beyond the recounting of vivid anecdotes to a more systematic analysis of the problem. Steps in this direction were made in the 1960s and 1970s,[1] but surprisingly little more work has been done since.[2]

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[1] All the important prior articles and book extracts are collected in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, ed., *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970). See also Gabriel Ben-Dor, "Corruption, Institutionalization, and Political Development: The Revisionist Thesis Revisited," *Comparative Political Studies* 7 (April 1974), 63-83; Victor T. LeVine, *Political Corruption: The Ghana Case* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1975); James C. Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972); James C. Scott, "Corruption in Underdeveloped Countries," *Cultures et Développement* 5 (No. 1, 1973), 107-24; John Waterbury, "Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime," *World Politics* 25 (July 1973), 533-55; and John Waterbury, "Corruption, Political Stability and Development: Comparative Evidence from Egypt and Morocco," *Government and Opposition* 11 (Autumn 1976), 426-45.

[2] Among the studies that have appeared in recent years, see in particular Stephen G. Bunker and Lawrence E. Cohen, "Collaboration and Competition in Two Colonization Projects: Toward a General Theory of Official Corruption," *Human Organization* 42 (Summer 1983), 106-14; Michael Clarke, ed., *Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Control* (London: Frances Pinter, Ltd., 1983); John Macrae, "Underdevelopment and the Economics of Corruption: A Game Theory Approach," *World Development* 10 (August 1982), 677-87; Leslie Palmier, *The Control of Bureaucratic Corruption: Case Studies in Asia* [India, Hong Kong, Indonesia] (New Delhi: Allied, 1985); Robert Wade, "The System of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South India," *Journal of Development Studies* 18 (April 1982),

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Obviously, we cannot say that this reflects a diminution of the phenomenon itself. Corruption remains one of the most significant features of the political landscape in the third world. Paul Harrison's assessment of the situation in Nigeria could easily be applied to many third-world countries:

> Corruption was there, invisible, in all dealings between public and officials. . . . Corruption riddles every part of the public edifice like a bad infestation of woodworm. . . . Corruption does not only weaken government and undermine social discipline at all levels. It is, in addition, another of the mechanisms by which inequalities are created and increased.[3]

His remarks on its meanings and effect are also representative:

> [Corruption] eats away at the foundations of trust between people and their rulers. It exemplifies the two key weaknesses of the developing state: the unholy marriage of political and economic power, whereby money buys influence, and power attracts money; and the "softness" of the state, to use economist Gunnar Myrdal's term—its inability to apply and enforce its own laws and regulation. . . . It [is] a symptom of government incompetence, and in itself further undermine[s] government's ability to rule.[4]

The implication is clear: we cannot understand how third-world states are (mis)governed unless we understand the causes, mechanisms, scope, and effect of corruption.

Most work has concentrated on causes and effects. The initial studies attempted to analyze the function served by corruption—in particular, whether it helps or hinders economic development,[5] and what its relationship is to political modernization[6]—and to propose explanations for its causes. The "revisionists" succeeded in showing that corruption should be analyzed as a matter of political choice (rather than as a problem of the morality of government officials, or simply as the residue of "tradition"); but their position that it has a certain relationship to the

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287-328; and Robert Wade, "The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State Is Not Better at Development," *World Development* 13 (April 1985), 467-97.

[3] Harrison, *Inside the Third World* (2d ed., Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1981), 366, 367, 369.

[4] *Ibid.*, 367, 368.

[5] See Nathaniel H. Leff, "Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption," *American Behavioral Scientist* 8 (November 1964), 8-14, reprinted in Heidenheimer (fn. 1), 510-20; Joseph S. Nye, "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 61 (June 1967), 417-27, reprinted in Heidenheimer (fn. 1), 564-78; and Waterbury (fn. 1, 1973).

[6] See Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 59-71; Scott (fn. 1, 1972); Waterbury (fn. 1, 1976); and Ledivina V. Cariño and Raul P. de Guzman, "Negative Bureaucratic Behavior in the Philippines: The Final Report of the IDRC [International Development Research Centre, Canada] Philippines Team," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration* 23 (July-October 1979), 350-85.

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stages of development, or is essentially a form of interest representation for "excluded" classes or groups, was shown to be ill-founded.[7] Further theoretical work building on Huntington's approach, as advocated by Ben-Dor, has not occurred. We are left with few agreed-upon general propositions, let alone theories, about third-world corruption. One result has been that the more recent theoretical contributions are confined to narrower issues: for example, how do game theory or queuing theory help to explain corruption?[8]

The scope of corruption—how widespread it is, at what levels in the hierarchy, and in which government activities—and its mechanisms have been less widely examined.[9] Such studies, and careful tests of some of the theoretical statements we do have, would require work in the field, which is certainly difficult and quite possibly dangerous. As a result, the empirical foundation of most inquiries has been built on cases described by scholars and by the press (in a few countries), as well as a comparatively limited set of reports of governmental inquiry commissions of the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in Ghana and India.[10] A few case studies of particular places or government departments[11] and the deep understanding of a political system, built up over years of residence and research,[12] have also served as a basis for work in this area.

In this paper, I will look carefully at one element in the mechanism of corruption: the middleman. The puzzle that prompted this focus emerged from my study of land consolidation in the giant north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh (U.P.).[13] In this program, ill-paid officials reallocate land to villagers, many of whom are illiterate and all of whom are wary of the bureaucracy as well as of the judicial system with which the land consolidation department is integrated. Moreover, there is significant inequality of power, based largely on inequality of landownership, in these

[7] See Ben-Dor (fn. 1); Waterbury (fn. 1, 1973).

[8] Macrae (fn. 2); Salim Rashid, "Public Utilities in Egalitarian LDCs: The Role of Bribery in Achieving Pareto Efficiency," *Kyklos* 34 (No. 3, 1981), 448-60.

[9] The major exceptions are Wade's articles (fn. 2) and Ledivina V. Cariño, "Bureaucratic Norms, Corruption, and Development," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration* 19 (October 1975), 278-92.

[10] See Scott (fn. 1, 1973).

[11] In addition to those by Wade (fn. 2) and Cariño (fn. 9), see J. David Greenstone, "Corruption and Self-Interest in Kampala and Nairobi; A Comment on Local Politics in East Africa," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 8 (January 1966), 199-210, reprinted in Heidenheimer (fn. 1), 459-68; and A. P. Barnabas, *The Experience of Citizens in Getting Water Connections (A Survey Report on Knowledge, Communication and Corruption)* (New Delhi: Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1965).

[12] See, for example, Waterbury (fn. 1) and LeVine (fn. 1).

[13] In 1980-1981, this state had a population of about 110 million; the land consolidation department had 25,000 employees.

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villages. This is a situation, then, in which earlier studies would lead us to expect to find a good deal of corruption.

Nevertheless, the nature of land consolidation, the rules that evolved in this particular program, and the procedures as they operated in practice, all worked to reduce the incidence of corruption to the point where it had only a marginal impact on the outcome of the program. On the other hand, the reputation of the department, as well as the testimony of many farmers interviewed formally and informally, indicated that corruption was widespread. I argue that this contradiction can be resolved by considering the role of the middleman, who makes use of the predictability of outcomes of the program (*because* corruption is a minor factor) to make money from farmers who are convinced—by the middleman himself as well as the general belief that in India corruption is pervasive—that it is necessary to bribe officials to get them to follow the rules. With few exceptions, the middleman has not been studied by those who write on corruption in the third world.[14] I contend that middlemen can and usually do play a significant part in corruption transactions and are worthy of study in their own right, to which end I propose a rough typology of the various roles played by them.[15] I then discuss how taking account of the middleman can alter the way in which we conceptualize corruption transactions.

The theoretical point that emerges is that we can treat administrative and political institutions and procedures, and the precise mechanisms of corruption they permit, as an independent variable to explain the incidence of corruption in a particular program or department. Two points of methodology are concerned with how to measure the pervasiveness of corruption in a political system. The first is the rather narrow one that, in answering certain questions, it would be better to consider subtransactions that occur as citizens and the bureaucracy interact than to try to discover how many officials are corrupt and how much money they are collecting. The second is that the degree to which corruption is *believed* to be occurring is not necessarily a good indicator of the reality.

Here it is worth noting Gunnar Myrdal's advice: "*The folklore of corruption* ['people's beliefs about corruption and the emotions attached to those beliefs, as disclosed in the public debate and in gossip'] *embodies im-*

[14] The exceptions include Barnabas (fn. 11); LeVine (fn. 1), 52-57; and Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1968), excerpted in Heidenheimer (fn. 1), 236.

[15] In addition to my research into land consolidation, I draw on my earlier work, *Big City Government in India: Councilor, Administrator, and Citizen in Delhi*, Association for Asian Studies Monograph XXXI (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976), and on my general understanding of Indian politics and administration.

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portant social facts worth intensive research in their own right."[16] Even more directly to the point:

> The taboo on research on corruption [in South Asia] . . . is rationalized, when challenged, by certain sweeping assertions [earlier Myrdal calls them "excuses, irrelevant and transparently thin"]: . . . that there is not as much corruption as is implied by the public outcry. . . . (This claim needs to be substantiated and if it is true, the causes and effects of that outcry should be investigated.)[17]

I have been using the term "corruption" without defining it because it is unnecessary here to add to that particular subliterature. What goes on in this case comes under the heading "administrative corruption" and consists mainly of bribery and tipping. Generally, bribes are negotiated payments made before a transaction; tips, indicating "gratitude," are paid afterwards, with the amount left up to the donor.[18] My discussion is also relevant to kickbacks, though not to embezzlement, nepotism, favoritism, fraud, and some other practices usually included in administrative corruption. It may also apply to political corruption. Thus, the term "bribery" is too narrow to use here, and "corruption" is too broad; I have chosen to err in the expansive direction. A corruption transaction, then, is defined as the exchange of money or favor for a benefit disbursed by a government official.

The Process of Land Consolidation

The difficult task of consolidating landholdings has been going on in Uttar Pradesh since 1954. Corruption has been a factor from the start: in the first ten years of the consolidation department's existence, nearly one-fourth of its employees were dismissed, mainly because of corruption.[19]

On the first day of my research work in 1980, a chance-met lawyer told me that the consolidation department was the "most corrupt" in the state. Later, many of the farmers I interviewed asserted that massive bribes had been paid in their village during the process.

Corruption or no, the map of three-fourths of the state has been literally redrawn. Before consolidation, farmers had owned scattered plots as

[16] Myrdal (fn. 14), 231; emphasis in original.

[17] *Ibid.*, 230.

[18] Tips are often agreed upon beforehand, and an official who accepts bribes from a particular person on a regular basis may allow for credit. In Hindi and Urdu, the difference is between *rishvat* (bribe) and *bakşheesh* (tip). The difference may blur; for instance, when the mailman comes to expect a tip at Christmas, his displeasure at an inadequate (especially a nonexistent) one may be made manifest in delayed or damaged mail.

[19] I.D.N. Sahi, "Consolidation of Holdings," *Journal of the National Academy of Administration* [India] 9 (April 1964), 9.

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the result of generations of sons dividing their inheritance by each taking a piece of each plot of a particular quality, or of farmers buying small pieces of land no matter where they were located (since land rarely came on the market). After consolidation, 90-95 percent of the postconsolidation farms were in one place.[20] Most of these farms have straight-line boundaries and all have a road right-of-way. Each village now has land set aside for straight roads of a fixed, adequate width; before, few if any roads, and those usually too narrow, twisted and turned through the fields.

The benefits for the farmers are hard to exaggerate. Having one field instead of many scattered throughout the village not only saves a farmer's time and trouble in moving from one to another, but also often means being able to invest in improving the land, especially by having a tubewell made. The farmer with a tubewell of his own is no longer at the mercy of a water seller's schedule and goodwill. Other causes of friction are also reduced: most important, the consolidation process requires that joint holdings be partitioned, so that operating one's farm—and taking out loans and paying the land tax—no longer needs the consent of one's co-holders. Disputes are also reduced when a farmer uses the opportunity of consolidation to change the location of his farm to get away from a neighbor with whom he might have fought in the past. In addition, a road right-of-way can help the farmer, especially the small one, in that he need not ask for permission to cross to his own holding with his cart. The new single-plot farm may also affect the cost of production and the crop pattern. Most significantly, the cost of supervision of labor is reduced when the farmer can, with ease, literally keep an eye on the workers, be they hired labor or his own sons or brothers. In Meerut District, consolidation gave farmers the opportunity to switch to the major cash crop of the area, sugar cane, a crop that requires assured irrigation, access by cart, and, typically, the use of hired labor.

It is thus not surprising that farmers in Uttar Pradesh have changed from resisting land consolidation, as they did when it was introduced,[21] to *demanding* that it be done—and, indeed, re-done in the areas where it was first completed, before certain improvements in the law had been

[20] In the rest of U.P. the figure is closer to 80-85 percent. Many villages were consolidated before the act was changed to mandate single-plot farms "as far as possible," and other areas have a much wider range of land quality, with less chance of improving it, than Meerut. In Meerut, farmers said, "give me my new farm anywhere, as long as it's in one place"; elsewhere, farmers wanted to retain some good, irrigated land rather than have one plot on poorer, drought-prone land.

[21] Joseph Elder, "Land Consolidation in an Indian Village: A Case Study of the Consolidation of Holdings Act in Uttar Pradesh," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 11 (October 1962), 27.

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made. The impact of consolidation has been significant: "It is no accident that the green revolution has firmly taken root in Punjab, Haryana, and Western U.P. where consolidation is complete."[22]

The land consolidation procedure is complex. In order to understand the part played by corruption, I must describe the steps in some, but by no means exhaustive, detail. After the village has been resurveyed, and the new field boundaries entered on the map, one official determines what discrepancies exist between the title and area as officially recorded and on the ground. He does this by asking the farmers—all of them together as they move from field to field—what the actual situation is. The discrepancies are then noted and made into "cases" that are resolved in two steps. First, the Assistant Consolidation Officer (A.C.O.) meets with the farmers and attempts to get all parties to agree to a resolution of the discrepancy. A typical case involves a transfer of ownership; for example, the record may show that one farmer owns a plot of land while it appears that he has in fact sold it; if both buyer and seller agree, the new owner's name is entered in the record.[23] Another frequent case is one in which a farmer has encroached on another's land, or, more commonly, on the village common land. He is usually persuaded to renounce any ownership claim to the land that is not recorded as his.

If the farmers involved cannot be persuaded by the Assistant Consolidation Officer or if one is absent at the time of this "conciliation" process (which takes place in the village), the case must be resolved in the court of the Consolidation Officer, the A.C.O.'s superior. In that court, sworn testimony may be taken, and evidence is presented—and, indeed, lawyers are often hired. In almost all the instances I observed, however, the procedures were informal in the extreme: the Consolidation Officer would ask all manner of questions, would joke with the farmers or pretend to get angry with them, would move from one witness to the other and back with no restraint, as all the people involved crowded about his desk. The Consolidation Officer's decisions are appealable to the next highest official, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), and ultimately to the state's

[22] K. C. Khanna, "Economics of Agriculture: Putting First Things First," *Times of India* (New Delhi), June 9, 1981. For more precise analyses of the economic impact of consolidation, see S. K. Agarwal, *Economics of Land Consolidation in India* (Delhi: S. Chand, 1971); Jeffrey P. Bonner, *Land Consolidation and Economic Development in India: A Study of Two Haryana Villages* (Riverdale, MD: The Riverdale Company, 1986); and India, Planning Commission, Programme Evaluation Organization, *Report on Evaluation of Consolidation of Holdings Programme*, P.E.O. Publication No. 69 (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1969). These studies may underestimate the effect, since they use data from the initial period of the program. Farmer after farmer—admittedly mainly those with holdings of more than one hectare—told me they expected their production to double after consolidation.

[23] The actual ownership is transferred only when a fee is paid at the time of registration of the sale.

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High Court, but the consolidation process continues on the basis of the Consolidation Officer's decision.

While the title to a plot of land is being settled, the Assistant Consolidation Officer, again with the active participation of the farmers, determines the value of each piece of land in order to transform the area measurement into a standard unit of value, which we can call "landwealth." This is done by having all the farmers agree on which plot is "the best plot" in the village. The criteria and the weight given to each of them are unspecified, but they obviously include the quality of the soil, the proximity to the village settlement, the slope of the land, and so on. This "best" field is given an arbitrary index value, in this case "sixteen annas" (in India's pre-decimal coinage, there were 16 annas in the rupee). A plot half as good would be valued at 8 annas. The A.C.O. walks to every field in the village, starting with the "best" one, and inquires from, and debates with, farmers, owners, and neighbors alike, on what its value should be. "Would you exchange this field, square meter for square meter, with this field next to it, the one we have determined to be worth 16 annas?" he will ask. If the answer is yes, then it, too, is valued at 16 annas; if no, he determines whether farmers believe—and he agrees—that its value should be 15 or 14 annas, or whatever.[24] The Assistant Consolidation Officer's decisions are appealable to the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), and those officials too will visit each field whose value has been questioned.

The settled area and title, and the value of the field, are combined so that each farmer is credited with a sum total of landwealth. The A.C.O. then "cuts out" new farms by asking farmers where they would like to be located. They are constrained by rules which say that, "as far as possible," the new holdings should be at the site of the old "major holding" and where "improvements" such as tubewells are located. The A.C.O. then draws new boundaries to produce a rectangular farm, putting in road rights-of-way; he divides the area by the value of the land in such a way that the "landwealth" total is used up. Any farmer affected by this jigsaw-puzzle solution can appeal, in whole or in part, to three levels of "court," each a little further away from the village, each a little more intimidating. But even at the highest level the proceedings remain informal. In Meerut,

[24] As can readily be imagined, farmers play games to maximize their benefit. For instance, if they expect to lose the field in question (typically because their major holding is elsewhere), they will try to get it overvalued; their neighbors who expect to receive it will try to get it undervalued. If the field is given too high a value, though, the farmer may be forced to retain it—thus winding up with a farm in two places. In Meerut, farmers and officials agreed that the valuation was completely fair in all but a few cases; even those farmers who maintained that corruption was rife agreed that it did not occur at this stage of the process.

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very few of these appeals went up to the highest level: four or five out of almost two hundred farmers per village.

The question whether or not the outcome of the land consolidation is a fair redistribution has been discussed elsewhere.[25] Based on the evidence of the distribution of landownership before and after consolidation in the six villages I studied intensively, on observations of the process, and on extensive talks with villagers and officials, I argue that the officials are "forced to be fair" by the way the program is conducted—in the open, with real participation by those affected.

This openness and participation is due to the imperative to get the job done as quickly as possible, and to the fact that the final exchange must include every farmer. As long as the process continues, farmers are unsure of what land they really own (the crops they have sown during consolidation are theirs). Sometimes they are reluctant to put much fertilizer in the soil, not to speak of going in for major improvements such as field leveling or a tubewell. Pressure to minimize the time of uncertainty is felt both by the officials and by fellow villagers who might have an interest in delaying matters. No one's position is clear until everyone's new farm is settled and all appeals are exhausted.[26]

As the act governing consolidation has been amended over the years, one feature that has been stressed increasingly has been participation of the farmers. There is no doubt that their involvement has reduced the number of appeals of valuation decisions and has thus speeded up the process. Recently, there has been an emphasis on "voluntary" consolidation, which means consolidation in which the new farm allocation is not appealed. Although appeals are heard with astonishing speed (within two to three weeks at each level), "voluntary" consolidation can cut two months off the eight or so months usually needed.

The participation of farmers and the fact that much of the procedure goes on in the villages rather than in government offices has meant that consolidation, more than other programs in India, is an open process. All the proceedings are open and well publicized, and the records are open. Indeed, there is a requirement (which is observed) that each farmer be given an "extract" of the record that shows precisely how much land he owns and what its valuation is, plot by plot. The officials are accessible, even when they are in their offices. This openness certainly has helped to make land consolidation fair.

[25] Philip Oldenburg, "Forced to Be Fair: Citizen Participation in the Land Consolidation Process in Uttar Pradesh, India" (manuscript).

[26] Appeals to the highest level—the Deputy Director, Consolidation—typically affect only a few "sectors" of the village—which, however, have significant numbers of farmers; the rest of the villagers may informally exchange their fields pending the official transfer of possession.

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The way the department is organized and the way it operates also helps to ensure a fair outcome. Officers were recruited in the mid-1950s on a temporary basis, which meant that the department was able to extract a great deal of work from them, by setting quotas of tasks to be accomplished. These quotas were reduced when the department was regularized, but the standards of what could be done in what amount of time—the number of discrepancy "cases" that could be disposed of in a day, the number of appeals that could be heard in a month, and so on—had been set at a high level. In addition, the tradition of rigorous and frequent checking that was established then, when corrupt or lazy or incompetent officers could be dismissed without much ado, continues today.

These features of the program reduce both the influence of the large and powerful farmers of the village and the significance of corruption. While an analysis of data from six villages in Meerut confirms the opinion of land consolidation officials and farmers alike that the larger farmers benefit most from consolidation, this is, on the whole, a "natural" result: the larger the farmer's holding, the more likely he is to have many scattered plots. It may be argued, of course, that since large farmers are going to benefit more than others, they have less incentive to increase that benefit by use of improper means, but it became clear that a few large farmers did attempt to force smaller farmers to accept a new farm in accordance with the large farmer's wishes. The reason was not necessarily simple greed, but also, for example, a wish to maintain a tie of dependence: by keeping the small farmer on a holding requiring an investment in irrigation and soil preparation beyond his means, his position as debtor or readily available wage laborer would be perpetuated. (For his part, the small farmer might want to trade in a large holding of waste land for a much smaller holding of good land on which he could easily grow vegetables or fodder for milch cattle, both of which would increase his nonwage income.)

As far as I could ascertain from my personal observations, these attempts on the part of powerful farmers did not succeed. Small farmers who had been forced to accept an unfavorable site for their new holding would have the decision reversed at the next appeals level. In some cases, this was due to the clash of factional interests: large farmers do not act as a class, and the rivals of the large farmer attempting to keep "his" small farmer in line, aided by the completely public nature of the land consolidation process, were able to persuade the small farmer to risk an appeal, or they simply made the objection themselves, as they were entitled to do. In other instances, the consolidation department officials worked to advance what they saw as the best interests of a particular small farmer. They were able to do this mainly because land consolidation has to be car-

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ried out quickly. Even a large and very powerful farmer is put under tremendous pressure by his fellow villagers if his attempts to get his own way delay the redemarcation of land holdings significantly.

Corruption in Land Consolidation

The observable strict adherence to the requirement of open proceedings and rapidly and thoroughly heard appeals also comes into play when we consider corruption. The evidence that corruption in land consolidation is not as significant as farmers believe does not rest on the fairness of the outcome, however. Bribing officials to adhere to the correct procedures is still corruption. Consolidation officials agreed that such bribery did occur, but—for reasons we will examine below—they maintained that its incidence was far lower than was commonly believed. The correctness of the outcome however, does suggest that bribes that produce illegal and unfair results are not common.[27]

The elements of public scrutiny and the provision of several speedy appeals make bribery both difficult and risky. All decisions in land consolidation are made publicly, and at each stage there are always many farmers present; farmers are literally able to look over the shoulders of the officials to see the records. This is true of all the appeals levels except the High Court (the final court of appeal). At the appeals stage, too, affected farmers are usually present. Thus, the result of a bribe that produces an illegal or even improper benefit would be there for all to see. In most cases, a number of farmers would be adversely affected, and one of them, or at least a friend, relative, or ally of one of them, would understand what was going on, and would appeal to a higher stage. (Appeals cost nothing: they are submitted on plain paper, are usually heard in the village or not very far away, and rarely require a lawyer.) Thus, a farmer making such a bribe would run a risk of having it go for nothing, unless he was able to count on bribing *all* the appeals officials or on there being "systematic" corruption encompassing most officers.[28] A village in which there are a large number of appeals is frequently "remanded" to a new Assistant Consolidation Officer, to have the new farms "cut out" from scratch. There is also a provision in the act for cancelling the process en-

[27] Small payments to the lower-level staff, for small services such as getting the field boundary moved a few meters at the demarcation stage, for example, are quite common. Officials as well as farmers treated this level of corruption as unfortunate, uneradicable, and not very significant.

[28] For a definition of "systematic" corruption, see Stephen Riley, "The Land of Warring Palms: Political Economy, Corruption Inquiries, and Politics in Sierra Leone," in Clarke (fn. 2), 195.

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tirely if the village is so divided, with too many farmers vehemently opposed to what is being done, that to continue would be to invite a pitched battle, perhaps literally.

Officers do come under considerable pressure to accept bribes. People expect them to be corrupt—as many other officials are—and that in itself is a temptation: some officers are bitter about this reputation, and a few may have decided they might as well actually take the money, since no one believes that they don't. But consolidation officers take real risks when they accept a bribe. For one thing, they are vulnerable to physical attack as they work, exposed, in the villages; in several cases, officials are said to have been beaten or killed by enraged farmers. Furthermore, accusations of corruption may be filed against them. These charges are investigated promptly by the official two levels up from the accused officer, in a hearing at which all farmers are asked to testify.[29] Although dismissal or suspension remains a possibility, transfer to another post—which means uprooting oneself and family and moving, sometimes hundreds of miles away, literally from one day to the next—is the more common sanction. Officials are transferred (though with the dislocation minimized) even when the charges against them are not upheld, because their credibility has been harmed. As a result, senior land consolidation officials in particular bend over backwards to avoid even the impression of having nonofficial contact with farmers. They angrily refuse to discuss a farmer's case if they happen to meet him on the road; they will not sit with farmers to drink tea at a local shop; and they live at some distance from their area of work. One senior officer is even said to have refused to accept tea when he visited a village—a startling departure from custom in India.

Many farmers believe that corruption is widespread during consolidation. In informal discussions, the charge was a general one: "the department is the most corrupt in the state" or "all these officers take money." By contrast, when some thirty of the more knowledgeable farmers in five villages were interviewed after the consolidation process was complete, the picture that emerged was more narrowly defined in terms of occasion and person. While farmers from two of the villages were almost unanimous in asserting that no corruption had occurred, those from two of the other villages in particular maintained that "all" the consolidation department officers took bribes or got a share. But this was not the case at every stage of the process: they testified that bribes were almost always paid when new farms were "cut," and were usually paid to ensure adherence to the rules.

[29] In the one instance I observed, the hearing was conducted with a seriousness of purpose on all sides that was impressive.

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Farm "carvation" is undoubtedly the most difficult process for farmers to understand. Their new farm is in many cases bound to seem less attractive than they might have hoped. It is natural to suspect that neighbors or rivals who appear to have done better may have paid off officials. As one officer put it,

> [Land consolidation] is a very revolutionary activity in which land is exchanged. Every farmer hopes that he will get good land in exchange for his bad land from this department. But everyone's wishes cannot be satisfied and therefore they leave no stone unturned in giving [us] a bad name and begin to say things like: a particular farmer bribed to get his work done and this he says in the presence of twenty or thirty people on his veranda while smoking the hookah, and those people say similar things on their own veranda and this distorts reality and a bad reputation is established.[30]

The excuse that "your farm didn't turn out well because so-and-so bribed the officials" is also useful when farmers are acting for their absentee coholding relatives.

The farmers interviewed understood that appeals can work, in that the officials at all levels do not hesitate to redraw a whole sector in an attempt to arrive at the most equitable solutions. Those who maintained that bribes were paid to get improper things done said that all the officials shared the bribes—i.e., that the corruption was systematic.

Systematic corruption is certainly not unknown in India. One case is described by Robert Wade, in a masterly account of the system of corruption in an irrigation department in South India.[31] Wade shows that "administrative," "political," "high," and "low" corruption are "systematically interconnected": the canal system is "operated and maintained so as to raise large amounts of illicit revenue for their staff and for politicians."[32] His evidence emerged from fieldwork experience not unlike mine, and he was able to elaborate on it and cross-check it exhaustively through conversations with officers and farmers. Had a system anything like the one he describes existed in the land consolidation program I observed, it would certainly have come to my attention. While bribe-taking officers for obvious reasons rarely admit to their corruption, some, as well as those who are not corrupt, *do* reveal the system, in persuasive detail, to

[30] I wish to thank Veena Talwar Oldenburg, Prabhu Ghate, and D. N. Mittal for helping translate this statement, and others quoted below, from the original Hindi. The statements of officers are drawn largely from their written answers to a questionnaire they filled out anonymously. Eight of the twenty officers of the Meerut section of the consolidation department completed the questionnaire. I have also paraphrased field notes that I kept of remarks made by farmers and officers.

[31] Wade (fn. 2, 1982).

[32] *Ibid.*, 288.

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the outside researcher.[33] In the present case, the fact that neither officers nor farmers presented details of how officials hearing appeals of new farms shared the bribes allegedly given suggests the absence of systematic corruption.

Unsystematic and "proper performance" corruption—bribing the A.C.O. to "cut" the new farm correctly—does occur. As one officer said:

> The Assistant Consolidation Officers will say—when they know a new farm is to be cut on a person's major holding—"I'll think about it" and will suggest alternatives, meaning thereby: pay me something. . . . It is impossible to prove and check this, since the new farm is ultimately given [i.e., demarcated] where it should be.

The question of how often this is done remains open: How much fire of actual bribery exists behind the smoke of the reputation for corruption "enjoyed" by the land consolidation department?[34]

The question is valid because officers give another explanation of why farmers claim, or even admit, that money was paid to the A.C.O., when, according to the officers, none was received. The answer is that the money is paid by the farmer to a *dalal*, or broker, who in many cases does not pass it on. One of several officers described this phenomenon as follows:

> It is incorrect to say there is more corruption in land consolidation. [People] say so because [the land consolidation department is one] that the people of the village come into greater contact with. In every village there are some rascals, *dalal* types who get hold of simple illiterate farmers and misinform them and mislead them and coax them. They want to extract money from them, and they find some officers who are greedy, and they take money from [the farmer] and the whole department gets a bad name.

Another officer maintains that the large landlords, the *zamindars*,

> have been sucking [the innocent uneducated farmer dry] from the start. Now they are called "village barrister." . . . If you should ask any villager who says this about the money given and taken, they will tell you the name of a villager. . . . These *vakils* [lawyers] take the bribes claiming that the officers are doing it, which is not correct.

And, in the opinion of yet another officer,

> One hundred percent of the farmers are dishonest. There are many whose *pesha* [occupation] is being a middleman. And it is *necessary* that they spread

[33] See Cariño (fn. 9). As I conducted research in Delhi in 1969-1970, systematic corruption was readily revealed to me.

[34] Cf. Elder (fn. 21), 26; Palmier (fn. 2), 111.

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> the "news" that the officers take bribes—so that people will feel no work will get done without bribes—even if you refuse to deal with them.

One farmer did make explicit note of the *dalal*, saying "a lot of money *was* given; 90 percent gave money (100 to 1,000 rupees), but the middlemen ate most of it." Other farmers from the same village (the only one where almost every farmer interviewed charged that bribery was a major factor) asserted:

> —Twenty to twenty-five thousand [rupees were paid] in bribes, by 75 percent of the farmers. [There was] no result—farms [were] made where they should have been. Half [was] given to officers, half to *dalals*.
> —All officers are corrupt. People gave one to two thousand rupees to keep their land.
> —Who knows [about bribes]? Whether you give a bribe or not, your farm will be put where it should be—otherwise the villagers would object loudly. There is no result of bribery, nor is there proof.

As the officers explained the system—and farmers did not disagree—the *dalal*, who knows what the rules of land consolidation are, realizes that in almost all cases a farmer will be given his proper new holding. He therefore can give a "money-back" guarantee: he tells the farmer that the officer is demanding a bribe to do the job correctly, and that since he (the *dalal*) knows the officer, he will pass the money on.[35] "But if the [expletive] doesn't do it," the *dalal* will say, "I'll return the money to you out of my own pocket." Even if, in as many as half of the cases the *dalal* handles, the farmer is dissatisfied with what he gets, the *dalal* is still making a tidy, no-risk income if he is in fact not passing on the money. Moreover, he has a clear interest in working for as many farmers as he can, and in drumming up business by spreading the word that one must pay to get what one wants. One officer noted that

> ten to fifteen percent of the farmers believe that they have benefited by giving money. It is very possible that if they had *not* spent, had not gotten tangled up with some *dalal*, then that very result would have occurred. But no improper work can survive till the end [of the process]. The Consolidation Officer, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), the Deputy Director, Consolidation can, except in one or two cases, correct all of them. In the meantime, the clever *dalals*, the lawyers, [and] the clerks loot the farmers.

Thus, the *dalal* can take a "cut" of 100 percent of the bribe, with no one the wiser.

The last officer concluded his statement by saying, "There's no doubt

[35] In the words of one officer, "clever farmers [i.e., acting as *dalals*] will claim to 'get the matter decided' by passing the time of day with the A.C.O. in the sight of the farmer."

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that where there is no personal rivalry and where there is no party feeling, in those villages not one penny is spent." The evidence from the villages I studied is inconclusive. All the farmers interviewed in one village—which had been handled by the A.C.O. most often accused of being corrupt in the other villages in which he worked—insisted that no major bribes had been given in their village. The only other village where there were no accusations of corruption was the one in which violently expressed personal rivalry and party feeling were constant features of the land consolidation process. The A.C.O.—much praised by all sides in this village—was accused of being corrupt by some farmers in a neighboring village. The one *dalal* who was named—rather than hinted at—lived in the latter village. Two other villages both had accusations of corruption and were handled by the A.C.O. most often accused, and certainly the degree of corruption alleged was higher in the village where party rivalry was fiercer. These five villages were not at all alike in several features: most important, they differed widely in ethnic composition and in land-ownership patterns.[36] *Ad hoc* explanations of both the degree of corruption and the depth of belief in the extensiveness of corruption would be easy to construct.

The general reputation for pervasive corruption can be narrowed down to an accusation that individual officers extract bribes to do their work according to the rules, aside from the "petty" corruption of tips to clerks and others. Thus, illegal and improper work can survive the open appeals process only if there is systematic corruption. There is no evidence that it exists. Finally, while some "proper performance" corruption undoubtedly does occur, the *dalals'* broadcasting the news that nothing gets done without bribes being paid is a persuasive alternative explanation for the belief that such corruption is widespread.

Before we explore the general implication of a middleman, such as the *dalal*, in corruption transactions, we must suggest why corruption in land consolidation is apparently not as pervasive as it is in other programs in India. The irrigation department Wade describes is clearly at or near the other end of the spectrum: it is a model of what "pervasive corruption" means. The crucial corruption-sustaining features of the "operations and maintenance" program he analyzes include the phenomenon of "commissions" (kickbacks) on the costs of construction: 8.5 percent of the large sums disbursed by government to contractors is returned to the officers who oversee the projects.[37] A contractor's malpractice is comparatively

[36] See Oldenburg (fn. 25).
[37] Wade (fn. 2, 1982), 292-300.

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easy to hide. The major bribes that farmers, acting together as a village, pay to grow crops in places where they are not supposed to (because they consume too much water) amount to a mere two to five percent of their net profit: the equivalent of a few dollars per acre. The damage an engineer can threaten—by withholding water at the precise time farmers must have it—is very heavy, leaves no permanent record, and can readily be blamed on lower staff members (who in fact receive significant "tips," usually of grain, but who do not share in the immense cash payoffs). Finally, posts of the same rank to which officers can be transferred are very different in terms of the work involved, and consequently vary spectacularly in the amount of money that can be "earned" in them. As a result, huge amounts of illicit income, effort, and political clout are invested in the attempt to get and hold onto lucrative posts.[38]

By contrast, in the Uttar Pradesh land consolidation program no money is disbursed by government; if individual farmers paid large bribes (the equivalent of hundreds of dollars per acre), the results might well harm their neighbors; and what officers do represents a permanent change and is recorded in writing and easily checked. In theory, officers could hold an entire village to ransom—though the time factor, while important, is not, as in irrigation, a matter of a day's delay being critical; but such an action would be very obvious, and the responsibility for it is easily located. Finally, when land consolidation officers are transferred, their duties do not change—though the farmers with whom they deal may vary significantly in wealth.

It is difficult to judge which of these programs is "typical" of Indian government—i.e., how representative the U.P. land consolidation department is of departments in general. The first problem is with the unit of analysis: departments differ enormously in size (number of employees, amount of budget), spread, funds expended or collected, and the frequency and strength of their impact on the daily lives of the citizenry. The weight given to each of these aspects depends on the feature of corruption in which one is interested, which also determines how one measures the degree of corruption within a department (the second problem). A focus on the effect of corruption on bureaucratic functioning might mandate comparisons of departments equivalent in structure or number of employees, while the degree of corruption could be measured by how many employees "earn" how much money—say, as a percentage of their official salary. A concern with the economic effects of corruption would

[38] *Ibid.*, 303-7. Wade (fn. 2, 1985), uses this case to build a model of a corrupt system in which payments for transfers occupy the central place.

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suggest a comparison of departments that generate similar amounts of money disbursed or collected (or to or from a similar clientele), and the measure might be the percentage of the total funds disbursed/collected that are spent/received as policy and rules dictate.

If one is interested in the extent to which corruption undermines a regime's legitimacy, departments that affect large numbers of citizens should be compared; the measure of the extent of corruption could be either the percentage of the clientele of a department who bribe (or are forced to pay), or a "transaction" measure: for example, the percentage of according-to-rule transactions that require a bribe to be made, and the number of paid-for, against-the-rule transactions. Clearly, the land consolidation department is best compared in a "transactional" framework. Other comparable departments—those that deal with large numbers of citizens on a day-to-day basis—include those that have to do with education, public health, passenger transport (railways, buses), postal and telephone services, agricultural extension, retail banking, life insurance, and ration distribution.[39]

In most of these instances, however, the government is providing material services to the citizenry, often in competition with private suppliers. Land consolidation does not fit into that category, since the service provided is one of brokering transactions between citizens, and there is no alternative mediator available. In this, consolidation resembles programs that affect smaller groups of citizens, such as those that deal with cooperative societies of certain kinds, or the state-level industrial development organizations that help entrepreneurs assemble a package of licenses and services from other departments in the state. Although in land consolidation the government merely facilitates the exchange of citizens' resources rather than the distribution of goods it possesses (licenses, electricity, or whatever) or services it supplies, land consolidation officials, in controlling the reallocation of land, can significantly harm or benefit particular farmers. Thus, the uncommonness of the department's formal role is less significant than it might seem.

Another way of assessing the degree of corruption is to employ summary indicators. Robert Wade has shown that corruption will be evident in the presence of large payments by people who want to receive (or avoid) transfers.[40] The reputation for corruption that a department has (measured, say, by the opinions of informed and unbiased observers)

[39] In my judgment, there is a comparatively low degree of corruption in most of these departments taken as a whole, though certain sections—those dealing with the purchase of supplies, in particular—are quite corrupt.

[40] Wade (fn. 2, 1985).

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might be another indicator. This last is, indeed, the one most often employed by citizen and scholar alike in India: it takes the form of assertions that "everyone knows that nothing gets done in department X without money changing hands." The case of land consolidation shows that we should use it only with great caution.

The Middleman

Our attention has been drawn to the middleman because he has the clearest interest in maximizing the belief that corruption is pervasive. Those who give bribes, at least in land consolidation, don't broadcast the fact. Officers who take bribes also have to be careful, and not only because of an increased chance of being caught: in a situation in which everyone offers bribes to all officers—even if they are accepted selectively—it may well be beyond an officer's power to deliver the goods without fail, and that, too, is a risky business. To be sure, there *are* officials and transactions, in the land consolidation department and elsewhere, that are corrupt (where, indeed, the citizen has paid the official directly); to that extent, the middleman's propaganda is effective.

Beyond his role as propagandist, how important is the middleman in corruption transactions? Is he a parasite living off the leavings of the principals, or is he a more central actor in the corruption transaction? In the literature on corruption, the actors named are typically briber and bribed, "donor" and "recipient."[41] Still, it is likely that corruption transactions involving only two actors, although perhaps the most numerous (most petty bribes are of this type), are not the most significant. As soon as we move up the ladder—of rank, as well as size of the benefits and payoffs—middlemen of some type make their appearance. Brokers such as the *dalal* are one kind, but there are others: touts, office insiders, right-hand men or other dependents of a patron, each with subtypes depending on the precise nature of the service provided. (These are roles, not persons; "corruption middleman" is rarely a full-time occupation.) Building on the discussion of the *dalal* in land consolidation, we can delineate the services of middlemen more precisely, and describe further the other types of middlemen.

The *dalal* preys on ignorance. He has a clear interest in keeping the process of land consolidation as mysterious as possible: he will insist that what is going on publicly is a facade, with the real decisions being made

[41] Simcha B. Werner, "New Directions in the Study of Administrative Corruption," *Public Administration Review* 43 (March-April 1983), 146-54.

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behind the scenes. He also claims to have special access: only *he* can reach the officials; after all, they have indicated to *him* that money is to be paid. The *dalal* has the time to spend on seeing the transaction through, and he lets it be known that he is willing to dirty his hands: not only is he experienced (knows the subtle hints, knows the techniques of passing money), but making use of him also allows the briber to distance himself from the transaction. He says: "Leave everything to me: don't worry about making a mess of it; someone like *you* shouldn't be involved directly." His services are necessary, he asserts, because he has special knowledge of the procedures, access to officials, time to spend, and dirty hands.

Land consolidation officials make real efforts to combat all four of these claims. It is difficult to avoid learning what is going on. There is a deliberate maximization of public access to the process—including conducting business on the farmers' own turf, in the village. Business is transacted literally in the open, at a makeshift desk under a tree, where officials are without the insulating barriers of office door and doorkeeper. They strenuously work to minimize private contact. The time spent is kept short by having many stages of the process occur in the village, by the rapid succession of stages, and by the expeditiously conducted proceedings. Finally, prompt and public investigations of charges of corruption serve to demonstrate that there are alternatives to dirtying one's hands.

Dalals—who typically are fellow farmers—constitute but one type of middleman in land consolidation. There are also lawyers who specialize in land consolidation cases; office boys, lower-level clerks, and the lowest level of officers (the "scribe" and the "consolidator" [*lekhpal* and *kanungo*]) all take money for some of the services they provide, as "tips,"[42] or they may claim to provide a channel for bribes of their superior officers. At the other end of the transaction, there are the "right-hand men" of the farmers: the clients or dependents of the powerful, the cronies of others, to whom the money and the approach can be entrusted.

These roles are probably to be found whenever major corruption occurs, or is alleged to occur. The potential donor has a trusted dependent who may not have more knowledge or better access (though a right-hand man can be asked to find out things that his patron has not the time or inclination to investigate), but who is prepared to spend time and to dirty

[42] Many of these "fees" are quite open, and not resented by the people who have to pay them; many a farmer expressed sympathy with the plight of these ill-paid and overworked men. The *lekhpal*, for example, is allowed to charge a fee for making a special copy of the record, but that fee was set decades ago, and so the informal adjustment for inflation that the *lekhpal* adds is seen as proper, even by his superior officers.

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his hands.[43] A rich and powerful donor might well have an elaborate hierarchy of dependents, the meanest of whom would be entrusted with the petty corruption transactions. The "lower" these people are, the greater the expectation that they will take a cut of the bribe. At that level, too, transactions are more likely to be regular: the donor's office boy, say, becomes an expert at bribing the postman to ensure prompt mail delivery; he thus develops knowledge and access along with his dirty hands.

The brokers and the touts are outside the donor's realm, but not quite inside the office of the recipient. Brokers tend to specialize in a few areas and to differ in terms of the level of the recipients to whom they have access; a donor may use several different ones, depending on the department to which the money is directed, or on the rank of the recipient. The *dalal* of land consolidation is all right for transactions involving the lower staff, but where senior people are to be bribed, another broker is used, perhaps an influential politician. This *dalal* may not be able to help, moreover, when it comes to bribing the registrar of land transactions.

Touts are men attached to particular departments or recipients (or both). They offer even greater knowledge and even better access than the brokers, and there is an implication that they work for the recipient. The wife of the corrupt junta general may well be a "big-time" tout. The lawyer who hangs around the land consolidation court and is willing to help a client bribe the *peshkar* (court clerk) is a middle-rank tout (we may call this type a "helper"). The *peshkar* may "employ" his doorkeeper to subtly advertise the need to pass money (this type could be labeled a "barker").

Donors expect to pay for the services of touts and brokers—whether with fixed fees or a percentage cut depends on the transaction. The donor is paying for results; but while the lower-level "insider" middlemen (the donor's dependents and those inside the recipient's office) deliver quite narrowly defined results, the touts and brokers ("outsider" middlemen) are expected to "get the job done." Insider middlemen—those who are "with" donor or recipient—are part of an informal (or formal) and typically hierarchical structure; outsider middlemen tend to be individual entrepreneurs. The former deal with one person at one "end" (their boss) and with many persons at the other; the latter deal with multiple clients at both ends.

Middlemen exist within the recipient's office as well. In systematic corruption, a regularized, conventional amount is given; it is shared by a wide range of staff. For example, in the zonal offices of the Delhi Municipal Corporation, public-works contractors gave what was called a

[43] As Pompey said to Menas (the subject was not bribery but proposed murder): "In me t'is villany, in thee't had been good service." (*Antony and Cleopatra*, act 2, scene 7)

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"commission" of 2.5 percent of the amount of their bill, which was shared among the Works Department Section Officer directly supervising the work (1 percent), his superior officer (0.5 percent), and the accounting department (1 percent); in the latter, the head clerk and the other clerks got different shares. This is a common pattern.[44]

Insider middlemen in the recipient's office clearly have the advantage of complete access and knowledge. The donor's problem lies in identifying who, precisely, will take the bribe. If he expects to have to pay off the same department regularly, he can move slowly and delicately to discover the venal officer he needs. Once a regular channel is established, the use of an insider middleman minimizes costs and risks. (For that reason, the land consolidation department—like others in India—makes a point of transferring senior officers every two to three years.)

There may be two internal office chains of intermediaries: one sending the application upward, the other conveying the decision or orders outward. Palmier describes an instance of the latter case. He recounts how the registry clerk responsible for dispatching the letter of decision of the senior officer on an appeal of excise duty would, when the decision was favorable,

> approach the appellant, asserting that the official was asking to be well rewarded for a favourable decision, and was using the clerks as confidential intermediaries. . . . On occasion a clerk would fly as far as Calcutta, some 800 miles away, and offer to secure a favourable verdict for 5,000 rupees.[45]

The racket was uncovered only when a clerk approached a friend of the senior officer. Why would anyone else, whether satisfied customer or pleasantly surprised non-taker of the offer, suspect the clerk?

When the corruption transaction is only sporadic, perhaps even a once-in-a-lifetime matter (as with land consolidation, or bribery connected with building a house), it becomes more difficult to find an officer who is both venal and in a position to help. If the word spreads too widely, such a person runs some risk of being caught (at least in India), in addition to the risk of having to share his bribe. And since, in all probability, the exact

[44] This was the case during the time of my research. Wade's study (fn. 2, 1982) is the best and most detailed discussion of a case of this type of corruption. The Santhanam Committee reports:

> We were told by a large number of witnesses, that in all contracts of construction, purchases, sales and other regular business on behalf of the Government, a regular percentage is shared in agreed proportions among the various officials concerned. We were told that in the constructions of the Public Works Department, seven to eleven per cent was usually paid in this manner. . . . India, Ministry of Home Affairs, *Report of the [Santhanam] Committee on Prevention of Corruption* (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1964), 10.

[45] Palmier (fn. 2), 73.

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amount is not routine and is therefore unknown, he may be subject to excessive demands. Thus, he has an interest in restricting the awareness of his receptivity to some degree. In such cases of sporadic transactions, outsider middlemen will play a greater role.[46]

These problems of donor and recipient making contact point to a solution, which is, in all likelihood, the modal pattern: a chain of middlemen. The schematic diagram shows some of the roles of middlemen; even with so few, the possible combinations of three or more actor chains add up to a substantial number.

A typical corruption transaction, then, is not one of the "donor-recipient" type, but may be broken down into a series of subtransactions, not all of which may involve the exchange of money. Consider, for example, a land consolidation case: the farmer asks his younger brother (the right-hand man) to give the bribe to the *dalal* (the fixer) who will pass it on to the A.C.O. (the junior officer), who may share it with some of his immediate assistants (clerks). The younger brother will probably deliver the entire amount to the *dalal*, who will take a percentage of what may be a fixed-fee bribe. This amount depends on the difficulty of delivering the goods rather than on the value of the land involved or the wealth of the farmer (though there may be some modification according to both of those factors). The "tip" given to the assistants may be for doing the necessary paperwork, but is more likely hush money.

At each point in the chain, the goal differs. The money is *given* in order to "get my farm put where it belongs." It is *spent*, however, on more narrowly defined tasks: getting the cash physically from one pocket to the other; entering certain items on the record; and ensuring silence about the transaction, or (if we suppose that money is indeed shared with senior officers) lessening the risk of reversal on appeal. It is important to make this breakdown, since the middleman is employed because he knows how much money must be spent at what point, and what the points *are*.[47]

We have already noted that the right-hand man may not get a cut of the bribe. Once we identify the chain of subtransactions, it becomes clear that in many of those transactions the expenditure of money may not be

[46] One would like to test the proposition: the more frequent (regular) the corruption transaction, the less the use of outsider middlemen and the greater the use of insider middlemen, and vice versa for sporadic (irregular) transactions.

[47] The points are sometimes not obvious. In Delhi, to prevent "speed money" being paid at the city planning office, there was a rule that a set of building plans would be deemed to have been passed if they were not acted upon within a certain number of days of their submission. People with irregular plans simply bribed—directly or through a middleman, whose knowledge was sure to be required—the office boy who carried the application (after its date of submission had been duly registered) to "misplace" it for the requisite period. This cost less than bribing the building department officer.

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SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF MIDDLEMAN ROLES IN CORRUPTION TRANSACTIONS

	Outsiders		
Donor's Side	*Brokers*	*Touts*	*Recipient's Side*
Right-hand man	Commission agent	"Big-timer"	Personal asst.
Sycophant	Fixer	Helper	Junior officer
Gofer	Petty broker	Barker	Clerk/Office boy

Right-hand man: trusted lieutenant, responsible for independent action and expected to follow orders
Sycophant: client/dependent available to work
Gofer: person to fetch and carry; completely dependent, acting on orders only
Commission agent: high-class broker with considerable expertise, connections, or authority
Fixer: arranger, lower status
Petty broker: person who brings people together
"Big-timer": typically a relative or close ally of recipient (or, if the recipient is high enough, of his immediate confidant or junior officer)
Helper: tout who knows the ropes
Barker: tout who spreads the word

required. Authority, power, alliance relations, kinship or other ethnic ties, and returns for favors may be substituted. Thus, the overall transaction may be corrupt while some of its parts remain proper (or at least acceptable). The converse is also true: when money is paid to get things done which ought to be done, the overall transaction is proper even though the subtransactions are corrupt.

It is in the middleman's interest to keep hidden, as far as possible, precisely the way he manages to get things done: this is most important, of course, when he in fact does nothing but allows the procedures to run to their appointed result. It is in the nature of corrupt transactions that the principals—particularly if they are at distant ends of a long chain of intermediaries—cannot as a rule check up on how much money was paid into the chain or received at the other end. As long as he gets results, the donor may not care how much goes into the recipient's pocket; the recipient may not care how much was originally put in the pipeline as long as he takes in what he wants. It is always in the middleman's interest to inflate the alleged demand when he is talking to the donor (or his representative) and to bargain down the demand of the recipient when the time comes to deliver the bribe.

This inflation of the cost of the transaction due to the middleman is constrained by the danger of limiting the number of clients who can afford his services. In land consolidation, I was told, even a corrupt officer will pay attention to what the farmer can afford, and will not demand a

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large bribe from someone who would find it difficult to pay. That is, it is not true that there is a fixed price on every transaction, particularly in the case of bribes to get things done that ought to be done. The man who cannot afford to pay will also tend to wait for a bribe to be demanded rather than offer to pay, and the dishonest officer with a moderate appetite may be willing to forgo some potential income. (This strategy also lowers his risk of getting caught, of course.)

Conclusions

An exploration of corruption in the land consolidation program in Uttar Pradesh has led to a focus on the middleman and the construction of a rough typology of middleman roles. We found that the contribution of the middleman to the "political culture of corruption"[48] is significant, and that there is a chain of transactions between donor and recipient. Several analytical and methodological findings can be firmly placed on this empirical base.

The first analytical point is that institutional arrangements can significantly restrict corruption, certainly in a social and political situation where many citizens suffer directly from the predations of a few. Several propositions emerge: (1) Corruption is less likely to occur when the method of work is explicit and understandable, and the process is open to continuous public scrutiny. (This may help to explain why third-world military regimes and other authoritarian systems have not succeeded in eliminating corruption even when Draconian punishments are employed.) (2) The longer the chain of officials involved in a decision on or implementation of action, the greater the chance that corruption will occur. And (3), the history and traditions of work of a department or program may help to explain why it is corrupt, as well as the degree of corruption.

The concept of a "folklore of corruption" requires further elaboration; propositions relating it to the *practice* of corruption must be tested. We need not agree with Jawaharlal Nehru's statement that the belief causes the corruption: "Merely shouting from the house-tops that everybody is corrupt creates an atmosphere of corruption. People feel they live in a climate of corruption and they get corrupted themselves."[49] But in the activity of middlemen we have identified one way in which the folklore of

[48] For a discussion of this phrase, see LeVine (fn. 1), 12-39.

[49] R. K. Karanjia, interviewer, *The Mind of Mr. Nehru* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960), 61.

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corruption can flourish independently of the practice. To repeat: the middleman is the one actor who has an unambiguous interest in spreading the belief that corruption is pervasive.

As we have seen, corruption is not simply a matter between donor and recipient: the middleman plays an important and sometimes crucial role. There is thus a large "interest group"—and not only with respect to corruption transactions—that has been left out of the literature. It is an unusual sort of interest group, to be sure: unorganized, with members who don't necessarily identify themselves as such, operating behind the scenes. Middlemen are not drawn from any particular ethnic or class categories, though there are arenas in which a certain type of middleman role may be monopolized by members of an identifiable group. In studying a government activity or the polity as a whole, we will need to know much more about middlemen: how dependent they are on their corrupt activities, how much money they manage to extract from the process, and how large and how important a group they are. The typology of roles attempted here is only tentative and far from exhaustive, even for India.

If a chain of middlemen is indeed the most prevalent pattern in corruption transactions, then it must be broken down into smaller segments in order to analyze the relationship of corruption transactions to other transactions within the system, including the exercise of legitimate authority. As we examine particular cases, we must ask: Is a substitute for a bribe available to the person who is reluctant or unable to pay? In Delhi, for example, citizens asked the municipal councilor to help with administrative matters when action was delayed or when bribes were expected.[50] In most cases, the councilor acted without extracting either a fee or even an explicit promise of future support, though the request for the latter (and in a few cases, for the former) was clearly understood. We must be aware of the difference between systems (or transactions within systems) where bribery is required, and those where it is but one option. The extent of the "informal polity" can be guessed at more effectively if this distinction is maintained; the boundary between formal and informal polity, which looks blurred when considered from afar, may become clearer when looked at from close by.[51]

There are also some methodological implications. We can make progress toward judging how pervasive corruption is in a particular country if we build up our picture from the smaller elements of subtransactions within larger corruption transactions. "Pervasive" corruption has two di-

[50] Oldenburg (fn. 15).
[51] Levine (fn. 1), 9-10.

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mensions. One may talk of pervasive corruption in a particular territorial or departmental unit of government when one shows that many office holders in this unit are corrupt (i.e., have taken a bribe at some point). Corruption is also pervasive when there are instances of corrupt subtransactions in almost all government units. But one must guard against slipping from a finding that corruption is "everywhere" into saying that therefore the system works *only* through corruption. It is when one finds corruption in *every* government activity, from enforcing traffic rules to the allocation of foreign exchange, and when there is corruption in most subtransactions, that corruption is "pervasive" in the polity as a whole.

To assess the impact of corruption on the allocation of goods, we must curb our disgust and ask *how often* a person takes a bribe, in *how many* transactions.[52] We must not assume that honest officials are extremely scarce. Different departments are unlikely to be home to equal amounts of corrupt transactions: some will be shot through with corruption, while others may be only tainted. As scholars, we must make an effort to study degrees of corruption, even while, as citizens, we may agree that any amount of corruption is too much.

It should be possible to describe a particular department in terms of the subtransactions in which its officers engage and to describe the "currency" of each transaction. The study of mechanisms of supervision and control could be placed in this context; furthermore, we should be able to construct some propositions about the probability of corruption transactions occurring even while we avoid judgment about the morality (or economic resources) of the persons concerned. It is likely that in most departments in India, one would find that most transactions occur "according to rule" or at least honestly; if the research is undertaken on that assumption, it will be easier to conduct. The question, "how is this done?" lessens the impression that the researcher is sitting in judgment.[53] If corruption plays a part in the transaction, it will emerge. As one looks at the subtransactions within a department, one may find entire (perhaps unsuspected) areas where there is simply no scope for corruption, or possibly no tradition of it. It will help in the search for explanations of the causes and effects of corruption if institutions are studied that are not, on the whole, corrupt.

We tend to believe that what we hear about corruption represents only

[52] Even in many of the countries where corruption is widespread, most citizens, though possibly inured to it, find it reprehensible; see Waterbury (fn. 1, 1973), 428, and Cariño (fn. 9), 280.

[53] For an example of this kind of research, see Cariño (fn. 9), and Cariño and de Guzman (fn. 6).

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the tip of the iceberg. There are obvious factors that would minimize the extent to which corruption is revealed to the outsider; in the middleman, however, we have a countervailing factor, and, judging from the land consolidation case, one that can have a sizable effect. This brings us back to a question touched on at the outset: does it matter what is *really* going on in terms of corruption? Isn't it the *belief* that corruption is pervasive that saps the legitimacy of the state? To run wild with metaphor: it is not necessary that the fire consume the ship of state: the clouds of smoke are enough to make people mutiny or abandon ship. This point has considerable force, but, in the absence of further theoretical work on legitimacy and political culture and of empirical study, it is unclear how valid it is. In India, the belief in the pervasiveness of corruption has not, as yet, outweighed the reality that many government activities proceed without much or any corruption. In this way, India may be as representative a third-world case as, say, Egypt, Morocco, or Zaire.

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HOW MIDDLE POWERS CAN MANAGE RESOURCE WEAKNESS: Japan and Energy

By DAVIS B. BOBROW and ROBERT T. KUDRLE*

The post-World War II world has seen the transformation of the international system from a configuration with several rival great powers into one with two superpowers and a set of lesser but still substantial powers—second-tier states with democratic politics and mixed economies. One of the recurrent concerns of the latter has been to secure supplies of natural resources. We argue that postwar conditions point to eight elements of prudent resource policy for middle-level powers. Such states should: (1) avoid military means; (2) choose trade partners whose political interests overlap with their own and who enjoy political stability; (3) seek to create in supplier and transit countries a structure of economic interests that will make supply agreements self-enforcing; (4) diversify with respect to commodity dependence, supplier share, and transit bottlenecks; (5) tailor stockpiles to the urgency of demand; (6) exploit technology to reduce dependence and enhance bargaining advantages; (7) encourage the private sector and public enterprises to become intermediaries in the international resource trade; and (8) pursue strategic interdependence among consumer nations by creating multilateral stakes in the maintenance of normal commerce in resources.

In this paper we develop a set of general prescriptions for the behavior of mid-level powers with small endowments of natural resources. We hold that states which follow these prescriptions will avoid endangering their economic performance. Indeed, they may outperform others that apparently hold an advantage in terms of greater resource endowments and military power. We use the case of Japanese energy policy to develop our prescriptions and to demonstrate their feasibility. The case has special interest because of the importance of energy resources in the world economy, Japan's extreme dependence on—and thus policy efforts related to—imported energy, and the vigor of the Japanese economy.

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We do not imply that Japan is an inherently typical middle power; with respect to energy dependence, economic performance, or military effort, she obviously is not. Nor do we suggest that her policy achievements are independent of world market conditions. We certainly do not contend that the policy guidelines we put forward provide a complete explanation of why the Japanese economy has outperformed many others. But we do believe that the Japanese energy case exemplifies what it means for middle powers to come to terms with the post-World War II world, to adapt to the difficulties and opportunities provided by the world market, and to try to shape them in a nationally beneficial manner. An atypically extreme case can serve to make policy possibilities especially clear.

I. Expectations about International Resource Policy

Analysis of resource diplomacy has its roots in the geopolitical thought of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The best of this literature combines the dominant balance-of-power preoccupations of classic international politics with specific attention to geographical factors.

If geopolitics had a single key question, it was, "What do maps (including natural resource maps) tell us about a state's foreign policy?"[1] The international environment of the geopoliticians was highly stratified in terms of national power (fuzzy as that concept was). They were primarily concerned with the relationships among the top-dogs and would-be top-dogs locked into what was fundamentally a zero-sum competition. Weaker countries were treated as pawns or properties. In that environment, states were held to differ in their power potential and in the most promising strategies to realize it. The differences were shaped by a state's geographic position and that of the territories it controlled, largely because of resource endowments and access to them.

The classical geopoliticians provided only a starting point for understanding the international resource strategies of contemporary second-tier states. Most of their writings have been rendered obsolete in the post-war world. We need a broader treatment of assumptions and hypotheses about the international environment, the motivations and goals of nation-states, and the appropriate instruments for achieving national ends.[2]

[1] Ladis K. D. Kristof, "The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 4 (March 1960), 15-51.

[2] In attempting to develop theoretical ideas pertinent to the changed conditions of recent decades, our first sources were the pioneering works in international relations. We carefully examined writings such as Richard K. Ashley, *The Political Economy of War & Peace: The Sino-Soviet American Triangle and the Modern Security Problematique* (London: Frances Pinter, 1980); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in*

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The International Environment

Even the most open-minded examiner is struck by how time-bound the geopolitical literature seems. Though a careful geopolitical thinker such as Mackinder[3] seriously modified his views several times over his lifetime,[4] each modification was as quickly outdated as the last. The reason is evident: space, position, and resource endowments matter for national power only as they are mediated by technology and economic development. In the 20th century, both military and civil technology and the distribution and extent of economic development have changed more dramatically than other aspects of the international environment.

The decades during which geopolitical thought was developed also saw vast changes in technology and in political-military alignments. Moreover, the international environment of the post-1945 world has been qualitatively different. First, the nuclear capabilities of the two superpowers have widened their lead over everyone else. For middle powers, that has made natural resource advantages of maximizing national military strength, especially conventional power projection forces, more problematic than axiomatic.[5] Compared with the resource assurances secured militarily by one of the superpowers, such forces are expensive, and their availability is uncertain.

Second, the collapse of colonialism in most of the world fundamentally changed the situation of many of the resource-rich but otherwise weak and poor countries. In the immediate prewar period, political subordination and the collapse of international trade closely bound colonies to their metropolitan power. Resource importers other than the metropole, such as Japan, had limited opportunity to trade. With the postwar growth

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Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment & U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics* 28 (April 1976), 317-47; and Bruce M. Russett, *Power and Community in World Politics* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1974). These works stress U.S. hegemony and its decline, address natural resource issues, and are frequently specific about the declining role of physical space as a critical factor in world politics. Only Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, *Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1975), however, deals in a sustained way with ideas directly relevant to resource conflicts, and even here the policy implications for mid-level powers can only be inferred. Most key expectations remain to be developed.

[3] H. J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," *The Geographical Journal* 23 (April 1904), 421-37.

[4] See Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Foundations of International Politics* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1962), 326-32.

[5] Davis B. Bobrow and Robert T. Kudrle, "Midlevel Powers: Determinants of Maneuver and Constraint" (paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, August 30–September 2, 1984).

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of independence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, countries rich in natural resources found themselves able to sell in largely open international markets, as well as eager to develop their resource potential. For many of the resource exporters, firms and destinations untainted by the previous colonial bond have held special attraction (although colonial patterns of trade were seldom completely overthrown). For others, the former metropole has lacked the desire or capacity to maintain the military and economic ties of the past. Anxious to preserve their independence, most of them avoided reliance on the same power for both military and economic matters. In particular, the management of relations with superpowers became not only a primary issue of military security, but also provided important constraints on and opportunities for resource diplomacy by most exporters and importers. A resource importer's relations with a protecting superpower can be relatively simple if the superpower is not also a seeker of resource imports. In the latter case, the other importers obviously must manage a conflict of interest.

Third, transportation and communication costs fell dramatically, and the importance of proximity declined accordingly. Co-location of resource inputs to plants for their use (such as iron ore and coal to steel mills) became less important. As locational factors increasingly provided only minor advantages, world trade became more dispersed and every major country's "natural" geographic sphere was penetrated by others. Hence, economic spheres of influence became less geographically predictable. Changing military technology and superpower bipolarity also made political spheres of influence less geographically predictable.

Fourth, the rapid pace of change in civil and dual-use technologies, combined with capital for foreign investment, made both the demand for and the supply of natural resources more dynamic and changeable than it had been before the war. In a relatively open and orderly international economic system, a major importer of a commodity to supply a leading industrial sector might, within a few years, switch substantially to another set of sectors with different input requirements. Moreover, scarcity of resources or unreliability of supply could trigger faster substitution, conservation, and the discovery and exploitation of additional resource sites. As a result, the resource imperative that had earlier made the pursuit of a particular sphere of influence seem essential could be replaced by a more general economic imperative for access to foreign sources and markets well attuned to contemporary and emerging needs. Costly spheres of influence on the formal imperial model are hardly conducive to flexibility by the resource-importing mid-level power.

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National Objectives

The national objectives explicated by geopolitical writing assume the naturalness of attempts to maximize national power margins. Success in that regard would better enable a state to do as it wished, free from interference by others.[6] The classical geopolitical view of natural resources combines this premise with assumptions about resources as a crucial input to the military-industrial base of states. Following World War I, for example, technology was expected to evolve so that major powers would need more and more resources, probably from ever more distant locations. The growth of resource appetites would provide incentives to acquire resource-surplus spheres of influence. These, in turn, would contribute to military capacity directly and indirectly, and thus to international standing based on military capability and economic strength. In sum, to the extent that geopoliticians addressed resource needs, they came to treat spheres of influence as a policy objective to be sought through external control, frequently by military means.

While the classical geopolitical writings effectively limit national objectives to the pursuit of power (construed as conventional military projection forces), more recent work calls for considering a trinity of national objectives: security, autonomy, and prosperity.[7] Tradeoffs then become ubiquitous; so do the incentives to make a changing series of compromises as one or another part of the trinity seems particularly endangered. Policies have merit as they advance one or more of the objectives—particularly an endangered one—or enhance some objectives more than they hamper others. For example, second-tier states may well gain a substantial degree of security and autonomy with only modest military projection forces. Such a strategy also serves the prosperity objective by diverting fewer resources from civilian use. This opportunity is one consequence of the superpower rivalry—at least for states outside of the Soviet zone of control—when one or both superpowers have an interest in the state's autonomy.[8]

If prosperity is a nearly universal major objective, it follows that steps to provide prosperity to others by offering markets, technology, or capital can become important instruments of resource diplomacy. At the same time, the trinity of objectives suggests that the threats nations pose to each other do not depend solely on their capability for military assertion. Clas-

[6] Kristof (fn. 1), 46.

[7] Robert T. Kudrle and Davis B. Bobrow, "U.S. Policy toward Foreign Direct Investment," *World Politics* 34 (April 1982), 353-79.

[8] Davis B. Bobrow and Steve Chan, "Assets, Liabilities and Strategic Conduct," *Pacific Focus* 1 (January 1986), 23-55.

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sical geopolitical thinking falsely implied that the absence of military projection forces or ambitions sufficed to render a state innocuous to the rest of the international community. A country that eschews the military instrument can still generate a "lateral pressure" internationally,[9] simply because of the increased demand for raw materials and the increased amounts of internationally traded goods that it may generate. International tensions may be heightened further when it aggressively pursues sources of raw material and when its export drives form an important part of an overall national strategy.

Policies for Achieving National Objectives

The geopolitical writers were explicit about desirable policies in a balance-of-power environment.[10] Specific prescriptions depended on the resource needs and the geopolitical position of particular countries. A country that was short of natural endowments was almost always enjoined to ensure foreign provision—i.e., to secure an exclusive sphere of influence. Spheres of influence could be gained and maintained by a combination of political-military and economic means. Aims and requirements for the former would depend on whether the resources were to be gained from a contiguous land mass or from across the oceans, from colonies or from nominally independent client states. Economic means involved trading relations that were asymmetrically favorable (in terms of sensitivity and vulnerability) to the importing nation.

Hirschman's Contribution

The asymmetric trade approach was at its most refined in Germany's policies toward the Balkans during the 1930s. Albert Hirschman's admirably concise and analytic account addressed the means used to achieve supply and influence.[11] For supply, he emphasized the importance of controlling (or avoiding the need for) ocean trade routes, of accumulating stockpiles, and of trading with countries least likely to be cut off in times of active hostilities. For influence, he stressed steps to foster an exporter's reluctance to hamper the flow of resources: large costs sunk in gearing the suppliers' economy to the German trade; dependence on German

[9] Choucri and North (fn. 2); see also Choucri and North, "Lateral Pressure and International Conflict: The Case of Japan" (paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, August 28-31, 1986).

[10] The policy prescriptions of Alfred T. Mahan, for example, were a powerful influence on Theodore Roosevelt; see Mahan, *The Problem of Asia* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1900).

[11] Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade: Studies in International Political Economy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945).

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goods and on bilateral trade with Germany; and vested interests linked to continued resource exports to Germany.

Hirschman showed how an importer's concentration on smaller and poorer countries facilitates dependence that, in turn, contributes to his influence. Such exporting countries gain relatively more from their resource export trade than larger or richer countries would. The growing specialization induced by trade leads to growing differences between production and consumption patterns.[12]

Since 1945 territorial expansion and colonial rule based on military power have not been particularly effective means for resource augmentation. Are the economic policies associated with geopolitics equally obsolete? We think not. We find most of Hirschman's analysis quite compelling from a contemporary perspective. Although he does not make the point, the economic instruments that foster resource supply and influence reinforce each other. Not only does dependence on an importer increase the importer's influence in the exporting country, but that influence contributes to dependable supply. Changes in the international environment and a more differentiated conception of national objectives do, however, call for additional policies and practices.

SPECIFIC POLICIES FOR TODAY

What, then, do we expect of a mid-level power if its policy system operates on the basis of the changed postwar international environment and the triple objectives of security, autonomy, and prosperity? Our policy expectations should hold best where resource diplomacy is paramount and where it is least conditioned by considerations other than those already outlined.

First, second-tier countries will perceive the acquisition, maintenance, or use of power projection military forces to be unhelpful for resource security. They will rely on the U.S. to provide the military means to ensure continued access to and receipt of foreign resources.

Second, middle powers will devote special attention to resource suppliers with certain characteristics: The former colonial powers will exploit past political ties where possible, and all middle powers will seek supplier countries that are characterized by political stability, military dependence on the United States, and a special interest in good relations with the importer.

Third, middle powers will seek relationships that give each of their suppliers a stake in stable performance. Hirschman's analysis of German bonding of the Balkan countries illustrates what economists now call

[12] *Ibid.*, 34-35.

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"self-enforcing agreements."[13] Suppose that two parties agree to specific performances in the future. It may be in the interest of one or both of them not to perform as promised. A failure of performance may result in discovery and retaliation, yet a violation may still be in the first party's interest if the benefits exceed the costs of retaliation. Thus, increasing the magnitude, speed, and certainty of specific retaliation can reduce the first party's temptation to violate the agreement. In the 1930s, several Balkan states concluded that their failure to support Germany diplomatically would have disastrous economic consequences. For reasons already discussed, leverage was extremely unequal: Rumania was far more dependent on Germany than Germany on Rumania. That need not be the case, however. Any ratio of relative vulnerability to retaliation is consistent with the logic of the argument. The greater the net cost of retaliation for each player, the more each will discipline itself to comply with the outstanding agreements.

A middle power, then, seeks the supplier's self-interest in stable performance. That could involve a set of measures roughly similar to those used by Germany: orienting the supplier country toward exports that would make a switch or curtailment very difficult. In particular, the middle power could involve itself in the production, sale, and distribution of resources that link dependable supply to its continued participation, and could further such dependence by becoming a crucial source of vital economic transfers to the exporter (trade, capital, aid). The importing country might also exploit conflicts among its various suppliers while supporting politically powerful interests within the export sources, who would seek continuing good relations with the middle power. The same logic applies to countries that might interfere with the flow of supplies at the source or in transit.

Fourth, a middle power will pursue diversification of several sorts. It will try to reduce dependence on any single type of imported resource. It will also seek suppliers whose locations call for the use of different sea lanes to transfer their resources to the importing country. Thus, the resource suppliers will come to be globally distributed (at least, as much as resource endowments and supplier politics permit); identifiable spheres of influence associated with each mid-level power may then become highly muted. A common desire for solidarity in the face of a challenge to resource supply may even lead a number of middle powers to cooperate on supply and transit assurance.

[13] Lester Telser, "A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements," *Journal of Business* 53 (No. 1, 1980), 27-44; see also Beth and Robert Yarbrough, "Reciprocity, Bilateralism and Economic 'Hostages': Self-Enforcing Agreements in International Trade," *International Studies Quarterly* 30 (March 1986), 7-21.

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The several forms of diversification obviously reduce the chances of serious interruptions of supply. They also increase the importing country's bargaining power relative to any particular supplier or vital transit-route country. In times of excess resource supply at prevailing prices, diversification facilitates advantageous price bargains. In times of tight supply, it holds down economic and political price increases.

Fifth, middle powers who are most dependent on foreign resources and for whom domestic substitution is least feasible will tend to stockpile raw materials.

Sixth, each middle power will take maximum advantage of technological opportunities to reduce its dependence and to improve its resource diplomacy position. Demand for imported resources will be reduced through conservation measures, shifts toward easy substitution, more resource-efficient technology for existing industries and uses, and industrial adjustment. Research and development will be an important policy instrument aimed at attaining these objectives.

Seventh, middle powers will strengthen private firms and quasi-public enterprises that can play an intermediate role in the world resource trade. This step reduces the chances of being frozen out of supply sites by other importers, and it increases the means for diversification.

Finally, a middle power will pursue strategic interdependence to turn its resource import problems into multilateral and, ideally, global problems. It will foster reduction in global demand, thus easing pressures on world markets and weakening the bargaining hand of resource exporters. If it can export goods and technologies that lessen global demand, so much the better. At the same time, the middle power will support all efforts to increase resource supply. A combination of global demand reductions and supply increases will minimize conflict with other importers and lower the power's resource import bill and vulnerability. Sea transit will be portrayed as substantially a multilateral problem, to be dealt with by collective action. A middle power will support efforts by others to ensure that chokepoints remain open; it will subsidize governments in key locations in order to facilitate safe transit; and it may even consider using ships of several different national origins for resource shipment. Such maritime policies serve to increase the difficulties of interfering with resource flows while not antagonizing third parties.

II. Resource Diplomacy and the Japanese Experience

The Prewar Period

Much of Japan's policy in the first four decades of the 20th century fits easily with the classical geopolitical perspective for a resource-poor coun-

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try.[14] National strength was seen as the only way to assure independence in a world ruled by imperial powers that treated Asia as a set of spheres of influence. Such national strength required major military forces and the image of a major military power. Japan's image was greatly enhanced by having inflicted a military defeat on the Russians early in the century. But the reality of power could only be developed by continuing forced modernization and nurturing an advanced indigenous military industrial base. As long as Japanese control extended only over the resource-poor and heavily populated home islands, a future of economic modernization and resource extraction seemed difficult to attain. Thus, Japan too had its advocates of *Lebensraum*. As early as 1927, Minister of Foreign Affairs Tanaka advised the emperor that food, raw materials, and extensive territory were the keys to "success, prosperity, and national strength," and should be sought through a closer association with Manchuria and China.[15]

Japan initially selected spheres of influence that were acceptable to the major Western imperial powers. Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria were made into colonies under Japanese political rule and military occupation to provide food and the primary inputs for the heavy industry of the period: iron and coal. Naval strength was crucial to establishing and maintaining these resource assets, but ground forces were not ignored.

As geopolitical theory would predict, the initial acquisitions proved inadequate to satisfy projected long-run demand. More specifically, while oil was rather unimportant in aggregate Japanese energy demand, it was crucial for the functioning of the military establishment. The only sources were either under Western imperial control or dependent on U.S. and European political willingness to continue supply—and the United States had demonstrated its willingness to use the "oil weapon." The prevalent geopolitical logic dictated that oil resources had to be secured lest Japan face inevitable military and economic decline. The policy response combined military expansion with anticolonial political strategies intended to separate resource-rich Asian lands from Western spheres of influence.

What of Japan's use of economic strategies similar to those of Germany in the Balkans? The historical record provides an incomplete and ambiguous account of Japanese commercial diplomacy late in the interwar period.[16] It is clear, however, that Japan aimed at transforming East and

[14] George C. Allen, *A Short Economic History of Japan* (London: Unwin University Books, 1962); William W. Lockwood, *The Economic Development of Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), and *Trade and Trade Rivalry Between the United States and Japan* (New York: American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1936).

[15] Robert A. Goldwin, ed., *Readings in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), Vol. VII, p. 69.

[16] Japan actively sought to create economic beneficiaries in her colonies and geared their development to Japan's economic needs. See Bruce Cummings, "The Northeast Asian Polit-

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Southeast Asia into its sphere of influence in as exclusive and comprehensive a way as possible. Until well into the 1930s, this attempt had met with little serious opposition from major powers, and in the early years of World War II, Japan's success in the Pacific War made the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere seem well within her reach. The success was to be shortlived, however, and the price for the attempt was onerous indeed.

The Postwar Period

Japan's resource endowments were not improved by the outcome of the Pacific War. The classic geopolitical solution to this problem and to her geographic position had led to war and defeat. To what extent could Japan now cope with the situation by means of strategies that conform with the expectations we have drawn from the interaction of contemporary international realities, a revised understanding of national objectives, and the logic of German economic diplomacy in the 1930s?

Japan's practices cannot prove her adherence to the conception we put forward. We can, however, be sure that there was no lack of attention to energy supply. In 1980 about 25 percent of the Japanese public asserted that energy was its main security concern, in contrast with about 15 percent in Germany and less than 10 percent in France, the United States, and the United Kingdom.[17] There is also abundant evidence of elite concern about coping with problems of energy supply.[18] Japan's failure to conform to our expectations would suggest a need to reexamine them; her successful conformance, on the other hand, should increase confidence in our conditional predictions and the reasoning behind them.

The Military Instrument and Energy

Japan has kept her military expenditures and forces at levels that are, relative to appropriate aggregates, among the lowest in the world. She has not even attempted to use military power selectively for the assurance of energy security. And she has shown special disinterest in projection

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ical Economy," *International Organization* 38 (Winter 1984), 1-40. Exports were shifted to smaller (and perhaps poorer) countries and bilateral trade with them increased, but there was little change in the sources of imports. Moreover, much of the export shift should be attributed less to Japanese initiative than to imposed pressures from the collapse of the raw silk trade, the devaluation of the yen, the closing of the markets through protectionism, and the insistence on bilateralism by many of Japan's trading partners. See Hirschman (fn. 11), 96-97.

[17] Tokio Kano, "Energy Security," in Inoki Masamichi and Kosaka Masataka, eds., *Japan's Security and a Crisis Proposal for Defense* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1982, in Japanese), 198.

[18] Davis B. Bobrow, "Putting Up, Not Speaking Up; Japanese Resource Allocation to Comprehensive Security" (paper presented to the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, March 1985).

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forces—i.e., the sort of military capabilities most useful for extended defense of sea lanes and control of foreign resource sites. Even verbal commitments for defense of her sea lanes up to one thousand miles from Tokyo have been followed more by domestic opposition than by tangible implementing actions.[19]

At the same time, the Japanese have actively encouraged U.S. military commitments in order to ensure the continued flow of energy resources from exporters around the world and unimpeded transit to Japan.

Suppliers and Supplier Relations: Asymmetries and Self-Enforcing Agreements

ENERGY TRADE PARTNERS

Japan imports most of the oil, gas, and coal that she uses. One way of exploring her relations with suppliers is to look at the share of Japan's imports of these three commodities from each supplier. The source of the imports does matter: while most energy resources are homogeneous, graded commodities (as in agriculture), long-term sales arrangements permeate the market. Hence, sensitivity and perhaps vulnerability dependence prevail. Part A of Table 1 contains information on each supplier's share of oil imports and covers total supply. Parts B and C deal with suppliers of gas and of coal, respectively. They list all countries that supplied four percent or more of Japan's imports in at least one of the years from 1966 through 1981.

For Middle and Near East oil suppliers, several points stand out. The rise of dependence on Iranian supplies parallels Iran's major development drive during a time of political stability (the late 1960s). The subsequent increase in national assertion and regional dominance abetted by the United States was accompanied by the beginning of a decline in Japan's dependence on Iran in the early 1970s. Finally, the rush to riches, followed by revolution and Islamic fundamentalism, saw a sharp decline during the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s. In short, Japan seems to have reacted negatively to Iran's increasing independence and megalomania even before the sharp contraction in Iranian output.

The Saudi share rises with the Japanese and Saudi perception of, first,

[19] For a complete discussion of Japan's comprehensive security budget and the role of energy security in it, see *ibid*. On Japan's military budget and the factors associated with changes in it, see Davis B. Bobrow and Stephen R. Hill, "Managing Your Protector: Japan's Use of Military Budgets" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 28-31, 1986); and Bobrow and Hill, "The Determinants of Military Budgets: The Japanese Case," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 9 (Fall 1985), 1-18.

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TABLE 1
SUPPLIER'S SHARE OF JAPANESE ENERGY IMPORTS

Part A: Percentage of Oil Imports from Selected Countries

	1964	*1967*	*1970*	*1973*	*1974*	*1975*	*1976*	*1977*	*1978*	*1979*	*1980*	*1981*
Iran	19.5	34.2	41.7	30.4	24.1	24.3	18.9	16.3	17.5	11.4	6.9	3.6
Iraq	5.2	2.8	—	0.0	0.9	1.9	2.5	2.9	3.3	5.4	8.3	1.7
Bahrein	1.0	1.7	—	—	0.0	—	0.5	0.5	—	—	—	—
Kuwait	41.1	31.6	18.4	7.9	9.3	8.7	7.6	8.7	7.9	9.2	3.6	4.9
Qatar	—	—	—	—	—	0.0	0.0	0.7	2.4	2.9	3.5	4.0
Saudi Arabia	18.2	18.2	14.8	21.4	25.3	28.9	32.2	31.6	31.0	31.2	31.5	35.0
Muscat/Oman	—	—	2.9	2.5	2.0	2.6	3.0	3.5	3.9	4.1	3.3	4.4
Trucials/U.A.E.	—	—	5.2	9.2	11.2	9.0	11.0	10.9	10.7	10.5	14.5	14.6
North Africa[1]	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.5	2.0	1.5	0.9	0.4	0.1	0.3	1.4	1.9
P.R.C.	—	—	—	0.5	2.1	3.7	2.5	2.6	3.3	3.0	3.8	4.4
Malaysia	0.3	0.1	0.1	4.5	3.9	4.2	1.0	1.4	2.1	2.7	2.5	2.0
Indonesia	9.0	6.6	14.2	18.4	15.5	12.7	13.3	14.9	13.5	14.7	14.4	15.8
U.S.S.R.	3.8	2.1	0.3	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Latin America[2]	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	1.5	3.2
Sub-Saharan Africa[3]	—	—	0.5	3.2	2.5	1.7	0.4	—	—	—	0.4	0.6
Asian Pacific Basin	9.3	6.7	14.3	23.4	21.5	20.6	16.8	18.9	18.9	20.4	20.7	22.2
Near and Middle East	85.0	88.5	83.9	71.9	74.8	76.9	76.6	75.5	76.8	75.0	73.0	70.1

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Part B: Percentage of Gas Imports

	1966	*1970*	*1974*	*1978*	*1981*
Saudi Arabia	40	30	33	25	21
Kuwait	56	27	14	6	6
U.A.E.	—	—	—	7	13
Iran	—	7	10	3	—
Indonesia	—	—	—	22	31
Brunei	—	—	15	18	MD
U.S.A.	—	5	4	4	4
Canada	3	12	3	1	1
Australia	—	—	12	9	9

Part C: Percentage of Coal Imports

	1966	*1970*	*1974*	*1978*	*1981*
P.R.C.	4	—	—	1	3
U.S.A.	43	61	57	21	35
Canada	5	6	11	21	13
Australia	35	25	25	46	41
So. Africa	1	1	—	4	5
U.S.S.R.	8	4	4	4	2

[1] Libya, Egypt, Algeria
[2] Venezuela, Mexico, Ecuador
[3] Nigeria, Angola
— = less than .05 percent.
MD = missing data
Source: AIXDT, Trade Data Base of the Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo.

an American tilt toward Iran in the early 1970s[20] and, second, a U.S. military umbrella over Saudi Arabia (late 1970s and early 1980s). Thus, Japan seems to have exploited the opportunities successively provided by the absence, and then by the presence, of a U.S. regional priority on the Saudis. Substantial and increasing shares have come from the relatively conservative, politically stable emirates (the U.A.E., Qatar, Oman) under U.S. and Saudi protection.

When we look at other regions, the importance of suppliers seems associated with their development imperatives, their strong interest in good relations with Japan, their security cooperation with the U.S., and their political stability (Indonesia, Malaysia, PRC). The vanishing share of the U.S.S.R. shows Japanese sensitivity to some of the same factors, and that of Africa probably stems from Japan's assessment of lack of political stability. Note that Asian Pacific suppliers play the role of a shock absorber in periods of supply turbulence (1973-1974, 1979-1981).

The gas and coal data (Parts B and C) show patterns of supplier concentration that fit even better with our predictions of the kinds of countries with which a mid-level power will associate. For gas, we again see increasing emphasis on Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E., and the reduced importance of Iran. Major roles are played by politically safe states or at least by those highly reliant on Japan—Indonesia and Brunei in Southeast Asia, as well as the United States, Canada, and Australia. This trio of Western industrialized countries, together with the PRC and South Africa, also looms large for coal. South Africa is clearly in no position to be choosy about its trading partners or to tie economic relations to politics. The United States, Canada, and Australia are bound to Japan by numerous economic, political, and military interests—including shared membership in the club supporting the current international economic order. Economic modernization in China benefits substantially from Japanese transfers of capital and technology on favorable terms. Once again, the Soviet share declines to the point of insignificance.

ASYMMETRY WITH TRADING PARTNERS

Even the most careful selection of suppliers does not remove vulnerabilities. The relationships involved are complex and need to be analyzed with care. The first part of our discussion deals with relations between Japan and her major energy suppliers in terms of the importance of the energy trade to each of the parties. To capture this, we use the three in-

[20] William R. Campbell, "Japan and the Middle East," in Robert S. Ozaki and Walter Arnold, eds., *Japan's Foreign Relations* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985).

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dices reported for individual supplier countries (as data permit) in Table 2. We then examine other linkages between Japan and her suppliers.

Column A shows the relative concentration in bilateral trade in terms of a particular energy commodity. A score of 1 indicates symmetry. Scores smaller than 1 indicate greater dependence by the supplier on the Japanese market than by Japan on the supplier's provision, and scores greater than 1 indicate the opposite asymmetry. Columns B and C put the bilateral trade in a particular energy commodity into the context of the whole of supplier's exports and Japan's imports, respectively. In Column B (where the maximum possible is 1) the score indicates how much disruption in a country's total export activity would result from disruption of the trade with Japan in a particular energy commodity; in Column C, the score indicates how large the purchase of a particular supplier's commodity looms in Japan's total import activity. The magnitude of each of the two scores is of interest in its own right, and so is their magnitude relative to each other.[21]

The stakes in trade continuity favor Japan to the extent that the scores in columns A and C are low while those in column B are high; in these cases, the supplier is much more heavily dependent. The opposite score profile, of course, would suggest asymmetrically heavy Japanese dependence. A more complex picture arises when Japan receives a greater share of energy imports from a given supplier than that supplier provides to Japan as a fraction of its energy exports (column A scores greater than 1), while those very same Japanese imports loom disproportionately large in the supplier's total export picture. Here there is noticeable countervailing dependence. Whether that mutual dependence is fully balanced depends, of course, on many factors—in particular the ease of finding alternative trade partners for both the supplier and for Japan, and the supplier's need for export earnings.

In Table 2, the general pattern is one of heavier dependence by suppliers on the Japanese market than vice-versa. It is particularly striking for the Asian Pacific suppliers (Indonesia, Malaysia, China, Australia, and Brunei) and, according to the scores for Kuwait and Iran, it also applies to many Middle Eastern suppliers. (Although Iranian data for the

[21] The careful reader of the text and the formula presented in Table 2 will note that the index in column A is the ratio of county *Y*'s export of commodity *X* to Japan's total imports of commodity *X*: the trade terms between the two countries in the ratio cancel out. If we presented the information in columns B and C as the ratio of C to B, we would have the same type of outcome with the ratio of *X*'s total exports to Japan's total imports. We leave columns B and C to be examined separately because their absolute (as opposed to relative) magnitude in the trade of the two countries would be lost in a ratio (as it is in A). There is no ideal measure of asymmetry or the importance of trade in a commodity to either country. (We could, for example, devise other measures related to the total outputs of the two countries.)

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TABLE 2
JAPAN'S ENERGY TRADE: BILATERAL DEPENDENCE
1965-1980

	Saudi Arabia						*Iran*			*Kuwait*						*Malaysia*		
	Oil			*Gas*			*Oil*			*Oil*			*Gas*			*Oil*		
	A[1]	B[2]	C[3]	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
1965	1.21	.16	.02	—	—	—	.85	.17	.03	—	—	—	—	—	—	.03	—	—
1970	1.05	.14	.02	.00	.01	.00[4]	.82	.36	.05	.67	.24	.02	.34	.02	.00	.03	.00	.00
1975	1.42	.20	.10	—	.01	.01	.60	.18	.07[5]	.38	.19	.03	.15	.01	.00	.02	.04	.00
1980	2.00	.16	.11	.31	.02	.01	—	—	—	.28	.09	.01	.09	.03	.00	.06	.10	.01

	Indonesia						*Brunei*						*China*					
	Oil			*Gas*			*Oil*			*Gas*			*Oil*			*Coal*		
	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
1965	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	.03	.00	.00
1970	.14	.28	.02	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	.00	.00	.00
1975	.25	.70	.09	—	—	—	.04	.60	.01	.15	.17	.00	—	—	—	.01	.00	.00
1980	.23	.34	.05	.38	.11	.02	.06	.42	.01[6]	.18	.26	.01[6]	.04	.11	.02[7]	.03	.01	.00

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	Australia						*Canada*						*United States*					
	Coal			*Gas*			*Coal*			*Gas*			*Coal*			*Gas*		
	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
1965	.25	.03	.01	—	—	—	.08	.00	.00	5.87	.00	.00	1.82	.01	.02	1.91	.00	.00
1970	.21	.05	.01	.03	.00	.00	.05	.00	.00	2.28	.00	.00	1.03	.01	.03	.60	.00	.00
1975	.31	.08	.02	.05	.01	.00	.14	.02	.01	1.17	.00	.00	.96	.02	.03	.18	.00	.00
1980	.43	.08	.01	—	—	—	.16	.01	.01	.52	.00	.00	1.05	.01	.01	.05	.00	.00

[1] A throughout this table = $\dfrac{\text{Japan's imports of commodity } X \text{ from Country } Y}{\text{Japan's total imports of commodity } X} \div \dfrac{\text{Country } Y \text{ exports of commodity } X \text{ to Japan}}{\text{Total Country } Y \text{ exports of commodity } X}$

[2] B throughout this table = $\dfrac{\text{Country } Y \text{ exports of commodity } X \text{ to Japan}}{\text{Total exports of Country } Y}$

[3] C throughout this table = $\dfrac{\text{Japan's imports of commodity } X \text{ from Country } Y}{\text{Total Japanese imports}}$

[4] 1969
[5] 1976
[6] 1979
[7] 1981

.00 = less than .005
— = missing data

Source: OECD (fn. 26); IFS (fn. 29).

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score calculations are unavailable after 1976, the decline of Iran's share of Japan's oil imports and the growth of Japan's total imports since then suggest that the subsequent pattern would be even more marked.) Additional fragmentary information for the U.A.E. and Oman also confirms this Japan-favoring pattern.

What of exceptions to the pattern? The possibilities are U.S. gas and coal, Canadian gas, and, most notably, Saudi oil. The U.S. and Canadian data do not seem to reflect serious Japanese dependency. The reasons include a decline in asymmetric dependence (U.S. and Canadian gas), minor importance in Japan's total import transactions, and the growing presence of eager alternative suppliers. For coal, those alternatives are China, Australia, and South Africa. For gas, they include Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, and Australia.

The strongest candidate for asymmetric energy trade dependence favoring the supplier is Saudi oil. Yet, even here countervailing factors conducive to Japanese leverage are at work. It is important to note the substantial part played by Japan's oil purchases in total Saudi exports. A reduction in these purchases would either cut Saudi oil export revenues substantially or require the Saudis to secure alternative customers. The Saudis as well as Japan's other energy suppliers will find the latter option increasingly hard to exercise because Japan's share of imports has been increasing as a portion of both OECD and total world imports of oil, gas, and coal. Between 1962 and 1981, Japanese oil imports rose from 9 percent of the world total to 21 percent, coal imports from 12 percent to 36 percent, and gas imports from 3 percent to 25 percent.[22]

RESOURCE TRANSFERS AND SELF-ENFORCING AGREEMENTS

Japan's creation of export relationships that are of major importance to the supplier's economy conforms to our expectations; it obviously encourages supportive interest groups in the supplier state. Development assistance and investment can have a similar effect. The countries listed in Table 3 are presented in Japanese government studies as important for energy supply.[23] Some are supplier states that are familiar from Table 1, while others are significant to the transit of resources to Japan. Some appear for both reasons, as columns A and B indicate.

The suppliers and the share of total Japanese energy consumption they provided in 1978 are listed in column C. Columns D through H provide data on Japanese official development assistance (ODA). Column D

[22] AIXDT: Trade Database of the Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo.

[23] Ministry of International Trade and Industry [MITI], *Toward the Establishment of Economic Security* (Tokyo, 1982, in Japanese), 148-49. Ministry of Transportation [MOT], *Transportation Policy: Considerations of Comprehensive Security* (Tokyo, 1983, in Japanese), 118-19.

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shows Japanese assistance as a share of the total ODA provided by the 17 members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. Columns E and F show Japanese ODA in relation to the population and to the GNP of the recipient country. Column G deals with the activities of the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA);[24] it shows the percentage of nationals of each aided country out of the total number of foreign nationals trained in Japan. Column H lists large-scale direct investment projects (including, but not limited to, "national projects" approved by the Japanese cabinet).

Sixteen energy suppliers are listed among the countries in Table 3. The DAC share of aid received and Japan's ranking among donors (in parentheses, Column D) is reported for eight suppliers (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Libya, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Mexico). In interpreting these data, it is important to note that Japan's overall share of DAC official development assistance was 11.8 percent, and that she ranked fourth among donors. In five of the pertinent cases, she provided substantially more than her share of total DAC funds, and in all eight she ranked higher than fourth among DAC providers. Personnel were trained for all suppliers except Canada. Major investment projects were planned or authorized for eight of the suppliers. Connections existed with all of them, albeit modest ones with those who were politically most controversial (Libya, Iran).

The Japanese overwhelmingly directed aid and investment in energy suppliers toward projects that promised a continued stake in country-to-country cooperation. Some of these projects involved infrastructure development that would orient the supplier's economy (and thus, regime success) toward continued exports of energy to Japan (and we have argued that Japan would typically be a hard market to replace in the short run). Others depended for profitability on continuing Japanese involvement in finance, management, technology, or marketing. For example, in the major Saudi Arabian petrochemical project, Mitsubishi will handle about 50 percent of production. At the same time, Japan's equity share is kept low and that of the host high as a way of ensuring that the host has no incentive to interfere with the conduct of international trade.[25] We know (although it is hard to show statistically) that Japan has gone to great pains to avoid raising extraneous political issues with suppliers such as Iran and Iraq; she has signaled that pressure by them might bring Japan to favor regional rivals.

[24] Japanese International Cooperation Agency, *JICA Annual Report* (Tokyo, 1983), 75-94.

[25] Interviews with officials of the Japanese General Trading Company, Tokyo, April and August 1983.

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TABLE 3
KEY ENERGY SUPPLY COUNTRIES

	A *MITI List (1982)*	*B* *MOT List (1983)*	*C* *% Japanese Energy (1978)*	*D* *Japanese DAC % & (Rank) (1979)*	*E* *Japanese ODA/CAP (U.S.$) (1980)*	*F* *Japanese ODA/GNP (1980)*	*G* *% World Trainees*	*H* *Direct Investment Projects (1983)*
Saudi Arabia	1		22.8	83(1)	0.1*		0.7	Petrochemicals, Construction
Kuwait	1		9.4	NA			0.2	
U.A.E.	1		6.8	NA			0.2	
Iraq	1		3.6	16(1)	1.8*		1.5	
Iran		X	12.9	5(3)	0.6	—	2.6	Petrochemicals
Qatar			1.8	NA			0.1	
Oman		X	2.9	NA	0.6	.01	—	
Sudan	2		0.0	NA	0.1*		0.8	
Egypt	2	X	0.0	13(2)	3.1	.53	2.6	
Libya	2		0.1	5(2)			0.1	
North Yemen	2	X	0.0	NA	1.7	.38	—	
South Yemen	2	X	0.0	NA	0.5	.12	—	
Turkey	2		0.0	1(3)	0.2*		1.5	
Maldives		X	0.0	NA	4.9	1.88	—	
Indonesia	3	X	10.4	36(1)	2.4	.57	10.4	Aluminum, Liquefied Natural Gas
Thailand	3		0.0	64(1)	5.5*		10.1	Soda Ash
Malaysia	3	X	1.5	83(1)	4.9	.29	4.0	Urea
P.R.C.	3		2.2	NA			0.9	
Philippines	4	X	0.0	52(1)	2.0	.27	7.0	Pulp

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Singapore	4	X	0.0	39(2)	1.6	.04	2.8	Petrochemicals, Ship Building
Pakistan	4		0.0	40(1)	3.9*		2.5	
India	4		0.0	5(3)	1.7*		3.8	
Sri Lanka		X	0.0	17(1)	3.0	1.12	3.4	
Mexico	3	X	0.0	7(2)	0.2*		3.4	Steel, Electricity, Transportation
Panama			0.0	NA	0.9	.05	0.4	Ships, 2d Canal
Australia	5		5.2	0			—	Aluminum, Autos
Canada	5		2.1	0			0.0	Not specified
U.S.A.	5		2.1	0			—	TVs, Autos
TOTAL			83.8%				59.0%	

A: Entry indicates that the country is on the MITI list (see fn. 23). The number suggests the type of country, as follows:
1: Middle East oil producers
2: Countries surrounding oil producers
3: Pacific Basin developing countries
4: Countries important for energy transport
5: Developed industrialized countries

B: X indicates that the country is on the MOT list (see fn. 23).

C: Percentage of Japanese energy consumption provided by the country indicated. MITI (fn. 23); AIDXT (fn. 22).

D: Japanese share of total official development assistance (ODA) disbursements by the DAC (see text). JETRO (Japan External Trade Research Organization), *Economic Cooperation of Japan* (Tokyo, 1980).

E: Japanese ODA in 1980 U.S. dollars divided by the 1980 recipient country's population. MOT (fn. 23); JETRO, 1980.

F: Japanese ODA in 1980 U.S. dollars divided by the 1980 recipient country's GNP. MOT (fn. 23); JETRO, 1980.

G: Percentage of all persons trained by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) by home country (fn. 24).

H: Large Scale Direct Investment Projects in 1983. JERC (Japan Economic Research Center), *Japan's Economy in the World—1990* (Tokyo, 1983, in Japanese), 289, 294; Interview with Foreign Ministry official (June 1983). Projects are existing and planned.

— = less than .1%.
* = 1977-79.
NA = not available.

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ATTENTION TO NONSUPPLIERS

Our revised geopolitical conception of resource diplomacy demands that Japan pay attention to nonsupplier countries that can hinder or facilitate Japan's importation of energy because they have access to sea lanes, leverage on supplier politics and policy, or both. Countries that provide only a modest portion of Japan's energy imports can loom large in these other terms. Japanese recognition of these factors is evidenced by the treatment of a number of nonsuppliers listed in Table 3: the Sudan, North Yemen, Turkey, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and Panama. In addition to the importance they have in their own right, many of these and the other countries listed in Table 3 are vital to the force presence and projection of the United States. The suppliers and selected nonsuppliers received more than half of their official development assistance from Japan on several different measures. As for investment, the list includes all but two of the countries for which Japanese government "national" projects of a development nature were approved by mid-1983 as well as 9 of the 14 countries identified as hosts for large-scale projects by the Japan Economic Research Center as of March 1983.

Trade leverage considerations would favor Japan if she played a larger part in the trade of these nonsupplier countries than they do in Japan's. The fact that this is true in almost every case is not surprising in view of the differences in the scale of the economies, but it has implications for leverage.

Thus, both for suppliers and supply-relevant countries, there is ample evidence of situations that are conducive to asymmetric "self-enforcing agreements" which favor Japanese energy security.

DIVERSIFICATION

Diversification in several dimensions is central to another set of our expectations. First, Japanese reliance on oil imports above all else has declined and is projected to decline further. Oil as a percentage of total energy requirements peaked in 1973 at 83 percent, dropped to 63 percent in 1983, and is projected to be 42 percent in the year 2000. The pertinent figures are 13 percent, 14 percent, and 18 percent for coal, and 1 percent, 7 percent, and 11 percent for gas.[26]

Table 1 bears on a second kind of diversification: by supplier state and

[26] Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], *Energy Balances* (Paris: OECD, various years); Japan Nuclear Energy Industries Conference, *Nuclear Energy Pocket Book* (Tokyo: Nuclear Energy Bureau, Science and Technology Agency, 1985, in Japanese).

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region. Between 1967 and 1981, Japan's dependence for oil imports on the Middle and Near East fell from 80 percent to 70 percent. During the same period, dependence on that region for gas imports fell from about 89 percent to 40 percent, and Japan never depended on that region for coal imports. Japan has not pursued a policy of maximum diversification from all possible suppliers, however. The reason for her substantial concentration may lie in the self-enforcing agreements that typically involve the Japanese market in a major way.

The general arguments introduced earlier do not call for the single-minded pursuit of supplier diversification in national terms, though they surely call for multiple suppliers and positive relations with as many of them as possible. Diversification of supplier regions and imported energy commodities moderates transit vulnerabilities, including those that are due to regional turmoil. A few of the chokepoints, in particular the Straits of Hormuz and the Malacca Straits, are shown in Table 4. But the Japanese are planning to reduce their vulnerability; they forecast a drop in total energy supplies passing through Hormuz from 42.4 percent in 1980 to 33.3 percent in 1990, and from 53.9 percent to 39.6 percent for Malacca.[27]

Stockpiles

Reserves and inventories (both official and unofficial) provide still another source of supply in case normal patterns are disrupted. Japan has

Table 4
Imports through Chokepoints
(1980)

	Malacca/ Singapore	*Salat/ Lamabok/ Sunda*	*Hormuz*	*Panama Canal*
Oil	78.2%	3.5%	69.0%	.9%
Liquefied Petroleum Gas	83.0	—	80.7	—
Liquefied Natural Gas	38.3	—	11.5	—
Coal	3.5	7.0	—	20.7

Source: Ministry of Transportation (fn. 23), 112-13.

[27] MOT (fn. 23), 112-13.

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created substantial oil inventories as well as the infrastructure for both oil and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) stockpiles. Oil stockpiles, which were only 22.5 percent of the previous year's consumption in 1967, jumped from 34.7 percent in 1973 to 41.8 percent in 1974 after the first major OPEC-caused price rise. Stockpiles again increased sharply, from 48.4 percent in 1979 to 55.9 percent in 1980, following the second OPEC price shock. In 1982, reserves stood at 61.5 percent. The *de facto* national stockpiles (public and private) are far greater than in most industrial countries and involved the use of a mix of policy instruments (summarized in Table 5) to bolster the Japanese hand in resource diplomacy. More recent changes in the demand-supply relationship have reduced the emphasis on shortages, but they have not challenged the reasoning reflected in Table 5.

Technology and Reduced Dependence

The burdens on resource diplomacy clearly decrease and the capability to achieve objectives clearly increases when technology and policy allow a rise in the ratio of economic activity to energy needs: a decline in the energy required per unit of real GNP. Such a situation could result from a decline in the role of energy-intensive industries, or an increase in their efficiency, or both. The ratio of total energy requirements to real GNP was virtually the same in 1973 as in 1960, but fell by 27 percent by 1982. Energy use per unit of output fell by 10 to 20 percent in several major industries between 1973 and 1980.[28] Heavy industry exports as a percent of total Japanese exports fell from 19.5 percent in 1970 to 10.2 percent in 1982.[29] At the policy level, we know that MITI anticipated the loss of comparative advantage in many industries and assisted in their "export" to other East Asian areas. One result of this development was a reduction in the sensitivity of Japanese export prices (and, derivatively, sales) to increases in oil prices. At the same time, the new basic industrial suppliers remained largely dependent on Japanese markets and middlemen.

Figures on foreign direct investment support these developments. The chemical, steel, and nonferrous metals industries are appropriate foci. The chemical industry accounted for 1.3 percent of total Japanese foreign direct investment in 1970, 7.2 percent of a rapidly growing total in 1980, and is expected to rise to 7.7 percent by 1990. For steel and non-ferrous metals the figures are 3.8, 7.2 and 8.3 percent. The annual average growth

[28] Kano (fn. 17), 173.

[29] OECD (fn. 26). Also see OECD, *SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) Listings* (various years), and International Financial Statistics [IFS] data base of the International Monetary Fund.

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rate of foreign direct investment of the two sectors together was an astounding 25 percent between 1970 and 1985.[30] Investments in petrochemical facilities in the region of least reliable but very important energy supply, the Middle and Near East, approached 18 percent of all of Japan's overseas chemical investments.[31]

Research and development has evolved along the same lines. Two major sources of funds are employed: the energy R & D account in the General Account budget and an electricity R & D special account funded by a source tax on electricity generation. Between 1976 and 1984, the increases in one or another of these energy funds exceeded those of the broader science and technology resource pool in all but one year. Together, the energy funds account for more than 20 percent of total science and technology government spending in the 1980s. The content of energy R & D also fits our expectations about managing resource weakness. For example, in fiscal year 1983, over 33 percent of energy R & D was related to energy conservation; more than 54 percent developed types of energy that involve minimum import dependence (such as nuclear power).[32] The non-nuclear aspects of alternative energy sources of R & D have concentrated on Project Sunshine, which accounts for over 10 percent of energy R & D in the 1980s; efforts are concentrated mainly on coal, geothermal, and solar energy.[33]

Nongovernmental Intermediation

Japanese general trading companies (GTCs) are involved in energy trade even when Japan is not a direct party to the exchange. Their involvement may be in energy *per se* or in products related to energy; in any case, there has been a growth in the middleman role of the GTCs.[34] They are now engaged in the energy trade of every region—in the West European and North American import trade as well as in exporting in the Middle and Near East and in Southeast Asia. This sort of global intermediary role obviously places Japanese firms in a position to be helpful to many exporters and importers; at the same time, it is difficult for other nations to freeze out or surprise Japan by taking special measures to manipulate energy supply and demand. The GTCs can also enter into con-

[30] Japan Economic Research Center [JERC], *Japan's Economy in the World—1990* (Tokyo, 1983, in Japanese), 289, 294.

[31] *Ibid.*, 296.

[32] Planning Bureau, Science and Technology Agency, *Indicators of Science and Technology* (Tokyo, 1984), 56.

[33] *Sunshine Information Center News* (Nos. 10-11, 1984), 13.

[34] Japan Foreign Trade Council, *A Study of Japan's Offshore Trade* (Tokyo, 1983, in Japanese), 27, 38, 40, 41, 78, 79.

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TABLE 5
ENERGY RESERVE POLICIES

	Special Supply Measures Necessary?	*General Policy*	*Reserve Needed*
Oil	Yes; 70% dependent on Middle East. Imports key to economic status quo.	Stabilize imports through long-term contracts, economic cooperation.	Yes; public and private reserves established.
Liquefied Natural Gas	Yes; Indonesia/ Brunei provide 80%. 1990 imports will be 2.5 times those of 1981.	"	Not now.
Liquefied Petroleum Gas	Yes; 80% from Middle East. 1990 imports will be 1.7 times those of 1981.	"	Yes; private reserves established.
Coal	Yes; dependent on Australia, U.S.A. 1990 imports of coal will be 4.8 times those of 1981.	"	Not now.

sortium arrangements for the development of foreign energy resources for export, as illustrated by Mitsubishi, Royal Dutch Shell, and the government of Brunei for liquefied natural gas (LNG).[35]

STRATEGIC INTERDEPENDENCE: A FINGER IN EVERY PIE

The old geopolitics recommended that major powers pursue unilateral resource diplomacy and establish exclusive spheres of influence. The present situation, however, frequently dictates strategic interdependence—by which we mean a measured and purposeful attempt to become involved with other importers, energy suppliers, and other states that are essential for energy supply. The foregoing discussion reports much of this behavior, and several other Japanese practices can be interpreted in the same way.

[35] Alexander K. Young, *The Sogo Shosha* (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1979), 159.

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TABLE 5
(Continued)

	Implementing Japanese Organizations	*Government Role*
Oil	Refining firms, cooperative refining company, public cooperation.	1. Provide energy harbors 2. Financing for crude oil reserve purchases at 5.5% interest rate. 3. Public oil corporation investment, financing for cooperative reserve firms. 4. Financing for facilities construction at 2% interest rate. 5. Subsidies to local public corporations.
Liquefied Petroleum Gas	Importing firms, LPG cooperative reserve company	1, 3, 4, 5 as above; 3% interest rate financing for purchase of reserve supplies.

Source: Ministry of Transportation (fn. 23), 130-32, 136-37, 140-44.

Strategic interdependence implies receptivity to international efforts to increase energy supply and minimize demand through conservation, substitution, and extraction. Japan has attached importance to all of these measures, whether they are pursued by international organizations (such as the International Energy Agency), bilateral governmental R & D projects (such as U.S.-Japan nuclear technology), or projects on which firms of different nationalities cooperate.[36] Thus Japan was instrumental in the establishment, in 1974, of the United Nations Revolving Fund for the Exploration of Natural Resources, and has been the largest contributor to it.[37] Relevant bilateral agreements have been concluded with the U.S., the U.S.S.R., France, West Germany, Australia, Canada, China, Indonesia,

[36] Kano (fn. 17); also MITI (fn. 23).
[37] Nobutoshi, Akao, ed., *Japan's Economic Security* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 271.

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and the United Arab Emirates.[38] Japan's performance in the export of energy-saving products has been impressive.[39]

Another example of strategic interdependence is Japan's control of a large share of the ships required to bring energy to her homeland, and her employment of ships of other nations.[40] It has become difficult to interfere with shipping to Japan without interfering with the shipping rights of numerous other states and their firms. Japan maintains a substantial nationally owned and Japanese flag fleet, which carried 45 percent of all energy imports in 1970, but only 36 percent in 1981. Control is provided by a combination of that type of carrier and chartered ships owned by Japanese firms and their overseas subsidiaries flying other flags; the latter group rose from 19 percent in 1970 to 33 percent in 1981. Resistance to interference is achieved by the use of these chartered ships as well as foreign vessels under other flags. The last group accounted for 36 percent of energy imports in 1970 and 31 percent in 1981. This strategy is consistent with large-scale direct investment projects in shipping in countries that are hospitable to providing their flags to foreign owners, such as Panama and Liberia.[41]

Another component of strategic interdependence offers the greatest departure from classical geopolitical thinking about resource diplomacy and spheres of influence. In the classic view, the importing power should seek exclusive control of promising supply sources. In our revised view, that is not necessarily the case. Instead, the importing power should show contingent restraint—that is, try to leave ample sources for other importing powers while simultaneously laying the groundwork to compete with them for supplies should the situation require. At the same time, the importing power should look with favor upon some involvement by other importers even in those countries that in normal times provide a significant share of the power's energy supplies. The rationale is to minimize the chances that a supplier's nationalism will be focused on a single importing power, and to maximize the chances for a coalition of importers in favor of the businesslike continuation of supply arrangements. These considerations are less applicable to coal and gas given their wide distribution, but they are certainly relevant to oil. In oil sourcing, Japan has thus balanced three objectives: geographic diversification, substantial ac-

[38] *Science and Technology in Japan* 3 (April-June 1984), 11; also see *Sunshine Information Center News* (fn. 33), 12.

[39] Michele Schmiegelow, "Cutting Across Doctrines: Positive Adjustment in Japan," *International Organization* 39 (Spring 1985), 261-96, at 286.

[40] MOT (fn. 23), 116-19.

[41] JERC (fn. 30), 294.

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tivity in many countries (frequently involving self-enforcing agreements), and the avoidance of dominating any single supplier.

Conclusion

In this paper we have explored the relation among the international environment, national objectives, and national resource (particularly energy) policies. In all three areas we have traced developments from the balance-of-power era to the postwar period of bipolarity and the emergence of distinct foreign policies by the mid-level powers. The focus of our attention has been the development of Japanese national energy strategy. Although the traditional geopolitical writing was consonant with behavior prior to World War II, the changed postwar situation can be explained only by means of the set of principles we have developed for that period. The new policy directions fit closely with our characterization of the changed environment and the revised set of national objectives.

While our approach surely fits the Japanese experience, the consonance of our argument with the practices and results of other contemporary mid-level powers remains to be determined. We suspect that Japan may prove to be the cleanest confirmation of the postwar policy directions. Other countries—Britain and France in particular—may have pursued policies more compatible with a world that no longer exists. For now, the Japanese case and the principles it manifests merit consideration as a general prescription for effective resource diplomacy for importers, but the strategic elements are not restricted to energy or particularly dependent on allegedly unique features of Japan's political culture.

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Research Note

THE SINGLE PARTY AS AN AGENT OF DEVELOPMENT: Lessons from the Soviet Experience

By GRAEME GILL

THE image of the single party as an effective agent of development has been an enduring one. Concentration of organizational power in a single-party regime has been seen as conducive to achieving those dramatic breakthroughs in development that are considered essential for substantial socioeconomic transformation.[1] This view—attractive to many of the leaders of states that gained their independence in the post-war era—was largely based on their perception of the Soviet Union as a country that, within a few short decades, transformed itself from a backward, mainly agricultural state into one of the world's leading industrial and military powers. A major factor in bringing about this transformation, it was believed, was the highly integrated, tightly organized, disciplined Communist Party.

This picture of the Communist Party as a powerful agent of central control and of development stemmed from two sources. The first was the received wisdom about the Leninist nature of the party. Leninism was seen as providing a blueprint for an efficient organizational weapon characterized by a high level of centralization and tight discipline, qualities that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was believed to have attained.[2] The second was the totalitarian paradigm; it portrayed the Soviet political system, of which the party was an essential component, as highly centralized, tightly disciplined, penetrating all sections of society,[3] and an efficient instrument for achieving politically inspired goals.[4]

[1] On breakthroughs, see Otto Kirchheimer, "Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs," *American Political Science Review* 59 (December 1965), 964-75, and Kenneth Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development. The Case of Romania 1944-1965* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

[2] On organization and communism in this context, see Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 334-43.

[3] See the influential works by Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951), and by Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956).

[4] See Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc. Unity and Conflict* (New York: Praeger, 1967), 99.

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This image of a link in the Soviet Union between rapid development and a tightly organized single party is a misperception. Neither the Leninist model of organization as usually perceived nor the totalitarian paradigm accurately reflects the reality of the party's condition during the period in which the most dramatic breakthrough was made. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, when agricultural collectivization and large-scale industrialization proceeded apace and when Kirchheimer's "revolutionary breakthrough" was achieved, the party was anything but a well-organized, highly centralized, tightly disciplined, and efficient political machine.

Scholars have long recognized the weakness of the Soviet Communist Party in the rural areas at the time of the first five-year plan and agricultural collectivization. This weakness has been seen principally in terms of the small number of party organizations in the rural areas, which resulted in the party's low profile outside the cities: in mid-1932, only 20 percent of the newly created collective farms had a party cell or an organized group of communists, and in 1933 there were only 70 communist party members for every 10,000 population in the rural areas. (The corresponding figure for the urban areas was 670 per 10,000.)[5] The number of rural party organizations grew from 30,000 in mid-1930 to 80,000 in October 1933.[6] Many areas in the Soviet countryside did not have a permanent party organization and were visited only intermittently by party representatives. Furthermore, the rural party organs that did exist tended to be smaller than their urban counterparts, with fewer members who could be mobilized for party tasks. Some of these members had been dispatched into the countryside from the cities, and were therefore not familiar with the area in which they were working; they were thus unlikely to be particularly effective as party operatives among the peasant population.

Another type of weakness in the party at that time has received less recognition although it is central to the perceived link between development and the single party: the weakness of the organizational structure itself. It manifested itself in the way in which the party was unable to generate rules and principles that were effective in structuring its internal functioning and, over time, would develop into a normative, regulative milieu that guided the party's internal life. The clearest example of this is the absence of binding norms which could ensure that leading bodies met at the frequency demanded by the party's *Rules* and exercised the func-

[5] T. H. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the USSR, 1917-1967* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 188 and 491.

[6] *XVII s'ezd vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (b). 26 ianvaria-10 fevralia 1934g. Stenograficheskii otchet* [XVII congress of the all-union communist party (bolsheviks). 26 January-10 February 1934. Stenographic report] (Moscow, 1934), 557.

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tions they were formally accorded. The formal rules designed to structure the party's internal functioning could thus be easily subverted by political actors, a condition that suggests the weakness of the institution as an autonomous structure. The more important point for our current concern, however, is the weakness of the mechanisms that the party developed to conduct its internal administration, its domestic housekeeping. At the time of the great breakthrough, the party's bureaucracy and its internal procedures worked inefficiently and haphazardly, with the result that, in practice, the party was anything but highly centralized, tightly disciplined, or smoothly working. Its organizational sinews were much weaker than we have commonly believed. The most important aspect of this weakness is the relationship between the central party organs and those at the lower levels which bore the brunt of the pressures for socioeconomic change.

The maintenance of close and continuing communications is crucial to the existence of a tight linkage between national and subnational party organs. In most urban areas and even in many of the larger towns, this did not pose much of a problem for party organizations, but it was more difficult in the smaller towns and villages in the depths of the countryside. Many of these areas had no direct access to telegraph or telephone facilities. The railroads had been developed mainly to service perceived national concerns, leaving many parts of the rural areas without any access to that network. Most of the road system remained unsealed and therefore closed to vehicular traffic throughout much of the year; those roads that were sealed tended to service the urban network and were of little direct benefit to areas not located on the major routes between urban centers. Thus, there was no basic communications infrastructure that would have facilitated close contact between national and subnational levels.

The party attempted to overcome this problem through the so-called "living links"—personnel dispatched to the lower levels of the party structure. Central Committee instructors and inspectors, special plenipotentiaries, and field couriers sought to maintain contact between the party's central organs and those at lower levels.[7] Such personal messengers, often members of the security apparatus, carried the flow of instructions and directives from above and reports from below throughout much of the country.[8] For many organs, however, such contact could only have been episodic and intermittent, with the result that central control

[7] Organs such as the control commissions and the security apparatus, both of which had some responsibilities with regard to the work of lower-level party bodies, relied heavily on personal couriers as well. For one discussion, see Niels Erik Rosenfeldt, "Stalinism as a System of Communication," in John W. Strong, ed., *Essays on Stalin and Stalinism* (forthcoming).

[8] *Ibid.*

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and the monitoring of local activities were likely to be neither close nor continuous for many party organizations.[9]

The weakness of such direct contacts would have been a major problem for any party seeking to exercise effective control in Russia in the 1920s and 1930s. Some of the difficulties could have been alleviated somewhat had an effective personnel regime been in operation inside the party. If the central party leaders had been able to ensure that positions of responsibility at the lower levels were filled by individuals who would carry out the instructions from Moscow regardless of other considerations, the weaknesses in the communications network would have been less important. Confidence in lower-level functionaries would have rendered the need for constant monitoring less pressing. But in this sphere too, the party's capabilities and performance were clearly deficient. Despite the established wisdom that the central leadership around Stalin had developed an efficient personnel placement system through which he was able to consolidate his own central power within the party, the evidence from the 1920s and 1930s is that such a system was more fiction than fact.[10]

At base, the establishment of an efficient personnel regime inside the party depended upon the collection and maintenance of satisfactory personnel records. Without such records, rational decisions about personnel allocation could not be made. These records had to exist both at the lower levels of the party, where members joined a party organization and where most of them spent the bulk of their political lives, and at the center, where overall personnel responsibility lay. The requirement for accurate membership records at both the apex and the lower levels of the party also meant that there was a premium upon the regularized transfer of information between these levels; at a minimum, information about those who joined or left the party had to be transmitted from the local organs in which they were members to the higher-level organs, where the distribution of personnel was a primary concern. In addition to adequate and up-to-date personnel records, the center needed a regularized process of decision making on personnel questions so that the personnel regime in the party could function efficiently. None of these became firmly established in the party before the outbreak of World War II.

One of the major barriers to the development of a regularized personnel regime in the party was the high level of fluidity that characterized

[9] The same point applies to the supervisory functions exercised by middle-level party organs over those lower down in the hierarchy. For example, see *Partiinoe stroitel'stvo [PS]*, No. 16(18), August 1930, pp. 18-20.

[10] See the discussion in Graeme Gill, "Stalinism and Institutionalization: The Nature of Stalin's Regional Support," in Strong (fn. 7).

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the membership. Between the revolution and World War II, the party grew enormously; from a base of some 24,000 in 1917, the membership had reached 3,399,975 by 1940.[11] This growth was uneven and marked by spurts and slowdowns in rates of recruitment. Frequently it was conducted by "the campaign method": large numbers were enrolled at one time, with little regard for formal requirements or regular entry procedures. But the flux in membership levels was not only a function of recruitment; it also reflected the departure of members from the party. Throughout the party's history there had always been individuals who became disillusioned or disenchanted with it and left its ranks voluntarily.

When the party was in power, this effect was compounded by the forced effluxion of undesirable elements. The prewar period was studded with campaigns designed to rid the party of those deemed deficient in some respect: reregistrations of party members in 1919 and 1920; an official *chistka* or purge in 1921-1922; official verification of party cells in government and educational institutions and in villages in 1924-1927; heightened levels of vigilance among government officials, in management, and in the local organs in 1928; official *chistki* in 1929-1930 and 1933-1934; verification of party documents in 1935; exchange of party cards in 1936; and terror/*Ezhovshchina* in 1936-1938. No accurate figures are available for those leaving the party as a result of these campaigns, but the evidence that does exist suggests that the numbers were substantial. The combined effect of many individuals entering the party while many others were leaving created a significant sense of flux in the membership. The problems thus posed for the party administration in keeping accurate membership records were exacerbated by the additional need to keep track of those members who shifted their place of work or habitation, and thereby moved from one party organization to another. This problem was particularly acute during the early years of Bolshevik rule, when the mass mobilization and transfer of party members was common. This was also a feature during the period of the first five-year plan.

High levels of membership fluidity created the worst conditions possible for the development of an institutionalized mechanism for personnel management. Virtually from its establishment, such a mechanism was apt to be overwhelmed by the complexity and scale of the work it was meant to handle. As a result, the development of regularized procedures was likely to take second place to the satisfaction of immediate needs through *ad hoc* arrangements—a practice that undermined the development of regularized, efficient machinery in this area of party life.

[11] Rigby (fn. 5), 52.

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No real attempt was made to systematize personnel matters at the center until the establishment of the Central Committee organs at the VIII Congress in 1919. A part of the Central Committee Secretariat established at that time was the Records and Assignment Department (*Uchraspred*), which was to collect personal data and statistics on all party members in order to provide the basis for making decisions regarding appointments, transfers, and job posting.[12] Attempts were made to create a registration system within *Uchraspred*, but three years after its foundation an official spokesman was scathing in his criticisms of its inadequacies.[13] Throughout the prewar period, this registration system was subject to almost constant tinkering and adjustment, to the recasting of personnel categories and the shifting of institutional responsibility for the different categories—a practice that injected an almost constant sense of uncertainty and ambiguity into personnel affairs.[14] The major reorganizations within the Secretariat as a whole, in 1924, 1930, 1934, and 1939, reinforced the uncertainty. These reorganizations, plus the tinkering with the registration process itself, are a reflection of the center's dissatisfaction with the way in which the personnel regime was operating;[15] at the same time, they contributed to its poor performance. The frequent attempts at organizational restructuring created confusion and hindered the generation of regular bureaucratic norms.

An important stage in the attempt to regularize the center's personnel regime was the institutionalization of the *nomenklatura* system in 1923.[16] This system was designed to codify the responsibilities for personnel appointments of each party committee by establishing lists of positions that each committee had the right to fill. The most responsible posts were within the purview of the Central Committee; those of lesser importance were filled by committees at lower levels, albeit under CC supervision. Designed as a framework for the systematic distribution of party forces, the operation of this system suffered as a result of the reorganizations of

[12] *Deviatyi s'ezd RKP(b). Mart-aprel' 1920 goda. Protokoly* [Ninth congress of the RCP(b). March-April 1920. Protokols] (Moscow, 1960), 500.

[13] *Odinnadtsatyi s'ezd RKP(b). Mart-aprel' 1922 goda. Stenograficheskii otchet* [Eleventh congress of the RCP(b). March-April 1922. Stenographic report] (Moscow, 1961), 65.

[14] For examples of changes, see *Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika* [Handbook of the party worker] (Moscow, 1924 and 1928), Part 4, pp. 144-49, and Part 6, vol. 1, pp. 527-28, 534-46, 553-54.

[15] For example, see *Trinadtsatyi s'ezd RKP(b). Mai 1924 goda. Stenograficheskii otchet* [Thirteenth congress of the RCP(b). May 1924. Stenographic report] (Moscow, 1963), 133-34 and 808; *PS* (fn. 9), No. 2(4), February 1930, pp. 3-13; *ibid.*, No. 1, January 1934, pp. 1-7; and *XVIII s'ezd kommunisticheskoi partii (b). 10-21 marta 1939g. Stenograficheskii otchet* [XVIII congress of the communist party (b). March 10-21, 1939. Stenographic report] (Moscow, 1939), 528.

[16] *Izvestiia tsentral'nogo komiteta VKP(b) [Izv. ts. k.]* No. 1(59), January 1924, pp. 64-67; No. 4(62), April 1924, p. 41; No. 1(122), January 18, 1926, p. 4.

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the Secretariat referred to above, revisions of the *nomenklatura* lists in 1925 and possibly in 1928,[17] and general confusion and uncertainty about the range of the responsibilities of committees at different levels.[18] One of its most important weaknesses was that it relied upon the cooperation and capability of lower-level party organs and officials, upon satisfactory record-keeping at these levels, and upon the transmission of appropriate information higher up in the party structure. Many lower party organizations did not function in a fashion that enabled them to meet the center's requirements.

The deficiencies in the administration of personnel matters by lower-level party organs were clear to all in the party long before the party press of the early 1930s made it a major issue. The center's campaigns against the situation at that time are an indication of the chaos that existed in party recordkeeping.[19] Many party organs were accused of paying insufficient attention to the accurate registration and recording of party members. A number of party registers were said to be as much as 50 percent at variance with real membership figures; some of their books were cluttered with "dead souls," while others had failed to register active members. Some party members held multiple party cards; others were registered in the wrong party organs; and on occasion an individual expelled from the party by one party organ held a responsible position in another organ.[20] It is no exaggeration to say that many party registers and local party secretaries did not know who was a party member and who was not. Even when local party organizations did have adequate records, they frequently failed to notify the center of changes in personnel,[21] with the result that local records were not accurately reflected at the center. Under such circumstances, the operation of a coherent personnel system inside the party was impossible. Thus, the image of the party as a tightly organized entity is a myth because its central power axis, personnel distribution, rested on such unsatisfactory foundations.

The weakness of the party's internal regime, evident in the underdeveloped nature of its personnel system, is also evident in Moscow's increased pressure on the verification issue. In theory, party organs at higher levels were responsible for verifying that party decisions were ac-

[17] *Ibid.*, No. 1(122), January 18, 1926, pp. 2-4; No. 6-7(227-28), March 5, 1928, p. 7.

[18] *Ibid.*, No. 31-32(152-53), August 9, 1926, p. 8; and No. 45-46(166-67), November 27, 1926, p. 6.

[19] See J. Arch Getty, *Origins of the Great Purges. The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered 1933-1938* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[20] For example, *PS* (fn. 9) No. 18, September 1933, pp. 4-5; No. 16, August 1934, pp. 21-24; No. 4, February 1935, pp. 32-36; No. 11, June 1936, pp. 26-28; and *XVII s'ezd* (fn. 6), 286.

[21] For example, *PS* (fn. 9), No. 16, August 1934, p. 23.

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tually implemented by party organs at lower levels; the continuing process of monitoring the performance of the lower levels was part of the normal responsibilities of party bodies at all levels. Again, the public emphasis on this issue during the early 1930s shows a high-level concern that this aspect of party life was not being carried out satisfactorily.[22] More importantly, it reflects apprehension that lower-level party organs were not implementing many of the decisions made at the top. Although it contained a good deal of political hyperbole, Stalin's attribution of blame for the excesses of collectivization to the lower-level party leaders is the most famous complaint of this type.[23] His attack at the XVII Congress in 1934 was more wide-ranging; it addressed the nonfulfillment of party directives and the nonimplementation of the party line.[24] Stalin lambasted those who carried out party decisions in form rather than in practice, who did just enough to avoid criticism from above and covered their inactivity by excessively optimistic reports to the center. The theme that much closer monitoring was essential was picked up by other speakers and by the Congress's resolution. Such reiteration tells us that the party was experiencing severe difficulties in ensuring that decisions made at the center were actually implemented at lower levels. Some of this criticism clearly had political roots;[25] nevertheless, it reflects the essential weakness of vertical organizational linkages within the party machine at the time of the major economic breakthrough.

The weakness of the party's vertical organizational linkages meant that there was considerably more institutional incoherence at that time than has generally been realized. Because central control was weak, lower-level sections were able to exercise some degree of autonomy in day-to-day affairs. Understanding how the party operated internally at that time must therefore be based on knowledge of the way in which power was structured at the subnational levels of the party.

At those levels, party leaders were subject to significant pressures and were highly vulnerable. During the initial years of Bolshevik rule, it was not possible to develop regular procedures or stable institutions at any level of the party. The crisis atmosphere and the mounting problems with which all party leaders had to deal encouraged *ad hoc* and "quick fix" solutions rather than the generation of stable norms of institutional operation; as a result, the development of effective party housekeeping func-

[22] For example, *ibid.*, No. 3-4(5-6), February 1930, pp. 5-6; No. 7, April 1931, p. 52; No. 7-8, April 1933, p. 5; No. 11, May 1933, p. 6; No. 1, January 1934; pp. 1-7; No. 10, May 1934, p. 1; No. 13, July 1934, pp. 1-2; No. 16, August 1934, pp. 1-3; No. 18, September 1934, p. 3.

[23] See "Dizzy with Success," in J. V. Stalin, *Works* (Moscow, 1934), 12, 197-205.

[24] *XVII s'ezd* . . . (fn. 6), 133-34; also pp. 285-87, 552, and 670-71.

[25] Gill (fn. 10).

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tions was stifled. The chaos in recordkeeping was but one aspect of this problem. Furthermore, the environment, at least in the rural areas, was highly uncongenial to the party and the establishment of its authority. Traditional peasant-based bodies, which remained supreme in many rural areas throughout the 1920s, were a continuing manifestation of the reluctance by many peasants to accept the rule of what was seen as an urban-based and -oriented party. The imposition of such antipeasant policies as war communism and agricultural collectivization could only increase such resentment.

The uncongenial nature of the environment for many lower-level party organs also manifested itself in the physical and material hardships local party leaders had to endure. Living in small towns or villages with few facilities, far from major centers and with uncertain lines of communication, party leaders who had come from the cities were likely to have an acute sense of isolation and deprivation. Such feelings were exacerbated during periods of economic difficulty—for example, between the revolution and the early 1920s, and at the time of collectivization. In economic good times, these problems were less acute, but life for party members was always going to be a struggle, even when, as was frequently the case, they were better off than their nonparty neighbors. So the mere problems of survival constituted a source of pressure for many party leaders at the subnational level.

Their position was rendered more uncertain by the nature of the demands made upon them from above. The expectations of central party leaders were always optimistic, demanding of their subordinates levels of achievement that were impossible to attain. Furthermore, such demands were often made in a nonspecific fashion, so that it was impossible to establish objectively whether or to what extent a particular directive or policy had been fulfilled. As a result, party organizations and their leaders were under continual pressure to perform at high levels in a situation in which the criteria of success were uncertain. Although this may have created some scope for maneuverability and individual initiative on the part of subnational leaders, it also involved significant dangers: judgments about satisfactory performance were made at the center, and the consequences of perceived failure to perform satisfactorily could be severe.

As a result of these diverse pressures, the position of the subnational party leaders was highly vulnerable. Their usual reaction was a local centralization of power at the expense of the rank and file; in many areas plenary meetings of party bodies were held infrequently, and power became concentrated in the executive organs or the person of the local

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secretary.[26] What is important for the current discussion is the form of this centralization of power. It can be summarized in the terms used by the Soviet press in attacking this phenomenon: "familyness," "groupism," and "localism."

The essence of these subnational power structures is that, within different parts of the country, at various levels of the party, a group of individuals came together principally to establish and maintain control over the local area. Such a group might consist of the leaders of the major local organizations, the party committee, soviet, *cheka*, trade unions, and major enterprises; in effect, it therefore constituted a coalition of local bureaucratic interests. But its real hub—the dynamic through which it operated—was the personality-centered faction in local politics. Supporters gathered around a prominent leader, usually the party secretary, shoring up his position and thereby consolidating their own places in the local power structure. In turn, the local leader used his power to promote supporters, in the process firmly establishing the "family group's" dominance over local affairs.[27]

Ties between the members of these family groups were essentially personalistic rather than bureaucratic; since they rested upon personal contacts and acquaintanceships rather than being mediated through institutional structures, they functioned in an extra-bureaucratic fashion. Issues were discussed and decisions made in these informal cliques rather than in the formal organs of the party; in many cases, the latter played a purely ratificatory role. Because the party structure was central to the continuing legitimacy of the local party secretary in the eyes of his superiors, it could not be left to wither away entirely. Nevertheless, it did not dominate the activity of the local elite, as a powerful institution would have done, but acted as the instrument of that elite. Like all other political institutions based in the region, the party was distinctly subordinate to the local power elite, the family group.

In the eyes of local leaders, the family group had distinct advantages as a method of organization. Because it was able to exercise control over the economic life of the area, its members could buffer themselves against the worst effects of economic bad times. In better times, it gave them access to whatever luxuries were available. Its personalistic basis and reliance on face-to-face or personal contacts expedited the conduct of local affairs

[26] See the comments in *Izv. ts. k.* (fn. 16), No. 32, August 6, 1921, p. 8.

[27] The instance most celebrated in Western scholarship is that of Smolensk. See Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule* (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), 48-52; also Olga A. Narkiewicz, *The Making of the Soviet State Apparatus* (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1970), chap. 10.

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because it involved the use of the kind of informal channels that are normally so important for the operation of any bureaucratic structure. The leaders thus had a flexibility and adaptability they would not have possessed had they been forced to rely upon and operate through the inadequate party machinery that existed in most areas. By working through the network of personalized relationships, they could reach decisions without having recourse to or being constrained by formal rules and institutional procedures.

Such a network, especially if it spread its tentacles throughout the region, constituted a more effective means for implementing decisions than the underdeveloped party structure. By relying upon local elites and mobilizing them through personalized contacts, subnational leaders could use established local structures and processes for the implementation of decisions, which was a more effective way of getting things done at the local level than the organizational structure decreed in Moscow. The family groups were thus seen by many of their members as effective means of administering the local area. They were, therefore, also means whereby local leaders could carry out the decisions of their political masters and thereby keep Moscow satisfied with their performance. Finally, at least as important was the fact that a personalized network was useful in terms of self-protection. By controlling all of the main institutions in the area, the family group could exercise some control over the flow of information to Moscow—a prerequisite to any attempt to cover up poor performance. To this end, it also constituted a means of smoothing relations among local institutions and thereby avoiding the sort of local conflict that might attract unfavorable attention to the area on the part of the center.

The existence of a tightly formed local network did not provide an impregnable defense for subnational leaders. There are many instances in Soviet history of a local machine being attacked from without, either by local rivals acting alone or by challengers supported by the center.[28] From at least 1922 or 1923, the center has had the ability to impose a secretary upon a provincial-level party organization if it so wished; the destruction of the Zinoviev group in Leningrad in 1926 showed that such a local power network could not be maintained against sustained attack by the

[28] For one example, see A. I. Mikoian, *V nachale dvatsatykh* [In the beginning of the twenties] (Moscow, 1975), chap. 2. Such a development is also referred to at the X, XI and XII Congresses of the party. See, respectively, *Desiatyi s'ezd RKP(b). Mart 1921 goda. Stenograficheskii otchet* [Tenth congress of the RCP(b). March 1921. Stenographic report] (Moscow, 1963), 45-46; *Odinnadtsatyi* . . . (fn. 13), 371 and 402; and *Dvenadtsatyi s'ezd RKP(b). 17-25 aprelia 1923 goda. Stenograficheskii otchet* [Twelfth congress of the RCP(b). April 17-25, 1923. Stenographic report] (Moscow, 1968), 66.

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center. But the end of Zinoviev's Leningrad opposition did not sound the death knell of the power of family groups in the party. No general move against family groups as a method of organizing the party's subnational power was made until the 1930s.[29]

Even when the center replaced individual party leaders—as it did on many occasions—this action did not eliminate the conditions that had generated the formation of family groups in the first place. The pressures for performance remained within a context in which success was uncertain and survival sometimes a struggle. Someone who had replaced an ousted leader was unlikely to be happy working with the latter's cronies, and he therefore had an extra incentive to introduce his own supporters and consequently to found a new family group. Although the faces may have changed, the phenomenon of family groups dominating the subnational political structure remained in place throughout the prewar period.

The picture of the party that emerges from this analysis is one of a segmented political organization in which power was split up among a diverse array of elites at the national and subnational levels. Although the national elite had the power to interfere directly in affairs at lower levels, it could not maintain a continuing high level of involvement in or supervision of events far from the capital. Its intervention was episodic, sporadic, and intermittent rather than continuous and direct. Most of the time, lower-level party leaders and the cliques around them were left substantially on their own to implement measures decreed at the center and to perform the basic administrative tasks that were essential to the maintenance and functioning of the regime. Rather than a highly integrated, tightly organized structure, the party was segmented into parts that were much more loosely articulated than the received wisdom would suggest. But in the conditions of the times, this was sufficient to achieve the revolutionary breakthrough. In general terms, the party provided the framework for that breakthrough. Although it was only weakly represented in many parts of the country, the existence of a network of party organizations provided a basis from which an attack on the old system could be launched. Indeed, the broad nature of the attack ultimately made the internal organizational weakness of the party irrelevant. If a high level of precision had been required or an attack by surgical means had been undertaken, a tightly organized, highly integrated structure would have been called for. But because the party adopted a battering-ram approach, what was needed was organizational staging posts for dedicated activists throughout the society—and these were in place.

[29] Gill (fn. 10).

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This analysis suggests that a highly organized and integrated party structure was not essential for a revolutionary breakthrough of the type achieved in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s. What was necessary was a party presence at a multitude of points throughout the society, which could provide a framework for the direction of the energy and commitment of enthusiastic activists and for the channeling of more forceful measures. Although the center's ability to remove individual local leaders may have acted as an incentive for them to follow Moscow's line, it was unable to exercise effective continuous control within the party through organizational means. If the single party does foster rapid development, Soviet experience suggests that this is not necessarily because of a high level of internal organization and control within its structure. Paradoxically, in underdeveloped countries where central organizational controls are inevitably weak, the Soviet experience thus becomes even more relevant than it would have been had it been characterized by a highly organized, tightly disciplined party structure.

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Review Article

COMPETING IMAGES OF THE SOVIET UNION

By BARRY R. POSEN*

Jiri Hochman, *The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934-1938*. London and Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984, 253 pp.
Jonathan Haslam, *The Soviet Union and the Search for Collective Security, 1933-1939*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984, 310 pp.

TWO competing images of the Soviet Union underlie many current American debates on foreign policy and national security. The Reagan administration and those who share its ideology see today's Soviet Union as not much different from yesterday's, and yesterday's Soviet Union as not much different from Nazi Germany. Like its progenitors in the 1930s, the modern Soviet Union is a "totalitarian" state, and therefore *by nature* expansionist, armed to the teeth, disposed to violence, fond of diplomatic tests of political will, and—as a consequence of all these factors—hard to deter and harder to beat.[1] A different view prevails among most of the arms control community, the NATO allies, and some American academics. In its foreign policy, the Soviet Union is seen as a fairly typical great power whose behavior in international politics can be explained by the mixture of fear, greed, and stupidity that has characterized most great powers in the past as they have tried to secure their borders and pursue their interests in a world without law. It does not like to take great risks, it fears war, and it is, at worst, opportunistically expansionist. In sharp contrast to Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union is more conservative than reckless; if anything, nuclear weapons have reinforced this conservatism.

Competing policy preferences can often be traced to these alternative images. For example, many of those who favor ambitious strategic nuclear counterforce ("warfighting") postures and doctrine do so partly be-

* I would like to thank Gabriel Gorodetsky, John Mearsheimer, Jack Snyder, Marc Trachtenberg, and Stephen Van Evera for their comments on various drafts of this essay. I alone am responsible for the arguments offered here.

[1] This point is tidily developed by Sidney Blumenthal, "We Still See Hitler in All of Our Adversaries," *Washington Post*, May 5, 1985, pp. C1-2.

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cause they see the Soviet Union as willing to take high risks for the sake of expansion; those who favor deterrence based largely on a policy of countervalue retaliation perceive the U.S.S.R. as a rather cautious power that is not likely to bet that a collapse of Western will would neutralize the huge retaliatory destructive power that could survive any Soviet nuclear offensive. The evidence that either party to this debate presents to support its premises is quite sparse; indeed, the conflicting assumptions are seldom expressed explicitly.

Two recent books on Soviet diplomacy during the 1930s contribute to this critical debate. Both are essentially conventional works of diplomatic history; neither explicitly addresses present-day Soviet policy. But such works often contain implicit arguments about current issues and may indirectly affect our position in current debates. That is especially true of diplomatic or military histories of the 1930s, a period that still elicits tremendous emotion, and from which many simplistic lessons about U.S. postwar foreign policy have been drawn.[2]

What was the aim of the Soviet Union in the 1930s—a risky collusion with Hitler in the hope of successful expansion, or a defense (however inept) of the status quo as the means to protect Soviet security? Jiri Hochman argues the first position and Jonathan Haslam the second. Both present strikingly different *explanations* of Soviet behavior. Hochman contends that Soviet totalitarianism was the culprit that propelled Soviet foreign policy. Haslam emphasizes the primacy of the constraints and incentives presented by the international political environment (as do many diplomatic histories); but he is less explicit and consistent than he ought to be.

Although neither of the authors makes a strong enough case to settle either the "what?" or the "why?" of Soviet foreign policy in the 1930s, their arguments will be of interest to those seeking enlightenment on the nature and origins of Soviet foreign policy today. Reaganites will find comfort in the continuity of Soviet foreign policy—from Hochman's prewar image to their own postwar perception of a scheming and malign expansionist. Those of a more moderate persuasion will be satisfied by Haslam's image of a status quo state intending to deter Hitler if it can, or to fight in a coalition against him if it must. If, under Stalin's ruthless leadership, and in a time of international political tumult that presented foreign policy risks as well as opportunities, security took precedence over expansion in Soviet foreign policy, then under his less demonic successors Soviet foreign policy could be expected to be even more conservative. Those still trying to make up their minds will find that together, the two

[2] Ernest May, *"Lessons" of the Past* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), esp. 19-51.

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volumes present an instructive—if frustrating—experience. Each of the two arguments is far more comprehensive than the opening statements of any debate, but the absence of rebuttal leaves the reader constantly wondering how each author would respond to certain arguments of the other that he has failed to consider in his initial remarks.

Overview

Similar titles, particularly the term "collective security," and coverage of roughly the same time period, would suggest that these books have a similar structure and address similar issues, even though they disagree. But a careful examination reveals different underlying premises that are themselves partially responsible for their divergent conclusions. The two authors basically disagree about how to interpret the pattern of Soviet behavior. The period 1933-1939 was characterized by relatively intense efforts on the part of the Soviet Union to induce France and Britain to cooperate, through traditional treaties of alliance and the League of Nations, in containing German expansion. However, the period also witnessed Soviet flirtations with Hitler in various efforts to reach a *modus vivendi*. Hochman sees these contacts as the natural descendant of the Rapallo policy, the obvious foundation for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and thus as the main line of Soviet foreign policy during the period. The diplomacy of "collective security" was merely the means to a nefarious end.

In Jonathan Haslam's view, the Soviet Union's efforts to deal with the West were the main line of its policy; he considers the flirtations with Hitler to have been a natural reaction to the diffidence of the French and British to Soviet overtures and to France's and Britain's apparent willingness to collaborate with Hitler.

These opposing perceptions of Soviet behavior are partly explained by the authors' fundamentally different standards of judgment. Hochman begins by judging Soviet foreign policy by "idealist" standards; Haslam employs power-political standards. Hochman takes the term "collective security" literally; he implicitly defines it in terms of the idealistic public image of a cooperative system of like-minded states uniting to oppose aggression and preserve the international peace that prevailed in the 1930s. He indicts the Soviet Union for its failure to live up to these exacting standards. By this criterion, it is no surprise that the indictment is easily upheld; indeed, France and Britain did not live up to this standard either. (Hochman also asserts that Stalin's extreme deviance from liberal democratic values at home inevitably doomed cooperation with the democracies against Hitler.)

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Haslam's definition of collective security is more elastic—so much so that one could argue that his book is mistitled; it ought to be called "the Soviet contribution to the botched effort to contain Hitler." Under the guidance of Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Union involved itself in the League of Nations, the key vehicle of collective security. Haslam judges this involvement by "realist" standards: to prove that the U.S.S.R. was basically a "status quo" power, he considers it sufficient that Moscow made what appears to have been a serious effort to contain Hitler. Absolute fidelity to League principles is not essential.

For Hochman, on the other hand, the Soviets' failure to live up to the ideals of the League of Nations is almost sufficient to demonstrate that they were eager coconspirators of the Nazis—at best trying to cause a war between Germany and the Anglo-French coalition that would leave the West ripe for communist penetration, and at worst striving for totalitarian condominium with the Nazis.

Haslam interprets the Soviet-German accord of 1939 as simply another manifestation of realpolitik, rendered attractive to the Soviet Union by the apparent unwillingness of France and Britain to risk war from 1933 to 1939, as well as by their ideologically motivated reluctance to ally themselves firmly with Russia, and the justifiable impression that they were trying to turn Hitler toward the East. Haslam's "realist" perspective on Soviet foreign policy, however, does not preclude a subtle harshness on his part regarding the French and British leadership. In that sense, he remains in the early postwar Western diplomatic-history tradition in which one could scarcely discuss appeasement without the display of open contempt for its practitioners. He also subscribes to the argument that conservative British and French statesmen were strongly disposed against cooperation with the Soviet Union for ideological reasons, and were in effect unable to perceive the far greater danger posed by fascism.

Both of the authors are guilty of myopia. Hochman is bent on making villains of the Soviets, regardless of how far he has to push the available evidence to do so. Haslam takes a more positive approach, portraying Maxim Litvinov as something of a hero (which is an exaggeration), and failing to analyze aggressively the Soviet diplomatic flirtations with Hitler throughout the period. This last is perhaps the principal inadequacy of his book; it makes for tremendous frustration in efforts to compare the arguments of the two authors. Because Hochman allocates considerable space to these episodes, a reader hungers for Haslam's views on them, and is surprised not to find a summary statement, and explanation, that dismisses Soviet approaches to Germany as unimportant. Instead, Haslam scatters his discussion of Soviet-German contacts throughout the book;

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his analysis is less penetrating than one would expect, considering the questions these contacts raise about his main argument. It is strange that Haslam did not anticipate such doubts and counter them in advance.

A final introductory point is in order. Both Hochman and Haslam write in a style often found in works of diplomatic history. The arguments they have in mind are frequently neither clear nor explicit. Although presumed cause-and-effect relationships are buried in their work, they are not developed in an organized way. Instead, they are themes that pervade the work. It is possible to deal with the 1930s from a different perspective, however—that of political science, especially recent American international relations theory. Such an approach permits a synthetic explanation for the patterns of behavior that both authors observe, and helps to explain the similarity of French, British, and Soviet behavior.

One reason the two authors have such a difficult time in persuasively casting blame on or establishing the innocence of different actors is found in the influence that two mutually reinforcing environmental factors exerted on all actors in the 1930s. These factors contributed to the unsavory behavior that Hochman traces to the nature of the Soviet state and that Haslam explains as a perfectly understandable response to British and French ideological antipathy. They also contributed to the success of the bloodless phase of Hitler's hegemonic career.

The first is that the structure of the system was multipolar in an extreme sense, even more than the pre-World War I period had been. As Kenneth Waltz has argued, a system of many actors makes for slow reaction as each falls prey to the temptation to give another the honor of opposing expansionists, and to the suspicion that others are acting in the same way.[3]

The second important environmental factor, perhaps an even more significant change from the pre-World War I period, was the widespread belief in the strength of the defense on the battlefield. Stephen Van Evera has pointed out that the cult of the offensive caused early, relatively tight alliances and quick military reactions before 1914.[4] Not so in the 1930s. Statesmen as well as the military perceived that a war would not be won either quickly or cheaply. The benefit of getting someone else to gnaw at the aggressor was thus seen to be high, while the risk that an important actor would quickly succumb to military conquest was perceived to be low. Thus, buck-passing was further encouraged.

[3] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 161-76.

[4] Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," in Steven E. Miller, ed., *Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 58-108.

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As I have argued elsewhere, and as Arnold Wolfers argued long ago, the pattern of behavior that both Hochman and Haslam observe in Soviet relations with Britain and France in the 1930s may also be observed between the two Western allies.[5] Each desperately hoped to avoid war with Hitler; each was willing to sacrifice the independence of other states in the hope of doing so; each was vitally concerned as to who would pay the blood price if war came; and each tried to ensure that it would pay less than the others. Ruthless though this behavior was, in all three cases it is best described as "ruthless caution"; the fundamental lesson to be learned about Soviet foreign policy is its propensity toward caution. The similarity of France's and Britain's behavior to that of the Soviet Union does not satisfy "second-image" or state-level explanations that stress ideology or national character. It suggests instead that environmental factors, which can exert a parallel influence on all actors, may be the most powerful causes at work.

A discussion of three key areas will serve to highlight the differences in the authors' treatments of many events of this period: the Soviet purges (especially the purge of the military) and their effect abroad; the issue of military geography (especially the physical separation of the Soviet Union from Czechoslovakia); and, finally, the Czech crisis itself.

The Purges

The Purges of 1937-1939 savaged the higher ranks of the Soviet officer corps: one-quarter to one-third were executed; 60 percent of those with rank of division commander and above were removed from their posts. Did the decline in Russian military capability that this upheaval implied cause British and French unwillingness to ally themselves with the Soviet Union?

Hochman argues, with abundant and persuasive documentary evidence, that the effect of the purges on the Soviet image in the West was profoundly negative; in fact, he considers them to have been the fundamental reason why France and Britain saw the Soviet Union as a bad prospective ally. That is not entirely convincing because French and British diplomats and military officers at the time were quite creative in devising reasons not to act to oppose Hitler. Haslam offers a more nuanced (and plausible) argument to the effect that the poor opinion of the Soviet military that followed from the purges was just one of many causes of West-

[5] Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Arnold Wolfers, *Britain and France Between Two Wars: Conflicting Strategies of Peace Since Versailles* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1940).

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ern diffidence; pure ideological opposition and the strong belief in the natural permanence of Soviet-German, communist-fascist antipathy was dominant. He also points out that Western doubts about the combat capability of the Soviet army pre-dated the purge (p. 140)—a fact that Hochman overlooks. Haslam does not explore the implications of the special form of the West's low opinion: both French and British observers of the 1936 maneuvers went to great pains to denigrate Soviet *offensive* capability (p. 140); this was precisely the capability they needed from the Soviet Union. Western statesmen feared a replay of the trench-fighting of World War I. In their military planning they strove to avoid having to pay this price in any new war with Germany. The Soviet Union would be an ally formidable enough to make them feel comfortable in standing up to Hitler only if it could be induced to play a major role in his ultimate destruction; it had to be able to *attack* Germany. The West's assessment of the Soviets' poor offensive capability in 1936 almost certainly had reduced their alliance appeal before the purge of the military reinforced French and British doubts.

Hochman turns his argument that the purges had substantial diplomatic consequences into evidence that the Soviet Union was not serious about collective security. He maintains that if Stalin had really cared, he should have understood the effect of the purges on his alliance appeal abroad, and stopped the bloodletting. Hochman's interpretation of the purge as a step toward the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is thus rendered more plausible.

Indeed, Hochman asserts that the purges as a whole were a preparatory measure for the rapprochement with Hitler that *Stalin had already planned*. The destruction of the Bolshevik old guard—likely to oppose a pact with fascism on ideological grounds—is taken to confirm this hypothesis. Here Hochman borrows heavily from Robert Tucker's introduction to *The Great Purge Trial*, and from an assessment by the German diplomat Gustav Hilger.[6] Indeed, like Tucker, Hochman goes so far as to suggest that the purges were a method of communicating Stalin's interest in a rapprochement to Hitler.[7] Hochman maintains that the purges

[6] Tucker, "Stalin, Bukharin and History as Conspiracy," Introduction to Robert C. Tucker and Stephen F. Cohen, eds., *The Great Purge Trial* (New York: Grosett & Dunlap, 1963), xxxiii-xl. Hilger's brief discussion seems to propose that the purge of the foreign office ultimately served the policy rather than that it was consciously designed to do so. See Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer, *The Incompatible Allies: A Memoir-History of German-Soviet Relations 1918-1941* (New York: Macmillan, 1953), 292-93.

[7] In a later essay, Tucker further develops the hypothesis that Stalin saw cooperation with Hitler as a useful means to improve the prospects for successful Soviet expansion; he traces this policy back to Stalin's veto of a united front of the German Communist Party and the German Social Democratic Party against the Nazis. See Tucker, "The Emergence of Stalin's

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"performed a specific role in asserting the pro-Nazi orientation in the Soviet foreign policy ..." (p. 123). To support this contention, he cites Tucker, who argues that Stalin "wanted to use [the trials] as a means of communicating to Hitler the seriousness of his interest in a collaborative arrangement. ..."[8] Although both Hochman and Tucker admit that Stalin also had powerful domestic political reasons for initiating the purge, they stress the foreign policy motive to an extent that other students of the period find implausible.[9] Even if this interpretation were correct, however, it would not explain the spread of the purges to the armed forces, or their fury toward the military. The purge of the armed forces does not appear to have followed any special pattern; anti-German elements were not singled out *per se*.[10] Indeed, one could argue that purging the army with such violence would not so much attract Hitler's cooperation as his contempt. Moreover, this action contradicted Stalin's tremendous industrial efforts toward military preparedness. Thus, considerable doubt is cast on Hochman's interpretation.

Military Geography

The second area on which the two authors disagree concerns the impact of geography on the alliance-worthiness of the Soviet Union and the "adequacy" of the Soviet effort to reduce the obstacles to military cooperation that were imposed by geography. Put simply, Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia stood between the Soviet Union and Germany. The Soviet Union could become an important force against Germany only if it could overcome the natural reluctance of Poland and Rumania to permit large numbers of Soviet troops on their soil.

Central to Hochman's discussion is his useful contribution to the issue whether the railroad network from the Soviet Union through Rumania to Czechoslovakia could have supported a major military intervention. The conventional wisdom has long been that it could not.[11] Relying on

Foreign Policy," *Slavic Review* 36 (December 1977), 563-90; also the commentaries by George Kennan, Philip S. Gillette, Alexander Dallin, and Teddy Uldricks (pp. 591-603), and Tucker's reply (pp. 604-7). Both Dallin and Uldricks challenge Tucker's analysis.

[8] Tucker (fn. 6), xxxviii. Tucker cites no source for this conclusion.

[9] Adam Ulam and many others simply disagree with the hypothesis that the purge was conducted with an eye toward rapprochement with Hitler. See Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence* (New York: Praeger, 1968), 238, 240. Gerhard Weinberg agrees with Hochman's thesis that the purges profoundly influenced Russia's attractiveness to the West as an ally, but believes that the purge "had its roots in domestic not foreign, policy issues." Weinberg, *The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Starting World War II, 1937-1939* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 213.

[10] Albert Seaton, *Stalin as Warlord* (London: Batsford, 1976), 85.

[11] George F. Kennan relied on the opinion of the German military attaché to Prague to the

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figures included in a Rumanian communication to the Soviets to the effect that they would be permitted to move a limited number of troops through Rumania in the event of a war arising from the Czech crisis, Hochman argues that 250,000-350,000 Soviet troops could have been moved into Czechoslovakia, and supported there, by means of this transportation system. Although his discussion of this issue is worthwhile, a common-sense review of the document suggests grounds for skepticism (Hochman, Appendix C, 194-201, "Text of a Note of the Rumanian Government to the Government of the Soviet Union," September 24, 1938).[12]

In fact, the Rumanians had given permission to the Soviets to move only 100,000 men through their country in six days, but insisted that if the figure were not reached in six days, no more could be moved. One suspects that they doubted that the figure could be reached. Moreover, Hochman pays no attention to the fact that the Russian rail gauge differed from the Rumanian (a different gauge from the European norm is a longstanding Russian policy that continues to this day), which would have necessitated switching trains at the border.[13] Finally, it is unclear how much rolling stock the Rumanians and the Czechs were to contribute to this operation—an essential factor in view of the differing rail gauges. Judging from the note, the Rumanians seem to have expected the rest of the troops (150,000 or more) to be moved by air. This was almost certainly out of the question technically because of the sparse airlift capabilities of all countries at that time. Indeed, no military airlift of this magnitude was attempted throughout the entire Second World War. Although it seems clear that a good bit might have been accomplished with the proper organization, Hochman's assertion that, "if an air corridor were also opened, and both routes were available to the Soviets, a force of 250,000–350,000 men with equipment could be moved in twelve days," is unwarranted (p. 61). If as many as 200,000 could have been moved by rail

effect that the Rumanian railroad network would not have permitted the passage of more than one Soviet division (perhaps 20,000 men, including support troops) in three months. See Kennan, *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin* (New York: Mentor, 1961), 304-5.

[12] Hochman makes much of this note in his effort to show that the passage issue was basically resolved during the crisis. This is unwarranted. The quantitative (100,000 men) and temporal (six days) restrictions placed on the Soviets are so narrow that no military organization would conceivably commit itself to battle the German army under those conditions. The note is as peculiar as it is revealing. It does suggest, however, that the Rumanian military had a much less pessimistic view of the capacity of their railroad network than did subsequent historians.

[13] Albert Seaton, *The Russo-German War 1941-45* (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 58, n. 16. Rumanian railroad builders chose the standard European gauge in the 1870s when they began building their first railroads; it is still used in Rumania. *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropaedia*, s.v. "Railroads and Locomotives" (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1976), Vol. 15, 477, 482.

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in twelve days and subsequently resupplied with the essentials of combat, that would have been a major achievement.[14] If this reduced figure could have been deployed, however, it might indeed have "decisively reduced German supremacy over the Czechoslovak army," as Hochman asserts (p. 61).[15]

Hochman's analysis of the Rumanian transportation system is central to his indictment of the Soviet Union because it permits him to magnify the impact of the sin of omission committed by the Soviets in not settling a longstanding territorial dispute with Rumania. The province of Bessarabia, populated mainly by ethnic Moldavians (one of the two major Rumanian ethnic groups) had been detached from Russia in the chaos of 1918. By Rumanian accounts, nearly 80 percent of the population was Moldavian; by Soviet estimates, roughly 50 percent. The Soviet Union refused to accept the loss of the territory. Hochman argues that, had the Soviets really cared about collective security, they should have done everything possible to facilitate aid to Czechoslovakia consistent with their 1935 treaty with France and Czechoslovakia. He maintains that they should have settled the Bessarabia issue by renouncing their claim altogether—an act that would have also proved their commitment to the principle of national self-determination proclaimed by the League of Nations. In view of Russia's longstanding control of the area and virtual unanimity between Reds and Whites on the validity of the claim, this would seem too high a standard to set for any Great Power. Moreover, it is still doubtful that such concessions would have elicited substantial Rumanian cooperation in the event of trouble over Czechoslovakia.

Haslam judges the Soviets less harshly on this matter; he suggests that they showed a willingness to set the issue aside for purposes of cooperation against aggression and to give assurances that Soviet forces would withdraw East of the Dnestr (the 1938 border) at the conclusion of any

[14] Although I have been unable to turn up more details on the Rumanian railroad network, I doubt that 200,000 men, their weapons, supplies, and ammunition, could have been moved in twelve days. But the Rumanian note does suggest that Rumanian staff officers believed that militarily meaningful numbers could have been transported. In footnote 9, p. 214, Hochman cites estimates of the railroad line's capacity that range from a low of 6 to a high of 30 divisions in 30 days. This large band of uncertainty implies that as few as 50,000 or as many as 240,000 troops could be moved in 12 days. The smaller number would not have done much to improve the Czech situation. Moreover, once combat began, much of the line's capacity would have had to be given over to resupply.

[15] The Germans had about 71 first- and second-class divisions, the Czechs about 36 first- and second-class divisions. If 200,000 Soviet troops could have been moved overland and continuously resupplied, they might have added 9 or 10 divisions to Czech strength. This would no doubt have been a great help and might well have tipped the scales against an initial German breakthrough. Over time, however, massive French intervention in the west would have been required to prevent the Germans from building new divisions and deploying them to the Czech border.

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fighting. In effect, he sees Moscow as offering a compromise that left the issue open, but committed the Soviet Union not to resolve it by force. Objectively, no more would have been accomplished if the Soviets had signed their rights away, since the end of any military operation would still have found their military forces squarely on the disputed terrain; no power present in the region had sufficient military strength to compel their departure. Although he does not state his position clearly, Haslam seems content that the actual pattern of Soviet behavior is sufficient proof of Moscow's basic inclination to oppose Hitler.

Hochman's account of the on-again, off-again Soviet-Rumanian negotiations on Bessarabia is much more detailed than Haslam's; it mainly shows that Rumania desperately wanted the Soviets to relinquish their claim to the territory as the price for a promise of cooperation against possible future German aggression. In retrospect, it seems a perverse ordering of priorities that the Soviets viewed this as too high a price; but it is not sufficient proof that they really were not serious about containing Hitler.

Even more intractable geographic issues emerged in Poland. Although Soviet-Polish hostility was quite muted from 1932 to 1938, deep nationalist antipathy, ideological differences, and the memory of recent bloody conflict combined to make any sort of Soviet-Polish cooperation difficult. Hochman condemns the Russians for their failure to develop some mechanism to ease Polish fears; other than the assertion that a generous settlement with Rumania would have set a good example, he does not elaborate on the type of mechanism he has in mind. Haslam essentially argues that there is no issue here; cooperation of any sort was improbable. Indeed, mutual antipathy was more or less inevitable due to the political unrest in Poland in which the Polish Communist Party participated—thus automatically implicating the Soviet Union. Poland's political control of millions of Ukrainians and Byelorussians was also a source of Polish fear, since the Poles correctly suspected that the Soviets wanted to reannex these people and the areas they inhabited.

In general, the Soviet position on these questions was that Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania were allies of France, and that it was mainly the task of France to win passage for Soviet troops. Hochman holds the Soviets to a higher standard. His argument on Rumania has some merit; on Poland it has less. Even if the Soviets had exercised strict control over Polish communists, Polish fears would probably not have been assuaged. Moreover, Haslam correctly points out (and Hochman ignores) that Poland was not simply a status-quo power at that time. She had expansionist interests of her own, and even showed some desire to

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profit from German expansion[16]—a fact that inevitably complicated Soviet decision making vis-à-vis Poland. It is always difficult to guess whether concessions to a neighboring state of uncertain proclivities will create an ally, add to the strength of a possible enemy, or feed its greed.

Beyond Hochman's argument that the Soviets simply did not want to oppose the Germans, and Haslam's apparent belief that concessions on Bessarabia were too much to ask and antipathy from Poland too difficult to overcome, one may develop a strategic rationale for Soviet reluctance that is still consistent with opposition to Hitler. The Soviets may not have moved expeditiously to settle these issues for fear of conveying the impression to the West that they would resist German expansion on their own, without allied help. Western actions contributed to Soviet fears of betrayal. The British showed an inclination to permit Hitler to make advances in the east if he would only behave in the west. Britain exerted a restraining hand whenever France appeared ready to stand firm against Germany, and discouraged the development of the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935. The French themselves showed only intermittent enthusiasm for the Pact after it was signed. Stalin, no more and no less noble than the Western allies, did not want to fight Hitler alone. The Soviet Union, by putting the burden of winning passage to Germany on the French government, ensured that France would be included in any resistance to Hitler.

It is true, of course, that such a pattern of diplomacy might have involved France in a conflict with Germany and then permitted the U.S.S.R. to sit it out. But this risk was nearly unavoidable in view of the territorial buffers that separated Russia from Germany. Indeed, even if the Soviets had wanted to do so, there was almost no way they could have guaranteed their involvement in the war. Rumania would have had to turn her railroad network over to Moscow long in advance of hostilities, and the Soviets would have had to move several tens of thousands of men to the Czech-German border at the first sign of German designs on Czechoslovakia. This would have been difficult to arrange no matter what concessions the Soviet Union could have made on Bessarabia. France not only feared Soviet defection, but also doubted Britain's reliability: the latter, too, had no common borders with Germany and also had the option of riding out a future land war. Above all, France aimed, in her foreign and military policy, to avoid conveying the impression to Britain that France would slay the dragon alone.

[16] The Poles had designs on Lithuania and on parts of Czechoslovakia, and indeed received a piece of the latter when the Germans took the Sudetenland. See Haslam, 160-62, 197; Weinberg (fn. 9), 203-9.

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The Czech Crisis of 1938

Both Hochman and Haslam devote an entire chapter to the 1938 crisis over Czechoslovakia—the focal event of the 1930s. As usual, the authors have different perspectives. Hochman argues that the Soviet Union bears a huge part of the responsibility for British, French, and Czech behavior at Munich. Haslam maintains that the Soviets conveyed fairly strong messages that they would oppose Germany if the allies and Czechoslovakia also chose to do so. Indeed, he suggests that they might have been willing to help Czechoslovakia if she had chosen to fight alone—at least to the extent of providing advisors and equipment in the manner of their aid to the Spanish Republic.

Hochman contends that, to Czechoslovakia and the allies, Soviet diplomacy appeared to be dilatory; they therefore believed they would have to fight Germany alone—a fearful prospect to be avoided at all costs. Neither account of Soviet behavior during the crisis is conclusive. In the end, the reader is forced to choose from rival interpretations of (and weights assigned to) ambiguous statements by key actors that the authors found in diplomatic documents, memoirs, and journals and newspapers of the period. Hochman is quite convincing in disputing the rather outlandish postwar assertions by the Soviets that they would have sent forces to the aid of Czechoslovakia even in the absence of French and British assistance. Soviet diplomacy shows no such intentions throughout the entire period. As we have seen, Haslam intimates that aid in the form of war materiel and advisors in the manner of Soviet aid to the Spanish Republic might have been forthcoming. That seems fairly plausible when we consider the capacity of the rail line through Rumania, the Rumanian note of September 24, 1938, indicating a willingness to permit limited use of the line, and an obvious Soviet interest in bleeding the Germans if the war did drag on.

Hochman and Haslam clash on the question whether, contingent on French assistance, the Soviet Union would honor its 1935 treaty commitment to aid Czechoslovakia. Hochman cites as evidence two conversations—one between the French chargé d'affaires in Moscow (Payart) and Litvinov, the other between French Foreign Minister Bonnet and Litvinov in Geneva. The two French officials report that in both of these meetings the Soviets seemed to be trying to wiggle out of their commitment. Hochman takes these observations at face value. Haslam, relying on Czech and French documents, notes that the French ambassador to Moscow (Coulondre), on his return to that city, determined that Litvinov had been misunderstood, and reported this to Paris (p. 180). Interestingly, Hochman cites the memoirs of the Czech ambassador to Moscow (Fier-

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linger), written years later, to the effect that Coulondre believed exactly the opposite (p. 159). Litvinov's account of the Geneva meeting indicates that he did not try to squirm out of the Soviet commitment, but reaffirmed it. In effect, the reader is forced to decide whose account of this meeting is true—Litvinov's or Bonnet's. Although each author seems to believe that the answer is self-evident, it is not.

The original treaty included a potential escape clause requiring a League recommendation before any of the signatories were obliged to lend assistance to any other. In at least the first of the two meetings, Litvinov apparently stuck to the letter of the treaty, a position that Hochman holds against him. True, a League recommendation would have taken time, but the French assumption that a German-Czech war would be over too quickly for League action is open to question. Hochman accepts it uncritically. In effect, Hochman has adopted the French premise as his own even though it made little sense in view of French beliefs about the advantages held by a defender in ground warfare. Because of the absence of a Russian-German border and the terms of the 1935 treaty, France simply had no way to guarantee Soviet involvement in the war.

To support his argument that the Soviet Union in fact did not intend to provide military assistance to Czechoslovakia, Hochman assesses the extent of Soviet military preparations during the crisis. Based on different sources, the two authors again come to diametrically opposed conclusions. Historians tend to make much of this point since military preparations of one kind or another were made not only by Britain and France in late September 1938, but even by Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland.[17] Haslam relies on Soviet documentary sources (including directives from Moscow to the military districts) to the effect that approximately 60 Soviet divisions were put on alert during the crisis, with 300,000 reservists called up. Since German and Polish sources reported little if any abnormal military activity in the Soviet Union during the crisis, Hochman concludes that none occurred.[18] Hence he doubts that the Soviets were serious about fulfilling their commitment to France and Czechoslovakia, even if these two states agreed to fight Hitler, and even if the access problem could be solved.

We have some reason to question all of this documentary evidence. Directives may have been sent to the military districts, but it does not necessarily follow that much military activity ensued. The effects of the purge on the military command structure could conceivably have slowed down the mobilization system. Alternatively, there simply may be more

[17] Ibid., 417-18, 427, 449.
[18] This is the conventional wisdom. See, for example, Seaton (fn. 13), 6-7.

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to the story than the Soviets have revealed; a series of on-again, off-again orders for military preparations may have been transmitted as the situation changed.[19] The competence of Polish intelligence services inside the Soviet Union is also open to question. In the case of German sources, there is a possibility that German observers in the Soviet Union were not telling Hitler the whole truth (Haslam, 141). These people had their own agenda and were unable to tell whether to exaggerate or to minimize the Soviet threat in order to influence Hitler in the direction of the restraint they preferred. It also ought to be recalled that German intelligence on the Soviet military was not outstanding. All German consulates in Russia had been closed in March 1938 (Haslam, 155). Where, then, could German information have come from? In 1941 the Germans were surprised both by the number of divisions and the quality of equipment that they found in the Red Army.[20]

It is also not clear how much Hochman's case is supported even if the Soviet Union did make only few military preparations. The Soviets seem to have doubted that Germany could achieve a quick victory over Czechoslovakia.[21] Most military experts in Europe believed that the defense had a strong advantage on the battlefield. Even the Germans had yet to develop any special faith in the combination of weapons and tactics that was

[19] The Soviets have had plenty of time to doctor the evidence; several historians with whom I have discussed this possibility believe, however, that the Soviet documents that are released are generally reliable. It may or may not be significant that Haslam only cites messages from Moscow to the military districts; he does not cite any responses that would confirm that the messages had been received or that they had been acted upon.

[20] It is by no means clear that foreign intelligence services in 1938 had an easy way to assess the degree of activity in the military districts. Military communications in the Soviet Union moved largely over land lines at this time. Stalin sent almost all his personal communications by telegraph-printer. Radios were primitive, unreliable, and scarce. Foreign intelligence would have had to tap the telegraph lines if military orders were to be intercepted—no mean feat in the Stalinist police state of 1938. Similarly, one suspects that it was not easy to gather intelligence directly in the Soviet Union at that time. On the Soviet military communications system, see Seaton (fn. 10), 102-3. He discusses the general inadequacy of German intelligence on the Soviet Union in *The Russo-German War 1941-45* (fn. 13), chap. 3, pp. 43-49. F. H. Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War, Its Influence on Strategy and Operations*, Vol. I (London: HMSO, 1979), explains that one cause of the sparse British intelligence on the Soviet Union was "her rigorous security measures" (p. 451). He also implies that the Russians were not generating much radio traffic in the late 1930s, relying mainly on land lines (p. 54). Seaton and Hinsley agree on these points.

[21] Haslam cites two Pravda editorials that appeared during the crisis (September 27 and 29, 1938) to support this proposition. He attributes the first to Litvinov, although it appeared under a pseudonym: "Even a struggle against Czechoslovakia alone would not be easy for her [Germany] and would drag on for months" (pp. 190-91). He attributes the second, "The Defense Capability of Czechoslovakia," to the Defense Commissariat: "In all caution and despite widely held opinion, one can draw the following conclusion: if Germany starts a war against Czechoslovakia, then this war could continue for an unforeseen period as has the war in Spain" (pp. 192-93). Hilger reports that Stalin persisted in this belief in a strong defensive advantage, expecting that Poland, France, and Yugoslavia would do a better job holding up the Germans than they eventually did. See Hilger, in Hilger and Meyer (fn. 6), 312, 318, 326.

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later to be known as Blitzkrieg. In view of the experience of the Spanish Civil War, the strength of the Czech fortification system, the high quality of Czech armaments, the possibility that some German forces would be tied down watching the French frontier, and the fact that the German army was still in the process of building itself up from the lean years of the Versailles Treaty restraints, this overall expectation of a slow German offensive was not altogether foolish.[22] The important point is that Stalin and his advisors had reason to believe it and seem to have believed it. (See fn. 21.) Had the war been "slow," Soviet help in the form of air power, replenishment arms and munitions, and raw materials of all kinds could have helped Czechoslovakia to keep on fighting.[23] Hochman's own analysis of the Rumanian railroad network suggests that this kind of material would not have been difficult to move. Moreover, it would have faced far less political resistance from Rumania than the movement of troops. Troops could have come later, if and as events demonstrated their strategic importance. Open warfare and the specter of Czech defeat might have reduced Rumanian opposition to the movement of troops to an extent that could never have been accomplished by Soviet promises.

Concluding Observations

No summary statement can do justice to the range of disagreement between the two authors. Several overarching observations are in order, however. First, the inventiveness and thoroughness of Hochman's re-

[22] In terms of active and reserve divisions and major items of ground weaponry, it is unlikely that the Germans outnumbered the Czechs by more than two to one in the fall of 1938. Milan Hauner, "Czechoslovakia as a Military Factor in British Considerations of 1938," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 2 (September 1978), 194-223; Albert Seaton, *The German Army* (New York: New American Library, 1982), 92-95; Norman Rich, *Hitler's War Aims* (New York: Norton, 1973), 118.

[23] According to Hochman, Soviet aid similar to that which had been provided to the Spanish Republic was exactly the outcome feared by Czech President Beneš (pp. 162-63). Like everyone else in Europe at the time, the Czechs had no interest in fighting Germany by themselves. But it seems improbable that fear of Soviet free-riding was the dominant concern of the Czechs, since their alliance with France was tighter and longer-lived, and the French were—contrary to Hochman's judgment—far better placed geographically to make war on Germany than was the Soviet Union. Had the Czechs decided to fight alone, *after a French betrayal*, and had the Soviets limited their assistance to logistical support, the Soviets would have merited no special honor. Nevertheless, the expectation of even this limited amount of foreign assistance would have made an independent Czech decision to resist Germany militarily a more reasonable one. In view of the demographic and industrial disparities between Czechoslovakia and Germany, one can hardly condemn Beneš for the choice he made. Nevertheless, the willingness to wage war has been the price of national independence in the modern international political system. The leaders of Czechoslovakia declined to pay that price; a year later, under equally hazardous conditions, the leaders of Finland chose to pay. Even in the absence of assured allies, the ultimate Czech decision was not self-evidently correct, and the prospect of even limited Soviet aid made it less so.

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search into several questions that have received too little detailed investigation is commendable: the capacity of the Rumanian rail networks, the extent of Soviet military preparations during the Czech crisis, and the history of Soviet-Rumanian contacts on the issue of passage are the most noteworthy examples. Haslam does not deal with these issues nearly so thoroughly.

Hochman's case, however, does not stand up as well as Haslam's, although that is not always a result of Haslam's superior research or analysis. Hochman's book aims to indict the Soviet Union for *substantial* complicity in the failure of collective security. While it is quite common for historians to make arguments in the course of writing history—and both Haslam and Hochman do so—in some instances Hochman reaches so far in his effort to discredit the Soviet Union, that the tendentiousness of particular arguments inevitably promotes skepticism toward the remainder of the case. One particularly egregious example will illustrate the problem.

In his discussion of the passage issue, Hochman accepts and reaffirms the French government's contention in 1938 that the Soviet Union was better placed geographically to help Czechoslovakia than was France because the Soviet Union had "no deep German territory to cross" (p. 156). This proposition is congenial to Hochman because it raises Soviet responsibility for that country's fate while it reduces French responsibility. But the argument is preposterous. The notion that the only, or even the best, way to help Czechoslovakia in the event of a German attack was to move troops to that country to defend it against the advancing Germans is simply silly. France, with her entire army in position to threaten Germany from her own territory, was far better placed to help Czechoslovakia than was the U.S.S.R. The way to do this, of course, was to attack Germany in the event of a German invasion of Czechoslovakia. A determined attack would have drawn off substantial German forces, thus improving the Czech prospects for resistance. As we know from France's behavior a year later during Germany's attack on Poland, the French were not willing to mount such an attack. Indeed, they were not willing to mount any attack. They did not intend to shed much blood or treasure to defend their allies in the east. Hochman goes beyond forceful argument to outright bias in his acceptance of the French rationale.

It would be unfair to conclude this review without observing that there are deficiencies in Haslam's approach as well. As mentioned earlier, Haslam does not adequately discuss or explain the series of Soviet approaches to Germany between 1934 and 1938. Hochman deals with the actual fact of these contacts better than Haslam, who shows an inclination to dismiss

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them as unimportant. One would have liked to see a more aggressive treatment.

In Haslam's defense, it must be said that Hochman's chronicle of these Soviet-German contacts fails to prove that the approaches represent a determined, single-minded effort by the Soviets to ally themselves with Germany. His documentary evidence does not strongly support this interpretation. Moscow may have been aiming at an alliance; or at appeasement, as were France and Britain; or at keeping its options open against the possibility of French and British accommodation with Hitler; or at scaring the Western allies into making a greater effort to tighten their connection with the Soviet Union. The real answer is probably a combination of these, which would make sense in view of the uncertainty about allied intentions that surely prevailed in the Soviet Union at the time. These approaches do not appear markedly different from French and British diplomacy toward Hitler, and are easily explained by the system-level constraints and incentives discussed earlier.

In sum, although both books contain flaws, those interested in Soviet policy during the 1930s will find it a worthwhile exercise to read them together. They must be carefully studied if the reader is to discern the full range of differences between the two authors as well as the reasons for these disagreements. In my judgment, Haslam carries the day because he explains more about the Soviet Union's activity during this period than does Hochman. In the end, Hochman can account only for Soviet flirtations with Hitler; he cannot explain Soviet approaches to the West. Haslam accounts for both—although his book would have been improved by a more thorough and self-conscious approach in developing his implicit "systemic" perspective on Soviet behavior.

The relevance of the different arguments to our assessment of current Soviet foreign policy is limited, but important. During the period under discussion, the expansionist policies of Japan, Italy, and Germany offered threats as well as opportunities to other states, including each other. In response to this situation, Haslam's account reveals a Soviet Union more conservative than revolutionary in its foreign policy, more fearful than greedy. We cannot, of course, infer from Soviet behavior during the 1930s the scope of the state's ultimate objectives in international politics either then or now. But Haslam's account strongly suggests that the basic security of the Soviet state took precedence over these objectives—whether they were limited or expansive. From 1933 to 1939, the Soviets were motivated more by their perception of the threat Hitler posed than by the opportunities his mischief might create. Although the avoidance of involvement in a great war was a central objective of Moscow's foreign pol-

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icy, the Soviets showed themselves willing to run at least modest risks of involvement in war for the sake of developing an effective coalition against Hitler. The policy was one of caution. And if caution prevailed under a leader as ruthless, and as insensitive to wholesale loss of life as Joseph Stalin, then Soviet foreign policy under his successors may be expected to be even more cautious.

The evidence of 70 years of Soviet foreign policy behavior does suggest that the West faces an adversary with expansionist proclivities. The evidence from the 1930s, however, supports those who have argued that the Soviet Union is far from the free-wheeling aggressor of the Nazi-German model. In view of the grave risks that the Soviet Union would run in a clash with the United States and its allies, Western mobilization of moderate political, military, and economic resources in support of deterrence should be sufficient to preserve Western security over the long term.

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

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

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

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

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